Day v. State By and Through Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 930135-CA

• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: GREENWOOD; BILLINGS; BENCH
• Citation: Day v. State By and Through Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 882 P.2d 1150 (Utah App. 1994)
• Decision Date: 02 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 930135-CA,930135-CA
• Parties: Mary DAY, individually, and as sole surviving heir to Boyd K. Day, deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, By and Through the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; Utah Highway Patrol; Ken Colyar; Salem City Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah; Brad James; Spanish Fork City Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah; Ed Asay; and Public Entities 1-3; and John Does 1-8, Defendants and Appellees.

Page 1150

882 P.2d 1150

Mary DAY, individually, and as sole surviving heir to Boyd K. Day, deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, By and Through the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; Utah Highway Patrol; Ken Colyar; Salem City Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah Brad James; Spanish Fork City Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah; Ed Asay; and Public Entities 1-3; and John Does 1-8, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 930135-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Sept. 2, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, and Dec. 12, 1994.

Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Jan Graham, Carol Clawson, and Debra J. Moore, Salt Lake City, for appellees Utah Dept. of Public Safety and Colyar.

Allan L. Larson and Anne Swensen, Salt Lake City, for appellees Salem City Corp., Spanish Fork City Corp., Brad James, and Ed Asay.

Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Mary Day appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment against her, arguing that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (Supp.1990) (repealed April 29, 1991) unconstitutionally deprives her of just compensation for her injuries and the death of her husband as a result of a high-speed police chase. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On March 18, 1991, at approximately 5:45 p.m., Trooper Ken Colyar of the Utah Highway Patrol had positioned himself on I-15 near Santaquin, Utah to monitor traffic. Trooper Colyar clocked, with a radar gun, a northbound black 1982 Buick at seventy-five miles per hour, ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit. Intending only to stop the vehicle and issue a citation for speeding, Trooper Colyar pulled onto I-15 and fell in behind the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle, sixteen-year old Steven Edward Floyd, increased his speed and exited I-15 at Santaquin.

For the next fifteen minutes Floyd led Colyar and at least two other law enforcement officers on a high speed chase--at one point reaching speeds approaching 120 miles per hour--through the rural communities of Spring Lake, Payson, Salem, and Spanish Fork. Floyd then entered I-15 again, heading north toward Provo, with Trooper Colyar close behind. Floyd took the University Avenue exit in Provo and ran the red light at the intersection of University Avenue and East Bay Boulevard. In the process of running the red light, Floyd struck the vehicle operated by Boyd K. Day, killing him and injuring his wife, Mary, who was a passenger in the vehicle.

Mary Day subsequently filed suit against the State's Department of Public Safety, the Utah Highway Patrol, and Trooper Colyar. In addition, Mrs. Day's Complaint named two other law enforcement personnel involved in the high speed chase--Brad James and Ed Asay--as well as the cities that employed them--Salem and Spanish Fork. Mrs. Day alleged that the negligence of all defendants proximately caused the death of her husband as well as her injuries.

Plaintiff and all defendants filed motions for either partial or full summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State's and Cities' motions for summary judgment. The trial court subsequently entered two Orders, one dismissing Mrs. Day's Complaint with prejudice and the other granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

ISSUES

On appeal, Mrs. Day urges this court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on one or more of the following arguments: (1) the trial court erred by ruling that Mrs. Day's cause of action arose during the time that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (Supp.1990) (repealed April 29, 1991) was in effect; (2) the trial court erred by not ruling that section 63-30-7(2) violated (a) the open courts provision, (b) the due process clause, or (c) the equal protection clause, of the Utah Constitution; (3) the trial court erred by declaring defendants immune from suit under the discretionary function exception in section 63-30-10(1); and (4) the trial court erred by granting defendants' motions for summary judgment because there are genuine disputes of material facts.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, "a court must consider all of the facts and evidence presented, and every reasonable inference arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah App.1987). Because summary judgment presents only questions of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's ruling. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Liability of Municipalities and Their Employees

Mrs. Day asserts as error on appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the cities of Salem and Spanish Fork and their respective peace officers who were involved in the high speed chase. Our review of the record reveals an insufficiency of alleged facts to establish causation on the part of the cities or their employees, as a matter of law. For example, Floyd's unrebutted deposition testimony was that he simply went around the municipal officers' vehicles, did not see them again after passing them prior to the collision, and was attempting at all times during the pursuit to elude only Trooper Colyar. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the municipalities and their employees. See Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (stating that when facts are undisputed and there is only one reasonable conclusion, issue of negligence is legal question).

Liability of State Entities and Trooper Colyar

1. Origination of Cause of Action and Notice of Claim

As a prefatory argument to her constitutional argument, Mrs. Day asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (Supp.1990) (repealed April 29, 1991) should not control her case. ¹ She insists that her cause of action "arose" after the Legislature repealed section 63-30-7(2) because although she filed her Notice of Claim with the State before the section's repeal date, the State did not deny the Notice of Claim until after the section's repeal date. ²

Mrs. Day's argument involves two fundamental questions: (1) When does a cause of action arise? and (2) Does the statutory requirement to file a Notice of Claim affect when a cause of action arises?

In Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah App.1993), this court noted that "[l]imitation periods begin to run when a cause of action has accrued, which occurs 'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.' " Id. at 252 (quoting Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983)); accord Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1992) ("Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to run 'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.' ") (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)).

Utah courts have held that a cause of action for personal injury arises when the accident occurs. Jepson v. State Dep't of Corrections, 846 P.2d 485, 488 (Utah App.1993); see also Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1987) (Howe, J., concurring) (stating that cause of action for personal injury generally accrues when the accident occurs); Fields v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah App.1988) (noting that statute of limitations for personal injury began running on date of accident). The statutory requirement to file a Notice of Claim does not, in our view, change the time when a cause of action originates. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he notice of claim provisions of sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 operate as a one-year statute of limitations in cases brought against a governmental entity." Warren, 838 P.2d at 1128. Furthermore, the notice of claim statute itself arguably refers to a "claim" in a manner synonymous with "cause of action." The statute states that "[a] claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(1) (1989). If Mrs. Day were to bring suit against private defendants, the statute of limitations would begin to run on the date that she was injured. Thus, the notice of claim is a mechanism similar to a statute of limitations designed to eliminate stale claims against the State. ³ As such, it limits the time period during which an individual may initiate suit against the State. It does not, however, determine when a cause of action against the State arises; rather, that is determined when the last event necessary to give rise to the cause of action occurs. Accordingly, in this case, Mrs. Day's cause of action arose on the date of her accident, March 18, 1991, during the period in which section 63-30-7(2) was still viable. Consequently, that now-repealed provision applies to and controls Mrs. Day's case.

2. Resolution of Issues on Nonconstitutional Grounds

Utah courts recognize the "fundamental rule that [they] should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so." State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985); accord State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 714 n. 2 (Utah App.1992). Accordingly, before reaching Mrs. Day's constitutional arguments, we must determine whether we can resolve the issues before us on nonconstitutional grounds. There are two such possible grounds in this case. First, Mrs. Day's cause of action cannot survive if Trooper Colyar owed no duty of care to her and her husband at the time of the collision. Second, in order to claim a violation of article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, Mrs. Day must first establish that there existed at common law a right which the Legislature totally abrogated by enacting section 63-30-7(2)...