Dawson v. Finch
Decision Date | 12 May 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 28364.,28364. |
Citation | 425 F.2d 1192 |
Parties | Sidney E. DAWSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert H. FINCH, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Sidney E. Dawson, pro se.
Eldon B. Mahon, U. S. Atty., Dallas Tex., Kathryn H. Baldwin, James C. Hair, Attys., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before THORNBERRY, DYER and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Dawson, an attorney, brought this action seeking an allowance by the District Court of an attorney's fee for his representation of a claimant for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416(i) and 423(a). The District Court denied Dawson's claim, concluding that 42 U.S. C.A. § 406 limits an attorney's total fee allowance to twenty-five percent of the past due benefits recovered by the claimant regardless of the fact that the attorney represented the claimant before both the Secretary and the District Court. Since the Secretary had already authorized twenty-five percent of the amount of the past due benefits for Dawson's representation in the administrative proceedings the District Court dismissed the complaint. We affirm.
In 1965 the claimant, Weldon, filed an application to establish a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416(i) and 423(a). The application was denied. Dawson first represented Weldon in 1966 at the administrative hearing which had been requested by Weldon. The hearing examiner also denied Weldon's application and the Appeals Council affirmed this decision. Weldon then entered into a fifty percent contingent fee contract with Dawson who instituted an action in the District Court for judicial review of the administrative denial of benefits. On motion of the Secretary before answer, the case was remanded for further administrative action resulting in an award by the Secretary to Weldon of accrued benefits totalling $2,502.30. The District Court case was subsequently dismissed upon Dawson's motion.
Upon the joint request of Dawson and Weldon the Social Security Administration made out the check for past due benefits in both their names and Dawson retained one-half of the amount as his fee. He then filed a petition with the Social Security Administration to obtain approval to charge a fee of "25% for services performed as a representative of * * * Weldon before the Social Security Administration and 25% for furnishing him money to pay his doctor bills * * *." The Secretary authorized a fee of twenty-five percent of the accrued benefits for his representation of the claimant and advised Dawson that charging a fee in excess of that amount would expose him to the penalties provided in section 206(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 406(a).
Dawson, being aggrieved by the administrative action, brought this suit in propria persona in the District Court seeking a judgment granting him an additional fee of $625.00 (or a total of fifty percent of the accrued benefits) for his services in representing Weldon before that Court in the earlier action. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that 42 U.S.C.A. § 406 limited the aggregate attorney's fees to twenty-five percent of the claimant's past due benefits. After denial of his motion for a new trial and for reconsideration Dawson appealed.
The novel question on this appeal is whether, under the provisions of section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 406(b), an attorney who has been authorized by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to charge a fee of twenty-five percent of the claimant's accrued benefits for his representation of the claimant in the administrative proceeding may obtain authorization from the District Court to charge an additional twenty-five percent for his representation of the claimant before the Court. It is Dawson's position that as the attorney for the claimant he may do so.
Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 406(b) provides:
Prior to the amendment of the Act in 1965 the Secretary was authorized to prescribe a maximum fee an attorney could charge for his service for representing a claimant before the Secretary. The Act did not provide for a maximum fee other than as fixed by the Secretary; it did not provide for the allowance of a fee by a court for professional services rendered by an attorney before the court; and it did not give the Secretary authority to certify a fee for payment directly to the attorney.
In order to control the charging of "inordinately large fees" by claimants' attorneys and to give assurance to attorneys that they would receive appropriate fees for representing claimants in court, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare proposed the amendments to Section 206. In the hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance2 the Department stated:
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McKenzie v. Heckler, Civ. No. 4-84-182.
...§ 406(b).10 In enacting 42 U.S.C. § 406, Congress intended to encourage lawyers to represent disability claimants. See Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830, 91 S.Ct. 60, 27 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970). The Secretary's policy contravenes that effort.11 For these re......
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Sumler v. Bowen
...Cir.1983), which was based on the Sixth Circuit's earlier decision in Webb, together with the Fifth Circuit decision in Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830, 91 S.Ct. 60, 27 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), another of McKittrick's progeny. See also MacDonald v. Weinberger......
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...becoming excessive, and second, that attorneys be able to collect their reasonable fees. Smith, 815 F.2d at 1155; Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (5th Cir.1970); see also Pappas v. Bowen, 863 F.2d 227, 230-31 (2d Cir.1988) (characterizing the second reason as to "encourage legal rep......
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...& Ad.News 1943, 2062, Hearings on H.R. 6675 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 512-13 (1965), and Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830, 953, 91 S.Ct. 60, 233, 27 L.Ed.2d 60, 261 (1970)); see also Watford, 765 F.2d at 1566-67; Guth......
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...cap. Compare Morris v. Soc. Sec. Admin ., 689 F.2d 495, 497-98 (4th Cir.1982) (recognizing a cumulative cap); Dawson v. Finch , 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1970) (same) with Clark v. Astrue , 529 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no cumulative cap); Wrenn ex rel. Wrenn v. Astrue , ......
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Issue Topics
...v. Social Sec. Admin. , 689 F.2d 495, 497 (4th Cir. 1982); Webb v. Richardson , 472 F.2d 529, 536 (6th Cir. 1972); Dawson v. Finch , 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1970)). Fourth Circuit In Morris v. Social Sec. Admin. , 689 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1982), an attorney moved the district court to a......
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Issue topics
...v. Social Sec. Admin. , 689 F.2d 495, 497 (4th Cir. 1982); Webb v. Richardson , 472 F.2d 529, 536 (6th Cir. 1972); Dawson v. Finch , 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1970)). Fourth Circuit In Morris v. Social Sec. Admin. , 689 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1982), an attorney moved the district court to a......