Dawson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 49,49
• Citation: 619 A.2d 111,329 Md. 275
• Parties: Stacy Eugene DAWSON v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 275

329 Md. 275

619 A.2d 111

Stacy Eugene DAWSON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 49, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 8, 1993.

Claudia A. Cortese, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

MacKenzie Canter III of Lehrfeld, Canter, Henzki & Diskin of Washington, DC, for Chiefs of Police National Drug Task Force, amicus curiae.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

On June 7, 1991, the defendant Stacey Eugene Dawson received a trial by jury and was convicted of distributing the controlled dangerous substance cocaine within 1,000 feet of school property under Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 286D. ¹ We granted certiorari to decide the issue of whether § 286D, which criminalizes the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property, even though the school was not in session at the time, violates due process requirements under the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. We hold that § 286D does not offend due process and affirm Dawson's conviction.

I.

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on September 6, 1990, Corporal Taylor, Sergeant French, and Deputy Galbreath of the Harford County Sheriff's Department were conducting an undercover drug operation near the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Harford County. The three deputies were driving on East Belair Avenue in an attempt to make undercover drug purchases. Upon entering the Church Green area of Aberdeen, the deputies saw a group of people gathered near a four foot high wall which paralleled the street. As the deputies passed the group, a young man sitting on the wall waved to the car and motioned for them to return. Corporal Taylor made a U-turn and stopped the car across the street from where the young man sat.

The young man climbed down from the wall, crossed the street, and approached the passenger side of the vehicle. When the young man asked what the undercover deputies were looking for, Corporal Taylor responded that they were looking for "coke." After a brief discussion, Corporal Taylor agreed to purchase a quarter-gram of cocaine. The young man produced a Newport cigarette pack from his pants pocket, removed a small clear plastic packet of cocaine from the cigarette pack, and handed the cocaine to Corporal Taylor through the passenger window. In return, Taylor handed the young man $25.00. In an attempt to learn the seller's name, Corporal Taylor asked whom to ask for if he wanted more cocaine. The young man refused to give his name but responded that "he was always sitting on the wall, and if [they] wanted Cocaine again, [they should] come back and look for him." The young man then returned to his perch on the wall, and the three deputies drove away. The transaction lasted approximately sixty seconds and occurred within 1,000 feet from Halls Cross Elementary School.

Upon leaving the scene, the undercover deputies radioed the Aberdeen Police Department to have a uniformed officer meet them. Within minutes, Officer Osborn met the three undercover deputies. Corporal Taylor gave Officer Osborn a description of the seller and the location of the sale. Corporal Taylor then instructed Officer Osborn to return to the sale area and ascertain the seller's name and address.

Moments later, Officer Osborn and another officer went to the sale area. Most of the group congregated near the wall dispersed upon seeing the police approaching. Two young men remained, however, one sitting on and one standing near the wall. Officer Osborn noted that the man sitting on the wall matched the description of the drug seller and asked him for identification. The man identified himself as Stacey Eugene Dawson. A short distance from where Dawson was sitting the officers found a pack of Newport cigarettes, which upon inspection was found to contain several small packages of cocaine.

The Grand Jury for Harford County indicted Dawson for unlawful distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, § 286(a)(1), and for unlawful distribution of a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school property. § 286D. On June 7, 1991, Dawson received a trial by jury before the Circuit Court for Harford County, the Honorable Stephen M. Waldron presiding. After hearing the evidence, the jury found Dawson guilty on both counts. Dawson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and we granted certiorari before the intermediate appellate court had an opportunity to hear the case.

II.

Dawson asserts two grounds upon which his conviction should be reversed. First, Dawson alleges that the evidence the State presented to the jury was insufficient to support his convictions. Next, he argues that § 286D violates the due process requirements of the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. We will review each contention and affirm Dawson's conviction.

A.

Dawson first asserts that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to prove that he was the person who sold cocaine to the undercover officers. In reviewing the record to determine the sufficiency of evidence supporting a criminal conviction we are mindful of the respective roles of the court and the jury; it is the jury's task, not the court's, to measure the weight of evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 290, 600 A.2d 430, 439 (1992); Hammond v. State, 322 Md. 451, 463, 588 A.2d 345, 351 (1991). Where the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction is at issue, we must determine " 'whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " McMillian, 325 Md. at 289, 600 A.2d at 438 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)). In order to preserve the jury's role in the truth finding process, the appropriate inquiry in applying this standard

"does not require a court to 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' ... Instead, the standard to apply is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis in original).

Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 717, 415 A.2d 830, 842 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)); Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 510-11, 495 A.2d 1, 13 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986).

Dawson argues that "the evidence was not sufficient to support his distribution convictions, [since] there was no credible evidence that he--and not someone else--distributed [the] cocaine at issue." Dawson asserts that the evidence linking him to the cocaine sale was "inherently suspect and virtually unbelievable." Dawson attempts to sow seeds of doubt regarding the State's testimonial evidence relating to the seller's identity. Specifically, he points to the poor lighting where the sale occurred, the brief period of time the purchasing officers saw the seller, the length of time between the purchase and the in-court identification, the fact that the seller wore a hat during the transaction, and the presence of twelve to fifteen other people, who left as Officer Osborn approached.

Dawson wishes for us to ignore the testimony of Corporal Taylor, Sergeant French, and Officer Osborn, and replace the jury's judgment with our own. At the trial, both Taylor and French identified Dawson as the person who waved for them to stop, approached the car's passenger-side window, and negotiated and sold cocaine to them. Both testified that they clearly saw Dawson's face while the transaction transpired within arm's reach. Finally Officer Osborn testified that after receiving the description of the seller, he immediately went to the area of the sale and found Dawson sitting on the wall. Officer Osborn testified that Dawson met the provided description and was sitting exactly where Deputy Taylor told him to look. In addition, Dawson himself admitted that he was at the scene of the drug sale. We conclude, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Dawson was the person who sold Taylor the cocaine.

B.

Dawson next challenges the constitutionality of § 286D under the due process clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Dawson does not dispute that the State has a valid interest in protecting children from the ravages of the drug trade. Rather, he contends that there is no real and substantial relationship between the General Assembly's objective of protecting schoolchildren and § 286D's imposition of criminal liability without regard to the actual presence of children. He reasons that the "distinct [legislative] purpose of protecting school children ... clearly is not served by providing additional punishment for distribution at a time when there is or will be no school children in the area to be in any way exposed to the drug nemesis." We disagree.

We begin with the recognition that the General Assembly has broad authority, under the exercise of the State's police power, to criminalize certain conduct and to decide what penalties to impose for the commission of crimes. Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116, 126, 532 A.2d 1357, 1362 (1987); Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 240, 155 A.2d 894, 897 (1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 719, 80 S.Ct. 1596, 4 L.Ed.2d 1521 (1960). The General Assembly's exercise of this power is not limitless, but must be exercised within the confines of...