Dawson v. Baum

• Citation: 19 P. 46,3 Wash.Terr. 464
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Decision Date: 30 January 1888
• Parties: DAWSON ET AL. v. BAUM.

19 P. 46

3 Wash.Terr. 464

DAWSON ET AL. v. BAUM.

Supreme Court of Territory of Washington

January 30, 1888

Error to Fourth district court.

Action for damages for alleged malicious and illegal seizure of goods under an attachment, by Isaac Baum against I. R. Dawson and others. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants bring error.

LANGFORD, J.

This case is one in which the defendant in error brought his action against the plaintiffs in error. "In the district court of Washington territory, and for the Fourth judicial district thereof, holding terms at Cheney for Spokane county. Isaac Baum, plaintiff, vs. I. R. Dawson, Walker L Bean, A. M. Cannon, B. H. Bennett, J. J. L. Peel, Gotthard Palmtag, Samuel Wilson, Victor Dessert, John N. Squier, and J. D. Sherwood, defendants. Complaint. Isaac Baum, the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, complains of the defendants therein, and for a cause of action alleges (1) that for a long time before, and at the time of, the committing of the injuries by the said defendants, hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff had been and was engaged in business as a retail merchant, at the town of Colville, in the county of Stevens, in Washington territory that during said time said plaintiff was doing a prosperous and profitable business, and had good standing, reputation and credit as a merchant; (2) that at the time hereinafter mentioned plaintiff had on hand and in his possession, in his store-house in said town of Colville, goods, wares, and merchandise to the aggregate value of ten thousand dollars,-said stock of goods, wares, and merchandise consisting of dry goods, groceries, hard ware queen's-ware, boots and shoes, ready-made clothing, and other articles usually kept for sale in a retail store; and was then and there engaged in selling the same; (3) that on the 26th day of April, A. D. 1886, at said town of Colville, one Oscar Bates, at the instigation and request of the defendants, and being by them then and there employed thereto and assisted therein, unlawfully, wrongfully, maliciously, and oppressively took from the possession of the plaintiff and carried away said stock of goods, wares, and merchandise, then and there being in plaintiff's store-house as aforesaid, consisting of dry goods, groceries, hardware, queen's-ware, boots and shoes, ready-made clothing, and other articles usually kept for sale in a retail store as aforesaid, the property of plaintiff, and of the aggregate value of ten thousand dollars as aforesaid, and unlawfully, maliciously, wrongfully, and oppressively detained the same from the plaintiff, to his damage in the sum of ten thousand dollars; (4) that, in consequence and by reason of such taking and detention of said stock of goods, wares, and merchandise, the plaintiff was put to great trouble and expense to procure the return of the same, and was compelled to pay, and did pay, the sum of seven hundred dollars as attorney's fees, and also the sum of three hundred dollars for other expenses necessarily incurred by him in order to regain the possession of said property; (5) that, by reason of said taking and detention of said goods, wares, and merchandise, as aforesaid, plaintiff lost the profits of three (3) days' sale from said stock, to his damage to the sum of one hundred dollars, and was further damaged in the sum of one hundred dollars by the careless and negligent handling of said goods, wares, and merchandise during the time they were so detained from plaintiff as aforesaid; (6) that, in consequence of said taking and detention of plaintiff's said stock of goods, wares, and merchandise, as aforesaid, plaintiff was greatly damaged in his credit and good-standing as a merchant, to-wit, in the sum of ten thousand dollars,-for which several sums, aggregating the sum of eleven thousand two hundred dollars, plaintiff demands judgment against said defendants, together with his costs and disbursements in this behalf laid out and expended. TURNER and FOSTER, Attorneys for Plffs."

The first point we will dispose of is defendants' motion for a new trial. There was no other or more definitive ground stated in this motion for a new trial than the language of the statute, which states the several general causes for a new trial. It is a general principle of practice that an appellate court will not consider any error which was not definitely brought to the attention of the court below, so that the trial court may know with some degree of certainty as to the error complained of. A general statement that the court erred in instructions to the jury, or in admitting evidence, and the like, does not point out the particular instruction or the particular evidence upon which the moving party relies, and does not give the trial court any notice of how it may correct the error. To permit the trial court to be thus entrapped into error would be trifling with justice. In the case of Territory v. Bradshaw, 3 Wash. T. 265, 14 P. 594, the ruling that the motion for new trial was too indefinite to support error was made, but the motion for new trial is not definitely set out in the report; but we have examined the motion in that case, and it is similar to the one in this case, and has like indefiniteness. We approve of this ruling, and think that no error can be assigned to the ruling of the court on that motion. We shall therefore examine the other assignments only. The assignments 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 25, 26, 37, 38, principally refer to one point of law, which can be best understood by the statement of the case. As will be seen by reference to the complaint, this action is in the nature of trespass for entering into the store of the plaintiff and seizing upon his property therein. Oscar Bates was sheriff, and at the suit of Dawson against Sheline had a writ of attachment. This plaintiff was suspected of not holding the goods in the store in his own right, but that said goods were the goods of the attachment debtor. Accordingly, to induce the sheriff to levy upon these goods, these defendants executed an indemnity bond to the sheriff. Thus induced, the sheriff made the levy of attachment upon these goods, held them two days, when the...