Dawson v. Department of Transp.

Decision Date13 June 1979
Docket NumberNo. CIV-79-72-D.,CIV-79-72-D.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma
PartiesJohn Allen DAWSON, In person and for all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Federal Aviation Administration, Langhorne Bond, Administrator, Oklahoma State Department of Health, Dr. Joan Leavitt, Director, Defendants.

Bob R. Schick, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff.

Larry D. Patton, U. S. Atty., by Kathleen Flanagan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant Dept. of Transp., FAA, Bond.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., by John Gregory Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert D. Kellogg, Atty., Oklahoma State Dept. of Health, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant Oklahoma State Dept. of Health, Leavitt.

ORDER

DAUGHERTY, District Judge.

This is an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, wherein Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring a proposed landfill in Oklahoma City to be an "airport hazard" as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4)1 and an injunction enjoining the Defendants from issuing the permit required for the landfill. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is a licensed commercial pilot as well as a licensed specialist in aircraft accident prevention and alleges that the proposed landfill will constitute a severe hazard to aircraft making instrument approach landings at both Wiley Post and Will Rogers Airports because of the large number of birds that the proposed landfill will attract. It is asserted that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Defendants Oklahoma State Department of Health and Dr. Joan Leavitt have filed herein a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the grounds that Plaintiff is not the real party in interest in this case and has not exhausted his state administrative remedies. Said Motion is supported by a Brief and Plaintiff has filed a Brief in opposition thereto.

In order for the Court to grant relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, supra, an "actual controversy" is required. 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Development Company, Inc., 519 F.2d 370, 377-378 (Tenth Cir. 1975); United States v. Fisher-Otis Company, Inc., 496 F.2d 1146, 1151 (Tenth Cir. 1974). The mere possibility or even probability that a person may be adversely affected in the future by official acts does not create an "actual controversy" within the meaning of § 2201. Garcia v. Brownell, 236 F.2d 356, 358 (Ninth Cir. 1956). Furthermore, the declaratory judgment procedure will not be used to pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial decision to an administrative body. Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Company, Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 246, 73 S.Ct. 236, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 174 U.S. App.D.C. 253, 531 F.2d 585, 596 (D.C.Cir. 1976); see generally 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 2757 and 2758 (1973).

From the record before the Court in the instant case, it appears without dispute that the permit required by Oklahoma law for the proposed landfill has not been issued. Moreover, the Defendants state in their Brief in support of the instant Motion that the application for said permit is not yet complete and cannot be processed until it has been completed. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that at best, there is presently only a mere possibility that Plaintiff will be affected by the proposed landfill. Furthermore, if the Court were to grant the relief sought by Plaintiff in this action, the Court would effectively preempt the Defendant Oklahoma...

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8 cases
  • Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 12, 1989
    ...be used to pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial decision to an administrative body." (Dawson v. Department of Transp. (W.D.Okla.1979) 480 F.Supp. 351, 352, citing, inter alia, Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Company, Inc. (1952) 344 U.S. 237, 246, 73 S.Ct.......
  • U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Kum Gang, Inc., 04-CV-2671 (ILG).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • July 28, 2006
    ...A controversy cannot be a mere possibility or probability that a person may be adversely affected in the future. Dawson v. Dep't of Transp., 480 F.Supp. 351, 352 (W.D.Okla.1979). A controversy "must be sufficiently real and immediate, allowing specific and conclusive relief .. . it must als......
  • New Energy Economy, Inc. v. Shoobridge
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • November 10, 2010
    ...869 P.2d at 291 (citing with approval a clarification of the "actual controversy" requirement set out in Dawson v. Department of Transportation, 480 F.Supp. 351, 352 (W.D.Okla.1979)). In the instant case, the proposed regulation was the subject of public hearings, and the final version, if ......
  • Yount v. Millington
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • November 22, 1993
    ...be adversely affected in the future by official acts" fails to satisfy the actual controversy requirement. Dawson v. Department of Transp., 480 F.Supp. 351, 352 (W.D.Okla.1979). In addition, "[t]he likelihood of the injury recurring must be calculable and if there is no basis for predicting......
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