Dawson v. Smith, 82-2077
| Decision Date | 12 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-2077,82-2077 |
| Citation | 719 F.2d 896 |
| Parties | Billy Ray DAWSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. William French SMITH and Harold G. Miller, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Robert C. Babione, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, East St. Louis, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.
Frederick J. Hess, U.S. Atty., Richard H. Lloyd, Asst. U.S. Atty., East St. Louis, Ill., for respondents-appellees.
Before PELL, POSNER and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Billy Ray Dawson, an inmate at the federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, appeals to this court from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Dawson asserts that he was denied due process of law in a prison disciplinary proceeding while he was incarcerated at the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, after a confidential informant advised prison authorities that Dawson intended to escape.
On October 24, 1977, while confined at the federal penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana, Dawson was the subject of an incident report which indicated that he "planned to escape." The report specified that:
That same day Dawson was provided with a copy of the incident report and after a "minor disciplinary action" hearing the incident was referred to the Institution Disciplinary Committee ("IDC") for further action. A hearing date was set and Dawson was informed in writing of his rights before the IDC including his right to representation by a staff member, the right to call witnesses, and the right to be advised of the IDC decision. He also had the right to be advised of the facts providing the basis for the IDC's decision, unless such disclosure might tend to jeopardize institutional safety.
On October 25, 1977, Dawson appeared before the IDC and after being confronted with the charge against him, he denied the same. The IDC then found that Dawson did indeed plan to escape as charged. The IDC imposed a forfeiture of 100 days of statutory good time and ordered that he be placed in disciplinary segregation. The Committee based its decision finding Dawson guilty on the contents of the disciplinary report, the investigative summary, and Dawson's statements before the IDC. Shortly thereafter in December of 1977, Dawson was transferred to the maximum security Federal Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. He asserts this transfer was a "direct result" of the IDC findings that he planned to escape.
In denying Dawson parole on December 13, 1979, the United States Parole Commission cited Dawson's "institutional misconduct" as a factor in their decision. 1 On August 20, 1981, Dawson brought this habeas corpus action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana and on November 4, 1981, the case was transferred to the Southern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404. Prior to his bringing this action, Dawson exhausted his administrative appeals of the IDC decision.
Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, a hearing on Dawson's petition was conducted by Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers. At the time of the hearing it was agreed that the case would be submitted on pleadings and exhibits and in addition Dawson and court-appointed counsel made statements before the court. The magistrate denied issuance of the writ after reviewing all of the materials presented to him, including a copy of the confidential informant's report of the planned escape. The magistrate ruled that the record showed "without question that there was more than substantial evidence to support the decision" of the IDC. The petitioner appeals.
Dawson's main argument before this court is that he was denied due process of law as he was not provided with any of the facts upon which the charge was based and was thus unable to adequately defend himself. He also argues that when confidential information is used as the basis for prison disciplinary action, there must be some indication of the reliability of the information and specific reasons must be set forth as to why the identity of the source should remain confidential.
Our court in Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.1983), ruled that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4161 "creates a right to good-time credits--that is, a firm expectation that if the prisoner complies with specified conditions he will automatically earn the credits and be released earlier--a deprivation of that right is a deprivation of liberty." Id. at 946. See also Hewitt v. Helms, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). It follows that any procedure depriving a federal prison inmate of earned statutory good-time credits must comport with the due process requirements of the Constitution.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court established minimum requirements of procedural due process to be afforded to prisoners in disciplinary proceedings. Among these minimum requirements is notice sufficient "to inform [the prisoner] of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Id. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2978. However, our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that:
Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S.Ct. at 872 (citations omitted).
We have examined the specific confidential information referred to concerning Dawson's planned escape and conclude that if Dawson were to be provided with any more specific factual information, it would seriously risk exposing the confidential informant's identity. Should this occur, there would most certainly be a grave danger of retaliation against the informant and institutional security would be jeopardized. We so conclude because:
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