Dawson v. Ojeda
| Docket Number | 2022-269-Appeal |
| Decision Date | 03 November 2023 |
| Parties | Jaimie Dawson v. Manuel Ojeda. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Providence County Family Court, (P 20-1689M) Richard A Merola, Associate Justice.
For Plaintiff: Frank S. Lombardi, Esq.
For Defendant: Derek M. Gillis, Esq.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
The defendant, Manuel Ojeda (defendant or Ojeda) appeals from an order of a Family Court trial justice, which affirmed the decision and order issued by the General Magistrate of the Family Court. After reviewing testimony, the General Magistrate granted the motion of the plaintiff, Jaimie Dawson (plaintiff or Dawson),[1] to relocate permanently to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with the minor child born as a result of the relationship she had with Ojeda.[2] This case came before the Supreme Court on October 5, 2023, pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After examining the memoranda and arguments presented by the parties, we conclude that cause has not been shown and proceed to decide the appeal at this time. We affirm.
Dawson and Ojeda began dating in early 2019. At that time, Dawson lived in Cranston, Rhode Island. In November 2019, Dawson moved to Manville, Rhode Island,[3] where she resided until moving to Acton, Massachusetts, pursuant to the Family Court's November 18, 2020 order. During the relationship, Ojeda was married to his current wife, a fact that was known to Dawson.
Prior to the child's birth, Dawson worked as a service manager at McGovern Automotive (McGovern) in Brockton, Massachusetts. Dawson commuted approximately one hour and thirty-five minutes to and from Manville, Rhode Island; worked six days a week from 6 a.m. to 5 or 6 p.m.; and earned an annual salary of approximately $112,000. In March 2020, plaintiff began a maternity leave from McGovern; and, on April 13, 2020, she gave birth to a son. Shortly after the child's birth, the relationship between Dawson and Ojeda ended.
On April 23, 2020, Dawson filed this action and an ex parte motion seeking, inter alia, temporary custody and physical possession of the child. The motion also requested that Ojeda be permitted supervised visitation at Dawson's home. The Family Court granted the ex parte motion and entered an order awarding Dawson temporary custody and physical possession of the child, with Ojeda permitted supervised visits at Dawson's home.
Dawson's work leave continued through late September 2020, when she received a letter from McGovern advising that it would no longer hold the service manager position for her and that she would be furloughed. Upon learning this information, Dawson contacted McGovern and was advised that a service writer/adviser position was available in Lowell, Massachusetts. Dawson accepted this position and returned to McGovern as a service writer/adviser in late October or early November 2020.
Dawson's return to McGovern, however, was preceded by the filing of the motion that is the subject of this appeal. On October 14, 2020, plaintiff filed a verified emergency motion to relocate to Massachusetts. At this time, Dawson was living in Manville, Rhode Island, with her son, paying $2,000 per month in rent, plus utilities and other expenses. Upon returning to McGovern, plaintiff's commute to Lowell, Massachusetts, was approximately one hour and forty-five minutes to and from Manville; and plaintiff worked from 7 or 8 a.m. until 3 or 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, in addition to one Saturday a month. While working in Lowell, plaintiff's mother and/or father would travel to Manville to be the primary daycare provider for the infant.
By order dated November 18, 2020, the Family Court granted the emergency motion to relocate and ordered that Dawson "shall move to Acton, Massachusetts and shall stay there until further order of this [c]ourt." The Family Court also granted Ojeda "reasonable rights of visitation to include Monday and Tuesday from 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. with the parties agreeing to meet at Target in the Lincoln Mall parking lot for both pick-up and drop-off." The Family Court's November 18, 2020 order was temporary in nature, pending a hearing and decision on plaintiff's motion to relocate permanently to Massachusetts.[4]
In or around November 2020, Dawson and her son moved into a three-story townhouse in Acton, Massachusetts, which she shared with her parents. The plaintiff testified that among the reasons for the move was saving money and ensuring daycare for her son, both of which were accomplished by moving into the same home as her parents. During this time, plaintiff remained working at McGovern as a service writer/adviser; and, although promised an annual salary between $70,000 and $80,000, plaintiff related that her actual income was lower because certain performance expectations were not met due to the economic downturn caused by the pandemic.
In January 2021, Dawson left her job at McGovern. The plaintiff explained that the reason for leaving McGovern was that her actual salary was lower than expected, and plaintiff further recounted that she did not search for another job in the automotive industry because of its demanding hours and the time it required her to be away from her son. Instead, Dawson began working at a Dunkin' Donuts located about eight miles from her Acton home. By working at Dunkin' Donuts, plaintiff testified, she was able to reduce her work hours to 6 a.m. until 1 p.m. and be home for lunch and dinner with her son. Dawson related that she valued the reduced work hours because they allowed her to "spend time with my son" and because "[t]ime is something I'm never going to get back."
The hearing on plaintiff's motion to relocate permanently to Massachusetts commenced before the Family Court General Magistrate on August 31, 2021, and continued on October 28, 2021. During the hearing, Dawson and Ojeda were the only testifying witnesses. Among the evidence submitted, Dawson testified that in October 2020, she was unable to meet her needs and "couldn't pay $2,000 a month in rent." Dawson also testified that moving to Acton, Massachusetts, was beneficial because she was able to save money, spend more time with her son, and have her parents assist with daycare at no cost.
On November 23, 2021, the General Magistrate issued a lengthy written decision, granting plaintiff's motion to relocate permanently to Massachusetts. Significantly, the General Magistrate reviewed the relevant factors, see infra, and determined that it was in the child's best interests that Dawson be permitted to relocate permanently to Massachusetts with her son. Ojeda filed a timely appeal to a Family Court trial justice, who affirmed the General Magistrate's decision. In relevant part, the Family Court trial justice concluded that there was "no basis to make a finding that there is any mistake of law or clearly erroneous interpretation of evidence in the within matter." This timely appeal ensued.
On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court trial justice's affirmance of the General Magistrate's decision and order allowing Dawson and her son to relocate permanently to Massachusetts. "[T]his Court will not disturb the findings of fact made by a justice of the Family Court with respect to the issue of custody and the best interests of the child unless the hearing justice abused his or her discretion in making such findings." Leon v. Krikorian, 271 A.3d 985, 989 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Andrade v. Andrade, 252 A.3d 755, 760 (R.I. 2021)). "We will affirm the trial justice's award concerning custody and the best interests of the child unless his or her factual findings overlooked or misconceived material evidence or were clearly wrong." Id. (quoting Andrade, 252 A.3d at 760). In reviewing a Family Court trial justice's or magistrate's findings, we have recognized that "[i]t is the trial justice who is in the best position to determine what factors regarding relocation may be relevant on a case-by-case basis, and his or her discretion in this regard should not be unduly constrained." Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 257 (R.I. 2004)).
This Court has recognized that "[r]elocation is the subject of much debate and controversy among legal scholars commentators, mental health professionals, and social scientists." Dupré, 857 A.2d at 248. In doing so, we explained that relocation "underscores an often-irreconcilable tension that develops when parents no longer reside together in a single-family unit." Id. "One parent may wish to move to pursue educational or employment opportunities, to remarry, to be closer to family, or simply to gain a fresh start; whereas the other parent has an interest in maintaining frequent contact and a continuing relationship with his or her child." Id. "To the extent that it can be said that one parent exercises significantly more of such responsibilities than the other, the general stability, well-being and happiness of that parent's family unit will have a direct bearing on the child's well-being." Id. at 256-57. Conversely, we have observed, "the child's opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the other parent, no matter how diminished that parent's role may be, will undoubtedly have some impact on the child's best interests." Id. at 257.
Previously we referenced various American Law Institute (A.L.I.) principles with approval, including that a "court should allow a parent who has been exercising the clear majority of custodial responsibility to relocate with the child if that parent shows that the...
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