Dawson v. State

• Decision Date: 15 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 96-259.,96-259.
• Citation: 2000 MT 219,10 P.3d 49,301 Mont. 135
• Parties: David T. DAWSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

10 P.3d 49

301 Mont. 135

2000 MT 219

David T. DAWSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent.

No. 96-259.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued September 4, 1997.

Submitted August 18, 1999.

Decided August 15, 2000.

Rehearing Denied September 28, 2000.

William F. Hooks, Montana Appellate Defender's Office, Helena, Montana, Kathryn Lund Ross, Attorney at Law, Seattle, Washington, For Appellant.

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Pamela P. Collins, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana, Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana, For Respondent.

Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

s 1 The Petitioner, David Dawson, was convicted of one count of robbery, four counts of aggravated kidnaping, and three counts of deliberate homicide following trial by jury in the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District in Yellowstone County on February 28, 1987. On April 15, 1987, he was sentenced to death for each of the three counts of aggravated kidnaping which resulted in the death of the victim. His conviction was appealed to this Court and affirmed in State v. Dawson (1988), 233 Mont. 345, 761 P.2d 352, cert. denied, Dawson v. Montana (1989), 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 708.

s 2 On January 16, 1991, Dawson filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to § 46-21-101, MCA, in the District Court in which he was convicted. On March 25, 1991, Dawson filed an amended petition for postconviction relief. In that petition, he claimed 30 separate grounds for relief. All but one claim, ineffective assistance of counsel, were dismissed by the District Court by summary judgment. On August 5, 1993, following withdrawal of his appellate counsel, Jeff Renz, Dawson filed a second amended petition for postconviction relief which added a 31st ground for relief: ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Dawson's second amended petition for postconviction relief on February 7, 1996.

s 3 Dawson appeals from the District Court's orders which granted partial summary judgment of his amended petition for postconviction relief and denied his second amended petition for postconviction relief. We affirm the District Court.

s 4 The following issues are presented on appeal:

s 5 1. Did the District Court err when it held that Dawson did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the pretrial phase?

s 6 2. Did the District Court err when it held that Dawson did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial phase?

s 7 3. Did the District Court err when it held that Dawson did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase?

s 8 4. Did the District Court err when it held that Dawson did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the direct appeal phase?

s 9 5. Did the District Court err when it denied Dawson's claims 1-29 by summary judgment?

s 10 6. Should this Court reconsider issues in a postconviction proceeding which were previously decided on direct appeal?

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

s 11 The Petitioner, David Dawson, raised the following claims as violations of his constitutional and statutory rights in his amended petition for postconviction relief:

1. The District Court failed to appoint a psychiatrist to assist the defense.

2. The District Court ordered that the mental health experts appointed in response to the defense request for a mental examination, report to the court and prosecutor as well as the defense.

3. The District Court limited the mental examination to competency and mental issues related to guilt.

4. The state employed psychiatrist and psychologist failed to warn Dawson that he could remain silent and that his statements and test results could be used against him.

5. The state employed psychiatrist and psychologist failed to warn Dawson that the interview would exceed the scope of the court's order.

6. The state employed psychiatrist and psychologist failed to warn Dawson that he had the right to have counsel present during the history taking and testing phases of the mental evaluation.

7. The prosecutor used the testimony of the court-appointed psychologist at the guilt phase of the trial to establish the petitioner's mental state and lack of remorse.

8. The District Court relied on the mental health report and testimony of the state employed psychologist, Dr. Van Hassel, in finding the non-statutory aggravating factor of lack of remorse.

9. Section 46-14-401, MCA (1985), as applied to Dawson, is unconstitutional.

10. The State failed to preserve mitigating or exculpatory evidence by waiting to draw Dawson's bodily fluids until 12 hours following his arrest.

11. The state probation officer failed to advise Dawson that he did not have to submit to the pre-sentence interview, and that anything he said could be used against him during sentencing.

