Day v. State, 1 Div. 149

Decision Date25 November 1980
Docket Number1 Div. 149
Citation395 So.2d 119
PartiesRicky A. DAY v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Floyd C. Enfinger, Jr. of Lacey, Enfinger & Newell, Fairhope, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Cynthia D. Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOOKOUT, Judge.

Grand larceny; sentence: ten years' imprisonment.

A Baldwin County Grand Jury indicted the appellant for grand larceny of an air-conditioner on July 7, 1977. On December 6, 1978, a hearing was held before Judge Wilson Hayes concerning motions for continuance in several cases involving the appellant at which time appellant's counsel stated:

"Mr. HAAS: The Defendant, in open Court, moves the Court for an opportunity to file some motions supported by affidavit in the event the case has to be tried waiving Jury trial.

"THE COURT: All right. What says the State?

"MR. NORTON (Assistant District Attorney): Judge, we don't have any objection...." (Emphasis added.)

On December 27, 1979, counsel for appellant filed a motion to reinstate his demand for a jury trial. On February 20, 1980, there was a hearing on this motion before Circuit Judge Harry Wilters. At this hearing Judge Hayes testified concerning the prior waiver of a jury trial:

"I asked him, specifically, and told him he had a right not to waive his right to a jury trial. I told him that he had a right to a jury trial. And they said they wanted to have a nonjury trial.

....

"But before we went to trial, as I remember, Mr. Hayes (sic) sought not to go to trial, but to have the case passed over. And he announced, himself, that he was withdrawing the jury trial. He was asking for a nonjury trial. I then informed Mr. Day of the matter. I know he heard it. I affirmatively informed Ricky Day about the right to a jury trial, his right. And he said he wanted a nonjury trial or that he waived his right to a jury trial. I hesitate to say the precise wording. Mr. Norton was present. And I am satisfied that Mr. Tom Hayes (sic) was present."

Judge Wilters denied appellant's motion to reinstate a jury demand based on appellant's previous waiver of his right to a jury trial. On April 15, 1980, appellant was arraigned at trial and entered a plea of not guilty. Again, appellant renewed his jury trial demand, but the judge once more denied the motion.

Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his affirmative requests for a trial by jury. Alabama law is clear that a defendant charged with a noncapital felony may waive a jury trial with the consent of the State and the trial court provided the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Marquez v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 3 d3 Abril d3 1996
    ...and intelligently--implying that the trial court's discretion is absolute once a valid waiver has been made. Day v. State, 395 So.2d 119, 120 (Ala.Crim.App.1980). Wabaunsee v. State, 554 P.2d 36, 38 (Okla.Crim.App.1976). 2 Some states require an affirmative showing by the defendant that he ......
  • Spradley v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 18 d2 Maio d2 1982
    ...necessary nor mandated. Murphy v. State, 347 So.2d 1369 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1371 (1977). See also Day v. State, 395 So.2d 119 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 395 So.2d 120 This issue was not raised in the trial court and is not preserved for review before this court. Thi......
  • Arnold v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 15 d5 Dezembro d5 2017
    ...the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently in light of all the surrounding circumstances." Day v. State, 395 So.2d 119, 120 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). Moreover, " ‘[i]f the record is silent as to the reasoning behind counsel's actions, the presumption of effectiveness is suff......
  • Maye v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 9 d2 Março d2 2010
    ...is absolute once made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and the waiver cannot thereafter be withdrawn. See Day v. State, 395 So.2d 119, 120 (Ala.Crim.App.1980); Wabaunsee v. State, 554 P.2d 36, 38 (Okla.Crim.App.1976). ¶ 55. Our supreme court has pointed out how a trial court's fai......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT