Day v. Porter

• Decision Date: 12 May 1896
• Citation: 161 Ill. 235,43 N.E. 1073
• Parties: DAY v. PORTER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

161 Ill. 235

43 N.E. 1073

DAY

v.PORTER et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 12, 1896.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Hibbard Porter and another against Frederick F. Day for commissions as brokers. From a judgment of the appellate court (60 Ill. App. 386) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Hoyne, Follansbee & O'Connor, for appellant.

A. C. Barnes, for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

Appellees recovered a judgment for services performed as real-estate brokers for appellant, in negotiating a sale of real estate on Wabash avenue, in the city of Chicago, and the appellate court has affirmed the judgment. The facts, as adopted by the jury and settled by the judgment of affirmance, are as follows: Plaintiffs were employed by defendant to find a purchaser for the property in question, and the price named by him was $40,000. They secured a prospective purchaser, in the person of David E. Corneau; and in the latter part of May, 1890, William P. Porter, one of the firm, submitted to defendant an offer of $35,000 on behalf of such purchaser. The offer was declined, but negotiations were continued, and Corneau afterwards offered $40,000, when defendant raised the price to $45,000. Subsequently Corneau offered $45,000, and defendant again raised the price, and placed it at $50,000. These negotiations covered the latter part of May and the month of June, up to the 25th or 26th. Corneau had not abandoned the idea of buying the property, but was considering the matter up to June 30th, when defendant met him in the office of Walter H. Wilson, another realestate broker, and learned from him that he was the person who had negotiated for the property through the plaintiffs. Defendant then wrote a letter to plaintiffs, that he had given Wilson the exclusive agency of the property; and on the same day he concluded a bargain with Corneau, by which the property was sold for $50,000.

Corneau, when examined as a witness, was permitted to state, against the objection of defendant, that he had the purchase of the property under consideration up to the time he closed the bargain, and had not abandoned the idea of buying it. The principal objection seems to have been that the question asked was a leading one, and it was perhaps somewhat objectionable in that respect. But it was proper that the witness should state the fact, which was a material one, and there was no abuse of the discretion allowed to the trial court in permitting the question to be asked in a leading form.

The court sustained an objection to a question asked of Corneau by defendant, as to whether he would have bought the property through the plaintiffs. The parties to the suit are agreed that a broker, unless wrongfully prevented by his principal, must bring...