Dawson v. Contractors Transport Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 24533.,24533.
• Citation: 467 F.2d 727
• Parties: Russell L. DAWSON et al. v. CONTRACTORS TRANSPORT CORP. Appellant, Magazine Bros. Construction Corp., et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

467 F.2d 727 (1972)

Russell L. DAWSON et al. v. CONTRACTORS TRANSPORT CORP. Appellant Magazine Bros. Construction Corp., et al.

No. 24533.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued October 27, 1971.

Decided June 15, 1972.

Rehearing Denied November 13, 1972.

Mr. John F. Mahoney, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Charles E. Pledger, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Warren E. Magee, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Thomas G. Laughlin, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee Dawson.

Mr. James C. Gregg, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Hugh Lynch, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee William H. Singleton Co.

Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and McGOWAN and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.

McGOWAN, Circuit Judge:

The only issue before us is whether a cross-claiming defendant in a negligence action was entitled as a matter of constitutional right to a jury trial. The question arises in the special context of a plaintiff who has (1) been injured in the course of his employment, (2) received workmen's compensation as the exclusive remedy available to him against his employer, and (3) sued two other persons in tort. The cross-claim is by one of such latter defendants, and it alleges that the employer's negligence was responsible for the injury.

For the reasons hereinafter appearing, we find that the trial judge was empowered to hear and resolve the cross-complaint without the intervention of a jury; and we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I

Appellee Dawson was injured on December 15, 1964 in the course of his employment at the Watergate Apartments construction site. The general contractor of the project, Magazine Brothers Construction Corporation, subcontracted the installation of the plumbing and ventilation systems to Dawson's employer, appellee William H. Singleton Company. Appellant Contractors Transport Corporation agreed with Singleton to deliver and "rig into place when directed" three large refrigeration machines. During the delivery of these machines a winch line snapped, causing injury to Dawson, who was assisting in the unloading.

Dawson subsequently applied for and received compensation from Singleton under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970), made applicable to the District of Columbia by 36 D.C.Code § 501. The Act is, by its terms, the exclusive remedy against employers available to employees injured in the course of their employment, and thus operates as a bar to any negligence suit by an employee against his employer. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970). Thereafter, Dawson and his wife filed suit in the District Court against Magazine and Contractors for their alleged negligence in causing the injury; and Magazine filed a third-party complaint against Singleton for indemnification, under a contract between them, against any judgment suffered by Magazine. Contractors then filed a cross-claim against Singleton which, by reference to our decision in Murray v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 405 F.2d 1361 (1968), sought a credit of 50 per cent against any judgment that might be rendered against Contractors.

The so-called "Murray credit" is an extension of the equitable doctrine of contribution in the context of workmen's compensation claims. Under the principle of contribution, a tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered is entitled to recover proportional shares of the judgment from other joint tortfeasors whose negligence contributed to the injury and who are also liable to the plaintiff.¹ Since employers covered by workmen's compensation statutes are not liable in tort to their injured employees, other tortfeasors are not entitled to contribution from negligent employers, and thus, before Murray, bore the entire burden of the tort damages.²

To mitigate the harshness of this result, we held in Murray that a person against whom the employee was awarded damages in a tort action could reduce the judgment by 50 per cent if he could show that the employer's negligence contributed to the injury.³ Thus the basis of Contractors' cross-claim against Singleton was the allegation that Singleton's negligence contributed to Dawson's injury.

Before the trial, Dawson moved for a jury trial in his action against Magazine and Contractors, as did Magazine in respect of its third-party complaint against Singleton. Although Contractors made no such request with relation to its cross-claim against Singleton, it argues that the trial transcript shows that the court and parties agreed at the start of the trial that the issues of fact on the cross-claim would be submitted to the jury. Alternatively, Contractors asserts that it was, in any event, entitled to rely on the motion of its co-defendant Magazine.⁴

At the trial, Contractors attempted to establish its own freedom from negligence by asserting and showing that the sole cause of the injury was Singleton's negligence. However, the jury brought in a general verdict which, although finding Magazine not negligent, held Contractors liable for $100,000 in damages. The trial judge then addressed himself to Contractors' cross-claim, finding that Singleton was not negligent on the evidence of record and, accordingly, denying the cross-claim. Contractors now asserts that the negligence issue underlying the cross-claim should have been submitted to the jury, and that the action of the judge in deciding it himself denied Contractors its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.

II

The Constitution in terms preserves the right to trial by jury in "suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." It is well established, however, that actions which are not "suits at common law" but which lie strictly in equity do not give rise to a right to trial by jury and may be tried by the court alone. Issues of fact relating to an equitable claim may be submitted to a jury, however, if the judge in his discretion chooses to do so.⁵ A threshold question here, therefore, is whether the judge undertook at the outset to submit the issues of fact on the cross-claim to the jury.

While Contractors insists that there was such an understanding between the court and the parties, the record indicates that there was no meeting of the minds on the question. It is apparent that at least the court and counsel for Dawson, Singleton, and Magazine understood that the issues of law and fact on the cross-claim would be decided by the judge alone after the jury's verdict in the main action.⁶ Although the statement made by counsel for Contractors in this colloquy is not completely clear, it is significant that there was no objection voiced to the course which the court clearly said it planned to follow. Although the record lacks the clarity requisite for the finding of a waiver of the constitutional rights now asserted by Contractors, it does at least indicate that there was no agreement reached between the parties and the court which estops any one of them from pressing his present position with respect to the procedure appropriately to be followed.

Thus, the judge erred in resolving the cross-claim himself only if Contractors had a constitutionally protected right to trial by jury. The answer to that question requires an analysis of the nature of a claim for a Murray credit, and examination of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court in this area.

III

The Supreme Court has noted the difficulty of "defin(ing) with precision the line between actions at law dealing with legal rights and suits in equity dealing with equitable matters," Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533, 90 S.Ct. 733, 735, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970), and has suggested that

The "legal" nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger of law and equity in the Federal Rules in 1938 custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply. Id. at 538, n. 10, 90 S.Ct. at 738.

Despite its recent origin, we have no doubt that a Murray credit claim is equitable in character. Indeed, it has a doubly equitable origin. First, the doctrine of contribution itself was created by courts of equity to dissipate the harshness of the common law rule that rendered liable for the entire damages a tortfeasor against whom a judgment had been obtained, despite the existence of other tortfeasors not parties to the suit. As this court said in Jones v. Schramm, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 170, 171, 436 F.2d 899, 900-901 (1970);

Contribution is an "equitable doctrine based on principle of justice," — which is not dependent on contract, joint action, or original relationship of the parties. . . . The doctrine of contribution originated in the courts of equity, and it was announced in this jurisdiction in a leading opinion by Judge Groner. . . . We may assume, therefore, as it has apparently been generally assumed, that when contribution is sought against a defendant who was not sued by plaintiff, as is permitted by our decisions, the claim sounds in equity and the court acts as finder of the fact to determine whether the second tortfeasor from whom contribution is sought was negligent, and therefore liable to the victim. (Emphasis supplied).⁷

Second, the Murray credit was adopted to prevent inequity in cases where workmen's compensation bars recovery in contribution. Furthermore, unlike actions at law traditionally, a Murray credit claim is not an action to recover money damages from the object of the claim, but rather for a declaration of entitlement to a credit against the claimant's liability in damages to a third party.

The Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Bernhard, supra, does not affect the conclusion that a Murray credit claim is equitable, and thus does...