Dawson v. Bankers' Life Co.

Decision Date14 March 1933
Docket NumberNo. 41565.,41565.
PartiesDAWSON ET AL. v. BANKERS' LIFE CO.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Greene County; R. L. McCord, Judge.

Action at law by the beneficiaries upon a $1,000 life insurance policy with a double indemnity clause in case of accidental death by accidental means.

The insured died September 17, 1930. The liability of the defendant company for $1,000 was never denied, and was promptly paid. The issue raised is whether the insured died from an accident, thereby making defendant liable for double benefits.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment was entered thereon. The defendant appealed.

Affirmed.Wilson & Harris, of Jefferson, and Alberson & Nourse, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Ralph G. Howard and Chas. E. Hird, all of Jefferson, for appellees.

KINTZINGER, Justice.

The facts are substantially as follows:

The insured was a young man 27 years of age. On the day of and shortly before his death, he was engaged in playing a game of baseball. In running the bases during the seventh inning, he made a slide to third base.

It is plaintiffs' contention that he was injured internally in the slide to third base. Some 15 or 20 minutes after the “slide” he was taken violently ill and removed to a doctor's office, wherein he died in about one hour.

Up to the time of receiving the alleged injury, he was strong, healthy, and robust; had never had any rheumatism, influenza, venereal or other diseases, and never had any indication of heart or other organic trouble, which might cause a sudden death. He was a farmer, doing most of the work on a 160-acre farm, had been engaged in outdoor work, and was experienced in playing baseball.

He was examined for life insurance by a company doctor about 90 days before his death, and was by him considered and recommended a good risk for insurance. At that time his blood pressure was normal. The doctor made an examination of his mouth, throat, teeth, chest, heart, pulse, temperature, and general build. His tonsils were somewhat affected, but the doctor made no report of it, and did not consider it sufficient to exclude insurance.

On the day of the ball game, and up to the time he made the “slide,” no one observed anything wrong with him. He had played a good peppy game, and never played a better or faster game than he was playing that day. Before the “slide” he made no complaint whatsoever.

After sliding to third base, another player made a two-base hit, and the deceased slowly sauntered into home plate. The next batter was put out on a fly, retiring the side. During the next, or first half of the eighth inning, the deceased was out in the left field, squatting down in a crouched position, and was not playing his usual game, in an upright position.

At the end of the first half of the eighth inning, he walked in slowly towards home plate, humped over, with his hand over his abdomen. As he came along the third base line, holding his side, he sank down on the ground. From that time on he suffered great pain until he died. After he came in from the field, he was met by some players who assisted him into an automobile. This was about 15 or 20 minutes after he made the slide. After coming in from the field, he began spitting and vomiting blood. When he was picked up, he exclaimed: “Oh I am so sick.” While lying on the ground, he was groaning with pain and vomiting, and big drops of sweat were standing out on his head. While in the car before leaving the ball field, he said to a fellow player: “Will, when you picked me up there, I thought I was going to die. I hurt myself when I slid to third base.” He also said: “When I made that slide into third base, I felt a tear in there” (indicating his abdomen). On the way down to the doctor's office he complained of pain, and continued to hold his side until he died. He was somewhat relieved of pain by raising his leg to his abdomen, but on straightening it out again the pain increased.

At the doctor's office, when the doctor asked him where it hurt, he said: “I hurt right in there (indicating his abdomen). When I slid to third base out there, I felt a tear in there.” He died in the doctor's office about a half hour after he arrived and about an hour and twenty minutes after the time he made the slide to third base.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff was accustomed to sliding to bases, and that a slide to a base is not ordinarily followed by serious consequences.

Several days prior to the ball game, deceased hurt his arm or wrist, requiring three stitches and a bandage. After the ball game, and at the doctor's office, Dr. Thornburg, defendant's witness, examined the arm, took out the stitches, said it was all healed up, and told deceased: “That ain't what's the matter with you.”

