Day v. ROBINWOOD WEST COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DIST.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:08CV01888 ERW.
• Citation: 693 F. Supp.2d 996
• Parties: Noel A. DAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROBINWOOD WEST COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

693 F. Supp.2d 996

Noel A. DAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROBINWOOD WEST COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, Defendant.

Case No. 4:08CV01888 ERW.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

February 16, 2010.

Anthony E. Rothert, American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri, St. Louis, MO, Daniel R. Kuehnert, Oak Park, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Ashley L. Narsutis, John M. Hongs, Hinshaw and Culbertson, LLP, St. Louis, MO, Michael L. Wagner, Hinshaw and Culbertson, Belleville, IL, for Defendant.

AMENDED¹ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E. RICHARD WEBBER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment doc. #40.

I. BACKGROUND²

Defendant Robinwood West Community Improvement District ("Defendant" or "the District") is a political subdivision of the state of Missouri, organized under the Community Improvement District Act ("the Act").³ The Act provides that property owners within a given area may vote to become a Community Improvement District ("CID"), which can be organized as either a non-profit corporation or a political subdivision. Those CIDs choosing the latter, such as the District, obtain certain governance powers, principally the power to tax in order to carry out public improvements. Pursuant to the Act, the District is governed by an elected Board of Directors.

Prior to the election held on June 10, 2008, only registered voters residing within the District were permitted to vote in board elections. In the June 2008 election, however, the Saint Louis County Board of Elections ("the Board of Elections") — administering the election for the District under the terms of the Act — mailed ballots to registered voters and to all owners of real property in the District, with landowners receiving a ballot for each parcel of land they owned at the time. The Act does provide that qualified voters, for purposes of board elections, are "registered voters and owners of real property ... which is located within the district,"⁴ but it is unclear why the Board and the District made this change for the June 2008 election given that this provision has been in effect since 1998.

In the June 2008 election, there were a number of differences between voting as a registered voter and voting as a nonresident landowner. Although the Board of Elections has practices in place that allow it to compare signatures of registered voters on returned ballots in order to detect voter fraud, it does not have any such practices with respect to the signatures of property owners. The Board of Elections and the District also did not screen the returned property owner ballots to determine whether the individuals who voted the ballots met the general criteria for voter registration in Missouri, such as U.S. citizenship and not being in prison or on parole for committing a felony. Additionally, for real property owned by a trust, ballots were addressed to the resident of the property. Because of this, one District resident claimed that he may have voted a property-owner ballot without authority to do so, as the real owner of his home is a trust of which his sister is trustee.

There were two issues on the ballot in the June 2008 election: a property tax issue on which only registered voters were entitled to vote, and the board election, for which District property owners received an additional vote for each parcel of land owned. When the ballots were counted, it was determined that a total of 477 ballots were cast on the property tax issue, versus 741 ballots on the director election (a difference of 264 ballots), and it is unknown what percentage of that difference resulted from individuals casting more than one vote. There were two director seats at play in the election, and 38 votes ultimately separated the second-place and the third-place candidate.

Plaintiffs filed the instant action in December 2008, alleging that the District's practices of granting voting power on the basis of real property ownership and permitting individuals to cast more than one vote in elections are unconstitutional. Plaintiffs Noel Day, James Strake, and Aimee Pavey are registered voters who do not own land in the District, and therefore received one ballot for the June 2008 election. Plaintiffs Barbara Monroney, Janet Kirk, Paula Smith, Cathy Doyel, Esther Swartz,⁵ and Adrienne Breen are registered voters in the District and also own one parcel of real property there; they all received two ballots for the June 2008 election. Plaintiffs J. Sharon Wilson, Judith Hale, David Hood, and Helen Horn are likewise registered voters in the District but own property jointly with their spouses, so in their cases, the property-owner ballot was addressed to both spouses. Plaintiff Barbara Schlottach received three ballots — one as a registered voter and two property-owner ballots addressed to Barbara Frank and Barbara Frank Schlottach, respectively — the names under which she owns two separate pieces of property. Plaintiffs Herbert Strake and Pauline Strake received one ballot, as they own one parcel of real property in the District jointly but are registered voters at their primary address outside of the District.

In March 2009, the District's Board of Directors passed a resolution providing for an election to take place in June 2009 to elect one successor director and to vote on proposed amendments to the District's bylaws. As in the June 2008 election, the District determined that only registered voters would be entitled to vote on the bylaw issue, while registered voters and real property owners would vote on the director election. In April 2009, the Court issued a preliminary injunction doc. #31, under which the District is prohibited from permitting qualified voters from receiving, casting, or having counted more than one vote in any election, and the District passed a resolution to that effect in May 2009. The District has pushed back the election originally to be held in June 2009 to November 2009, however, due to uncertainty as to whether it may constitutionally permit the District's nonresident landowners to vote on the election of the successor director.

Plaintiffs bring their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Mo.Rev.Stat. § 67.1401.2(14)(c) — the provision of the Act providing that owners of real property are qualified voters for board of director elections in community improvement districts — is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment to that effect, permanent injunctive relief, and nominal damages.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if all of the information before the court shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a genuine material fact is one "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the non-moving party has failed to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,... there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The initial burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment is placed on the moving party to establish "the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in his favor." City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988). Once this burden is discharged, if the record does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on that issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). When the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but, by affidavit and other evidence, must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Stone Motor Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 293 F.3d 456, 465 (8th Cir.2002). To meet its burden and survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the non-moving party must show there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party which would enable a jury to return a verdict for it. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 334, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "If the non-moving party fails to produce such evidence, summary judgment is proper." Olson v. Pennzoil Co., 943 F.2d 881, 883 (8th Cir.1991).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not "weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record, decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual issue." Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir.2000). The Court instead "performs only a gatekeeper function of determining whether there is evidence in the summary judgment record generating a genuine issue of material fact for trial on each essential element of a claim." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) Mo.Rev. Stat. § 67.1401.2(14)(c), as applied to Plaintiffs, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that Defendant has granted multiple votes in District...