12. The pre-sentence report failed to comply with the requirements of §§ 46-18-111, and -112 (1985), MCA.

13. The District Court failed to give weight to non-statutory mitigating circumstances.

14. The District Court failed to consider the mitigating circumstances as a whole.

15. The District Court failed to consider the mitigating circumstances as a whole when comparing the mitigating circumstances with the aggravating factors.

16. Section 46-18-305, MCA (1985), as applied to Dawson, is unconstitutional.

17. The District Court failed to consider other mitigating circumstances of which there was substantial evidence in the record of their existence.

18. The District Court and the Supreme Court interpreted § 46-18-303, MCA (1985), the statute which enumerates the aggravating factors, too broadly.

19. The District Court imposed the sentence of death as a result of passion and prejudice.

20. The District Court failed to make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law.

21. The District Court's findings establish that the District Court believed the crime to be so serious that it could never find that any evidence of mitigating circumstances would be sufficient to warrant leniency.

22. The District Court reacted emotionally to the testimony of Amy Rodstein in the presence of the jury.

23. The sentence of death by hanging is unconstitutional.

24. The District Court failed to provide Dawson with a jury trial on the issue of whether there were aggravating circumstances.

25. The District Court erred when it concluded that Dawson was not subject to rehabilitation.

26. The District Court erred when it concluded that Dawson would be a danger to others in the future.

27. The State failed to disclose evidence and used inaccurate testimony at the trial and sentencing hearing.

28. The District Court erred when it precluded the testimony of relevant defense witnesses.

29. The prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument.

30. Dawson was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel.

s 12 On May 20, 1991, the State filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on its contention that Dawson's claims 1-29 were procedurally barred, either by res judicata or by § 46-21-105(2), MCA. The District Court granted the State's motion for partial summary judgment on September 16, 1992. On March 15, 1993, Dawson's appellate counsel, Jeff Renz, requested and was granted permission to withdraw as Dawson's appellate counsel. Following Renz's withdrawal, Dawson requested and was granted leave to file a second amended petition for postconviction relief. Dawson filed his second amended petition on August 5, 1993, which added the following claim to his previous 30 claims for relief:

31. Dawson was denied effective assistance of counsel by his appellate counsel for failing to raise petitioner's claims 1-29, inclusive, as issues on petitioner's direct appeal.

s 13 On October 5, 1992, Dawson filed a motion for reconsideration of the District Court's order granting partial summary judgment based on his contention that 9 of the 29 claims dismissed by partial summary judgment, required the presentation of evidence which was not part of the record of the first trial in this case and could not reasonably have been raised on direct appeal and, therefore, were not subject to the procedural bar of § 46-21-105(2), MCA. On January 26, 1993, the District Court denied Dawson's motion for reconsideration.

s 14 On February 14 and 15, 1994, the District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 46-21-201, MCA, to consider the claims set forth in Dawson's second amended petition for postconviction relief. Several witnesses testified at the hearing, however, the District Court refused to consider four affidavits submitted by Dawson in support of his position.

s 15 On February 8, 1996, the District Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying Dawson's second amended petition for postconviction relief. Dawson filed a notice of appeal with this Court on April 5, 1996. On appeal, one of Dawson's contentions was that the District Court erred when it refused to consider the four affidavits he submitted in support of his petition for postconviction relief. On December 12, 1997, without deciding the merits of Dawson's appeal, we entered an order which required the District Court to accept and consider Dawson's four affidavits and any affidavits the State might file in response. Following consideration of the affidavits, we ordered the District Court to issue any additional findings it deemed necessary along with a memorandum stating the effect the additional evidence had on its prior decision.

s 16 On March 8, 1999, the District Court entered its additional findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order in response to our order. Following its consideration of the new evidence, the District Court again denied Dawson's petition for postconviction relief.

s 17 Specific facts which served as the basis for the Petitioner's conviction and his sentence...