Day v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 26 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:15-cv-698-MMH-PDB |
| Parties | MELVIN JEROME DAY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Melvin Day, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on June 9, 2015,1 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). Day is proceeding on an amended petition filed on July 14, 2015 (Amended Petition; Doc. 10). In the Amended Petition, Day challenges a 1999 state court (Clay County, Florida) judgment of conviction for armed robbery. Day raises five grounds for relief. See Amended Petition at 5-10.2 Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response;Doc. 19) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Day declined to file a reply brief; instead, deciding to rely on his allegations and arguments as raised in his Amended Petition. See Doc. 22. This case is ripe for review.
On July 28, 1999, the State of Florida (State) charged Day by way of an amended Information with one count of armed robbery. Resp. Ex. A at 8. Day proceeded to a jury trial, at the conclusion of which the jury found him guilty as charged, with a specific finding that he used a firearm during the commission of the offense. Id. at 74. On January 13, 2000, the circuit court adjudicated Day as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and sentenced him to a term of incarceration of thirty years in prison, with a fifteen-year minimum mandatory as a HVFO and a three-year minimum mandatory for his use of a firearm during the commission of the crime. Id. at 132,137-38.
Day appealed his conviction and sentence to Florida's First District Court of Appeal (First DCA). Id. at 149. Day, with the assistance of counsel, raised one issue on appeal: whether the circuit court erred in sentencing Day as a HVFO. Resp. Ex. D. The State filed an answer brief, Reps. Ex. E, and Day filed a brief in reply. Resp. Ex. F. On January 18, 2001, the First DCA per curiam affirmed Day's conviction and sentence without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. G. The First DCA issued its Mandate on February 5, 2001. Resp. Ex. H. On February 18, 2000, Day filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) (Rule 3.800(a) Motion), in which he alleged his HVFO sentence was illegal. Resp. Ex. I. On February 29, 2000, the circuit court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction due to Day's pending direct appeal. Resp. Ex. J. On November 9, 2000, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the dismissal with a written opinion, Resp. Ex. K, and issued its Mandate on December 5, 2000. Resp. Ex. L.
On August 13, 2001, Day filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. M at 7-29. In his Rule 3.850 Motion, Day argued that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) misadvising him to reject a favorable plea offer; (2) failing to call a witness; (3) failing to impeach two witnesses; (4) opening the door to evidence that was otherwise excluded pursuant to a pretrial motion in limine; (5) referring to Day as the unidentified robber, and failing to object when the prosecutor and a witness made the same characterization; and (6) his cumulative errors. Id. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the motion. Resp. Ex. O. On January 10, 2005, the First DCA affirmed the circuit court's denial without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. U. Day filed a motion for rehearing, Resp. Ex. V, which the First DCA denied on February 18, 2005. Resp. Ex. W. The First DCA issued its mandate on March 8, 2005. Resp. Ex. X. On May 19, 2003, Day filed a second pro se motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) (Second Rule 3.800(a) Motion), arguing that his HVFO adjudication was illegal because one of the prior convictions the State relied on did not qualify as a prior conviction for purposes of the HVFO statute. Resp. Ex. P. In an order filed July 24, 2003, the circuit court denied the motion. Resp. Ex. O. Day did not appeal. Resp. Ex. AA.
On October 8, 2008, Day filed another pro se motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) (Third Rule 3.800(a) Motion), in which he again attacked his HVFO adjudication based on the State's reliance on a conviction that did not qualify as a previous conviction for purposes of the HVFO statute. Resp. Ex. Y. The circuit court denied the motion on March 9, 2010. Resp. Ex. Z. Again, Day did not appeal. Resp. Ex. AA.
On October 28, 2011, Day, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion to correct illegal sentence and petition for writ of habeas corpus (Fourth Rule 3.800(a) Motion). Resp. Ex. BB at 1-57. In the motion, Day argued that the circuit court relied on an older version of the HVFO statute that allowed for the imposition of a HVFO sentence if a defendant was on parole within five years from the commission of the instant offense. Id. The Florida legislature amended the statute to eliminate the probation or parole provision of the law prior to the date Day committed the armed robbery. Id. Thus, Day contended that the circuit court's reliance on an Alabama conviction for which Day wasreleased from prison more than five years before the commission of the instant offense, even though he was on parole within the five-year period, was improper and resulted in an illegal sentence. Id. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Day's Fourth Rule 3.800(a) Motion, finding Day did not qualify as a HVFO and ordered a new sentencing proceeding. Id. at 127-31. Ultimately, the circuit court resentenced Day to a term of imprisonment of thirty years, with a three-year minimum mandatory. Id. at 188-89.
Day appealed the imposition of his new sentence to the First DCA. Id. at 197. Day's appellate counsel filed an Anders3 brief. Resp. Ex. DD. After the filing of appellate counsel's Anders brief, but prior to Day's filing his own pro se initial brief, Day filed with the circuit court a motion to correct a sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) (Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion). Resp. Ex. EE. In the motion, Day alleged that (1) his sentence was illegal because a successor judge sentenced him rather than the original trial judge; (2) the circuit court violated his due process rights by not allowing him to address the circuit court; (3) the circuit court considered erroneous information during the resentencing hearing; and (4) the circuit court did not understand it had the discretion to impose a sentence of less thanthirty years. Id. at 2-10. The circuit court denied the Rule 3.800(b)(2) Motion. Id. at 13-15. Thereafter, Day filed his pro se initial brief, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Resp. Ex. FF. On March 10, 2014, the First DCA per curiam affirmed Day's sentence without a written opinion, Resp. Ex. GG, and issued its mandate on April 7, 2014. Resp. Ex. HH.
On June 6, 2014, Day filed a motion to mitigate sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). Resp. Ex. II. The circuit court denied the motion on June 19, 2014. Resp. Ex. JJ.
On June 9, 2015, Day filed his initial Petition with this Court. See Petition. Following Day's notice of voluntary dismissal, Doc. 7, the Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice. Doc. 8. On July 14, 2015, Day filed an amended federal habeas petition, but it was given a new case number, 15-cv-882. See Doc. 1 in case number 15-cv-882. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition as untimely. See Doc. 12 in case number 15-cv-882. Day filed a reply brief. See Doc. 13 in case number 15-cv-882. On April 6, 2018, the Court denied Respondents' motion to dismiss, reopened case number 15-cv-698 (the instant case), and afforded Day the right to pursue his claims in this case. See Doc. 14 in case number 15-cv-882.
On October 20, 2015, Day filed another Rule 3.850 Motion (Second Rule 3.850 Motion) in state court, in which he alleged his counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to object to a successor judge sentencing Day and advising Dayof the law in relation to the facts of his case; (2) failing to object to the State's misstatement of the law; (3) misadvising the circuit court on the law in relation to his case; and (4) failing to object to scoresheet errors. Resp. Ex. KK. On May 4, 2016, the circuit court denied Day's Second Rule 3.850 Motion. Resp. Ex. NN. Day did not appeal. Resp. Ex. AA.
This proceeding was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). However, Respondents challenge the timeliness of Ground Five of the Amended Petition. Response at 11. The Court will address the timeliness of that ground below.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiaryhearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Day's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339...
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