Day v. Seblatnigg
| Decision Date | 21 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC 20280 |
| Citation | 341 Conn. 815,268 A.3d 595 |
| Parties | Margaret E. DAY, Coconservator (Estate of Susan D. Elia) v. Renee F. SEBLATNIGG et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
James G. Green, Jr., with whom was Laura W. Ray, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant First State Fiduciaries, LLC).
Glenn W. Dowd, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Howard Fetner, New Haven, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff Marc W. Elia).
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.**
The issue that we must decide in this certified appeal, broadly stated, is whether a person who has voluntarily obtained the appointment of a conservator, and thus has not been found by a court to be incapable of managing her affairs, shares joint authority with the conservator of her estate. This issue arises in the specific context of the question of whether an inter vivos trust created by a person under a voluntary conservatorship was void ab initio because the authority to create such a trust rested exclusively with the conservator of the estate under General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 45a-655.1
In 2011, Susan D. Elia submitted an application to the Probate Court for voluntary representation by the named defendant, Renee F. Seblatnigg,2 as the conservator of her estate. The Probate Court granted the application. Thereafter, Elia created an irrevocable trust and arranged for the transfer of certain assets to it. In 2014, the plaintiff, Margaret E. Day,3 acting in her capacity as coconservator of Elia's estate for the limited purpose of matters related to the irrevocable trust, brought this action, seeking a judgment declaring that the trust was void ab initio because Seblatnigg, as Elia's conservator, did not create and fund the trust with the approval of the Probate Court pursuant to § 45a-655 (e). Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant, First State Fiduciaries, LLC,4 a Delaware limited liability company that was designated as "the protector of the ... irrevocable trust," appealed from the judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that the trial court had incorrectly determined that Elia could not create an irrevocable trust on her own behalf while she was under a voluntary conservatorship. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Day v. Seblatnigg , 186 Conn. App. 482, 506, 199 A.3d 1103 (2018). This certified appeal followed.5 We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history. "In June, 2011, Elia applied to the ... Probate Court for the voluntary appointment of a conservator of her person and her estate [because she had Parkinson's disease, a progressively degenerative condition].6 Following a June 28, 2011 hearing in the ... Probate Court, at which the court, Hopper, J. , saw Elia in person, heard her reason for seeking voluntary representation, and explained to her that appointing a conservator as requested would subject her and her property to the authority of the conservator, the court ... granted Elia's application for voluntary representation [by the persons she had designated]. By decree issued on June 28, 2011 ... the court appointed Seblatnigg the conservator of Elia's estate and Richard DiPaola ... the conservator of Elia's person.
"On January 9, 2014, at Elia's request, the ... Probate Court issued a decree ... naming the plaintiff the coconservator of Elia's estate for the limited purpose of any matters relating to Elia's interest in the Delaware irrevocable trust, because Mulia had a possible conflict of interest." (Footnotes added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Seblatnigg , supra, 186 Conn. App. at 486–89, 199 A.3d 1103.
The plaintiff subsequently brought this declaratory judgment action, in which she sought a declaration that the Delaware irrevocable trust was null and void ab initio and an order that "any and all assets transferred to the [Delaware irrevocable trust] or to any entity owned by [that] trust be returned to the conservatorship estate from whence they came ...." The plaintiff then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Delaware irrevocable trust was void because the assets held in the Connecticut revocable trust were part of the conservatorship estate, and Seblatnigg had not obtained the permission of the Probate Court to create or to fund the Delaware irrevocable trust, which, according to the plaintiff, was required by § 45a-655 (e). The plaintiff further contended that Elia's signature on the trust documents could not invalidate the otherwise improper act because, as a voluntarily conserved person, she lacked independent power to create and fund the Delaware irrevocable trust. The defendant contended that § 45a-655 (e) did not apply because the Connecticut revocable trust, which predated the conservatorship, was not part of the conservatorship estate and because Elia herself, not Seblatnigg, created and funded the Delaware irrevocable trust.
The trial court concluded that, when a person is subject to a voluntary conservatorship, "the conservator, as the agent of the Probate Court, has the exclusive authority to manage the affairs of the conserved person." (Emphasis added.) The court further concluded that, because Elia held a present equitable interest in the Connecticut revocable trust, it was part of the conservatorship estate subject to the conservator's authority and, in turn, the requirements of § 45a-655 (e).8
Because Seblatnigg had not complied with the requirement that she obtain Probate Court approval for the creation and funding of trusts on behalf of a conserved person, the court concluded that "the Delaware irrevocable trust [was] void ab initio and unenforceable, and all transfers of assets from Elia's conservatorship estate to the trust or to Peace at Last were unauthorized and improper." Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that the trial court had incorrectly determined that "Elia lacked the ability to execute the Delaware irrevocable trust while under a voluntary conservatorship."9
Day v. Seblatnigg , supra, 186 Conn. App. at 501, 199 A.3d 1103. The Appellate Court concluded that, "[b]ecause a voluntarily conserved person does not retain control over her estate, no genuine issue of material fact existed that Elia lacked the legal capacity to form the Delaware irrevocable trust" and, therefore, that the trial court correctly determined that the Delaware irrevocable trust was void ab initio as a matter of law. Id., at 505–506, 199 A.3d 1103. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., at 506, 199 A.3d 1103.
This certified appeal followed. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that Elia lacked the "legal capacity" to create the Delaware irrevocable trust because Seblatnigg, as the conservator...
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