Medical experts on behalf of claimants, in answer to hypothetical questions, testified that in their opinion, in a case of that kind, under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, the cause of death of a person receiving such injuries was from an internal injury or hemorrhage caused by external force, and that in their judgment death under those conditions would not be due to any natural cause or causes.

The expert opinion evidence of the medical experts offered on behalf of the plaintiffs and defendant was conflicting as to the cause of decedent's death.

The testimony of the medical experts offered on behalf of the defendant was to the effect that a person, under the facts assumed in the hypothetical questions put to them, died from angina pectoris, and not from an accident.

The medical evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs showed that a person under the facts assumed in the hypothetical questions, based on the evidence, could not possibly have died from angina pectoris, and, in their opinion, the death was produced by an internal injury caused by external force.

The medical testimony shows that angina pectoris is simply the symptom of a diseased condition of the heart organs, and, if this disease in such organs did not exist, there would be no angina pectoris. The pathology showing the existence of disease would necessarily be present for some considerable length of time before an attack of angina pectoris occurred. One of the doctors testifying on behalf of the defendant made an examination of the deceased 90 days before his death, and failed to find any symptoms of such disease. Medical experts also showed that, if none of the diseases existed in the heart organs, physical exertion itself would not bring on an attack of angina pectoris.

Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that the presence of such diseases would be discovered by a physical examination of a person occurring 90 days before his death. This was admitted by defendant's experts, but they say it could have been discovered upon such an examination, but that it might not.

The provision of the policy relied on for double indemnity is as follows:

“Upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental cause, the Bankers Life agrees to pay double the amount called for in the policy.”

“This double indemnity benefit will not apply if the insured's death resulted from some physical or mental infirmity or directly or indirectly from disease of any kind.”

A certificate of the attending physician was furnished wherein the cause of death was given as angina pectoris. The first proofs of loss were furnished to the company by claimants about September 22, 1930, giving as the cause of death, an injury to decedent's wrist, received nine days before his death. On September 29th claimants filed an amendment to their first proofs, by furnishing another affidavit, stating that the death of the insured resulted from an accident upon the baseball field on September 17, 1930. The claim that the cut had anything to do with the cause of his death was wholly abandoned, and at the trial the evidence as to the cause of death was centered upon the alleged accident upon the baseball field.

About October 7, 1930, claimants received a letter from the insurance company denying liability for the double indemnity because no proof that insured's death resulted from an accident was submitted to the company. A few days thereafter claimant and his attorney visited the officers and attorney for the company at their office in Des Moines. At that time and place, claimant told the company they could furnish evidence to prove that deceased died accidentally, if they wanted it, and orally advised the company's officers and attorney of the nature of such additional proof. The conversation was had with Mr. Nourse, their attorney. At that time the attorney said he did not care for additional proofs, that they were not going to pay any of the extra $1,000, and that they refused to pay any of the additional double indemnity.

[1] I. One of the claims made in this case is that because the slide to third base made by the deceased was an ordinary occurrence in a ball game, that an injury resulting therefrom would not in itself be considered accidental.

The requisites of the policy required a showing that death resulted exclusively from bodily injury inflicted through accidental means. In many jurisdictions the courts distinguish between accidental results and accidental means, and requires that both be proved in order to meet the provisions of such a policy. Such was the earlier rule in Iowa. In the case of Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa, 423, 166 N. W. 363, 367, 168 N. W. 884, 3 A. L. R. 1295, the early rule was modified, and it was there held that an accidental result and the accidental means by which it is caused are somewhat identical, and that proof of the former may be considered as proof of the latter. See, also, U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 S. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 60;Budde v. Nat....

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2 cases
  • Dawson v. Bankers' Life Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 14 Marzo 1933
  • Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 26 Febrero 1941
    ... ... verdict, even if based on properly assumed facts and opposed ... by expert testimony based on personal examination ... Dawson V. Bankers' Life Co., 216 Iowa ... 586, 247 N.W. 279 ... [100 ... Utah 129] With regard to the contention that the conclusions ... of ... ...

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