Dawkins v. Richmond County Sch.

• Decision Date: 04 May 2012
• Docket Number: 1:12CV414
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: WILLIAM COREY DAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. RICHMOND COUNTY SCHOOLS and MARSHA PORTER (principal), Defendants.

WILLIAM COREY DAWKINS, Plaintiff,

v.RICHMOND COUNTY SCHOOLS and MARSHA PORTER (principal), Defendants.

1:12CV414

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

May 4, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1), filed in conjunction with Plaintiff's pro se form Complaint asserting employment discrimination claims against Defendant Richmond County Schools ("RCS") and Defendant Marsha Porter (Docket Entry 2). The Court will grant Plaintiff's request to proceed as a pauper because his Application demonstrates financial eligibility and his Complaint appears to state a viable claim against Defendant Porter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for discrimination based on sexual orientation in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Before this litigation proceeds any further, however, in the interest of effective case-management, the Court will order that:

1) if Plaintiff agrees to proceed only against Defendant Porter under Section 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clauseby discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, he shall file a written notice to that effect; or

2) if Plaintiff wishes to pursue any cause of action other than one against Defendant Porter under Section 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, he shall file an Amended Complaint that clearly identifies and that contains sufficient factual allegations to support any such additional cause(s) of action or he shall file a memorandum showing cause why the allegations in the Complaint suffice to support any such additional cause(s) of action.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

"The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892 [and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts 'solely because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs.'" Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). "Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its problems. Parties proceeding under the statute d[o] not face the same financial constraints as ordinary litigants. In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit." Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4thCir. 2004). To address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that "the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines that - . . . (B) the action or appeal - (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

As to the second of these grounds for dismissal, a plaintiff "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when the complaint lacks "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. In other words, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.¹

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is "a bisexual/gay male" and that Defendant RCS and Defendant Porter "discriminated against [Plaitiff] based on [his] sexual orientation and gender." (Docket Entry 2 at 2.) According to the Complaint, Defendant RCS employed Plaintiff for the 2010-11 school year as a teacher at a school at which Defendant Porter served as principal and at which the faculty consisted of "24 teachers, 3 of which were male." (Id. at 2, 4 (emphasis in original).) The Complaint states that Plaintiff is "an excellent teacher, who has always had a great rapport with children of all ages." (Id. at 3; see also id. at 6 (alleging that students "always enjoyed [Plaintiff's] lessons").)

As support for Plaintiff's claims of unlawful employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender, the Complaint first asserts that Defendant Porter "did not seem to respect [Plaintiff] from the start." (Id. at 2.) It further alleges that Defendant Porter "seemed to favor the females [on the faculty], and often went out of her way to speak and be personable with them." (Id. at 3.) The Complaint acknowledges that, "[i]nearly December [2010], . . . a few parents, and PTO [Parent-Teacher Organization] members approached [Defendant] Porter with 'concerns' of misconduct." (Id.)² However, according to the Complaint, "[t]here was no formal investigation by authorities, nor charges filed [and,] . . . [a]t NO TIME, ever, have the students entrusted to [Plaintiff's] care, been in an un-safe environment." (Id. (capitalization and emphasis in original).)

Nonetheless, the Complaint alleges that, "[i]mmediately following the [expression of parental concerns], [Defendant] Porter called [Plaintiff] into her office. She stated that '[Plaintiff] didn't belong here' and reported the allegations made by parents. It was at that point [Plaintiff] began to fear that [Defendant Porter] might not renew [Plaintiff's] contract." (Id.)

Next, the Complaint states that, in "mid-March [2011], [Defendant RCS's personnel director] called an un-announced conference with [Defendant] Porter, [an assistant principal], and [Plaintiff]." (Id.) According to the Complaint, during the conference, Defendant RCS's personnel director "showed no support for [Plaintiff,] . . . did not serve as an affective [sic] liaison [and] sided with [Defendant] Porter." (Id. (emphasis in original).) The Complaint further asserts that, when DefendantPorter "announced that she would not renew [Plaintiff's] contract, [Defendant RCS's personnel director] was cold as [Plaintiff] begged for [his] job." (Id.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff's pleas, the Complaint alleges that Defendant RCS's personnel director and Defendant Porter "continued with their 'matter of fact' judgement . . . [and,] "[s]oon after that meeting, they began almost 'pushing' [Plaintiff] to resign. This continued until the end of the school year." (Id. at 3-4.)³

According to the Complaint, after "word of [Plaintiff's] non-renewal leaked out[,] . . . [f]aculty and staff often made homophobic type jokes within [Plaintiff's] hearing range . . . ." (Id. at 4.) The Complaint also describes the following incidents:

One afternoon, as [Plaintiff] was about to leave for the day, [his] lover came by the school. He came to [Plaintiff's] end of the building as [Plaintiff] was walking out. [Plaintiff's lover] was VERY upset, and needed [Plaintiff's] help. [Defendant] Porter seeing [Plaintiff and his lover] on camera, sent another teacher (one of her pets) out to investigate. She was very noisy and rude toward both [Plaintiff and his lover]. She wanted to know why [Plaintiff's lover] was at the school. [Plaintiff] was outRAGED!

. . . .At a faculty meeting in April [2011], [Plaintiff] expressed interest in an alternative licensing program in school administration. . . . [Plaintiff] was one of 2 teachers to raise their hands. . . . [Defendant Porter] jotted [Plaintiff's] name down; however, [Plaintiff is] sure it wasn't submitted for consideration by [Defendant RCS's] personnel [staff].

. . . .

After learning of [Plaintiff's] non-renewal, a good friend approached [the assistant principal who had attended the meeting at which Defendant Porter told Plaintiff she would not renew his contract] in a grocery store. [Plaintiff's friend] demanded to know why [Plaintiff] was "let go" . . . [and the assistant principal] stated to [Plaintiff's] friend . . . that "[Defendant] Porter had a problem with [Plaintiff's] sexual orientation."

(Id. at 4-5 (capitalization in original).)

DISCUSSION

The Complaint does not identify a specific legal basis for Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims. (See id. at 1-7.) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). "In 1972, Congress . . . extended the coverage of Title VII . . . to allow suits against state and local government employers under the same conditions as private employers." Keller v. Prince George's Cnty., 827 F.2d 952,955 (4th Cir. 1987). At that time, "§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 [now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983] already provided a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprived another person of any federal constitutional or statutory right." Id. However, "Title VII does not supplant § 1983." Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, as a general proposition, in addition to pursuing discrimination claims under Title VII, "[p]ublic employees are entitled to bring § 1983 actions asserting claims based on equal protection violations." Adams v. Trustees of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 566 (4th Cir. 2011).

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim under Title VII. First, Title VII does not prohibit employment discrimination based on "sexual...