Day v. State Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Child Support Enforcement Div., 95-157

• Decision Date: 27 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 95-157,95-157
• Citation: 900 P.2d 296,272 Mont. 170
• Parties: In re the Support Obligation of Stuart Anthony DAY, Absent parent Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Montana, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 296

900 P.2d 296

272 Mont. 170

In re the Support Obligation of Stuart Anthony DAY, Absent parent Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Montana, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION Defendant and Appellant.

No. 95-157.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs June 20, 1995.

Decided July 27, 1995.

Ann Hefenieder, Department of SRS, Child Support Enforcement Division, Billings, for appellant.

Loren J. O'Toole, II, O'Toole & O'Toole, Plentywood, for respondent.

NELSON, Justice.

The plaintiff, Stuart Anthony Day (Day), brought a petition in the District Court seeking review of a decision of the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) that his child support obligation was past due and permitting CSED to begin income withholding to satisfy the arrearage. The District Court for the Seventeenth Judicial District, Phillips County, reversed the agency decision holding that CSED's action on child support arrearage was barred under the statute of limitations of the Fort Peck Tribal Code. CSED's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied. CSED appeals. We reverse and remand.

The issues on appeal are:

1. Did the District Court err by holding that the Fort Peck Tribal Code's statute of limitations applies in this case rather than Montana's longer statute of limitations?

2. Did the District Court err by holding that CSED cannot enforce the Tribal Court judgment without initiating an action in District Court?

Stuart Anthony Day and Vina Buckles (Buckles) were divorced in Nevada on March 15, 1982. They were the parents of four minor children, for whom Day was ordered to pay support in the amount of $200.00 per child per month, beginning April 1, 1982.

Sometime thereafter, the parties moved to Montana and agreed to modify Day's support obligation. On March 18, 1983, the Tribal Court of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, entered an order incorporating the agreement and modifying Day's child support obligation.

In June 1983, Buckles applied for and received public assistance through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Under the applicable state and federal laws, she assigned her rights to child support payments to CSED.

On August 11, 1983, and again on July 1, 1986, the Tribal Court issued orders requiring the payment of past-due child support. All four children have now reached 18 years of age and the last month any benefits were paid by AFDC was February 1990.

On July 15, 1993, CSED sent Day a notice of intent to withhold portions of his wages for payment of past-due child support. An amended notice of intent to withhold was sent to Day by CSED on September 7, 1993. Day contested CSED's decision to withhold for past-due support and a telephonic hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was held on September 8, 1993.

At the hearing, Day presented a written memorandum that the Fort Peck Tribal Code's five-year statute of limitations barred enforcement of the judgments obtained in 1983 and 1986. Section 306 of Title VI of the Fort Peck Tribal Code provides:

Life of judgment. No judgment of the court for money shall be enforceable after five (5) years from the date of entry, unless application to renew the judgment shall have been filed before the date of expiration pursuant to Section 307.

Contrary to Day's contention that the judgments had expired, CSED argued that Montana's ten-year statute of limitations concerning collection of past-due child support, as provided by § 27-2-201(3), MCA (1993), was applicable in this case. The ALJ agreed and in his order of December 6, 1993, ruled in favor of CSED. Day was found to owe a total of $24,226.00 in past-due child support.

Day appealed to the District Court arguing that his substantial rights had been prejudiced. The District Court reversed the ALJ's order and stayed CSED from enforcing any decision to withhold income for delinquent child support based on the Tribal Court judgment. The District Court held that CSED's action on child support arrearage stemming from the 1983 and 1986 Tribal Court judgments was barred under the five-year statute of limitations of the Fort Peck Tribal Code. Moreover, the District Court ruled that, in order for CSED to collect any non-barred child support, CSED would be required to proceed judicially, instead of proceeding with its administrative income-withholding procedure. CSED's motion to the District Court for reconsideration of its order was denied. CSED appeals the District Court's order reversing the agency decision as well as the court's order denying CSED's Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue 1

Did the District Court err by holding that the Fort Peck Tribal Code's statute of limitations applies in this case rather than Montana's longer statute of limitations?

The ALJ determined that Montana's 10-year statute of limitations applies in the case before us on appeal. The ALJ cites the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roche v. McDonald (1928), 275 U.S. 449, 48 S.Ct. 142, 72 L.Ed. 365, for the proposition that a state with a longer statute of limitations can enforce the judgment of a sister state which judgment would be barred by the sister state's shorter limitation period. The ALJ concluded that the Fort Peck Tribe should be afforded the same status as a sister state and entitled to full faith and credit for its judgment.

The District Court reversed the ALJ concluding that under Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe (1982), 201 Mont. 299, 654 P.2d 512, full faith and credit does not apply to Indian tribes. More correctly stated, full faith and credit does not apply to the orders, judgments and decrees of Indian tribal courts. Rather, Montana treats tribal court judgments with the same deference shown decisions of foreign nations as a matter of comity. Wippert, 654 P.2d at 515.

The District Court noted that foreign judgments must meet the requirements of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (the Recognition Act) found at Title 25, Chapter 9, part 6, MCA. The Recognition Act, effective October 1, 1993, provides for the enforcement of a judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money. Specifically, the District Court noted that under the Recognition Act, a foreign judgment must be enforceable where rendered. Section 25-9-603, MCA. The court held that since the action in the case before us on appeal is time-barred in the Fort Peck Tribal Court, it is no longer enforceable and fails to meet the requirement of § 25-9-603, MCA.

On appeal, CSED contends that given the enactment of the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (the Child Support Act), which was effective prior to the District Court reaching its decision, the court on judicial review should have applied the provisions of the Child Support Act to uphold the ALJ's order. Day contends that since the Child Support Act was not in place at the time of this action it does not apply.

Our review of a district court's conclusions of law is plenary. We simply determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603.

Although, generally, the District Court's statements regarding the Recognition Act were correct, the court's application of that Act in this case was erroneous. As regards child support orders issued in Indian tribal courts, Indian tribes are deemed to be "States," 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(b), and are, therefore, excepted out of the definition of "foreign states" under the provisions of the Recognition Act. Section 25-9-602(2), MCA. Additionally, judgments for support in matrimonial or family matters are not considered "foreign judgments" under the Recognition Act. Section 25-9-602(1), MCA. Hence, the Recognition Act is not applicable, and the District Court was incorrect in applying its provisions in the instant case.

That brings us to the Child Support Act, the provisions of which the District Court declined to apply. In 1994, Congress determined that a lack of uniformity in the laws regarding child support orders encouraged noncustodial parents to relocate to other states to avoid the jurisdiction of the courts of the home state. This contributed to relatively low levels of child support payments in interstate cases and to inequities in child support payment levels that are based solely on the noncustodial parent's choice of residence. To counteract this problem, Congress enacted Public Law 103-383, known as the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994)).

As mentioned above, the Child Support Act defines a "State" to include "Indian country." 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(b). Additionally, the Act provides:

PERIOD OF LIMITATION.--In an action to enforce a child support order, a court shall apply the statute of limitation of the forum State or the State of the court that issued the order, whichever statute provides the longer period of limitation. [Emphasis added.]

28 U.S.C. § 1738B(g)(3) (1994).

We have previously held that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision. In re Marriage of Elser (1995), --- Mont. ----, 895 P.2d 619, 52 St.Rep. 434 (citing Haines Pipeline v. MPC (1991), 251 Mont. 422, 433, 830 P.2d 1230, 1238). An appellate court must give effect to the latest enactment of the legislature and must decide each case in accordance with existing laws. See, United States v. Schooner (1801), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L.Ed. 49. Moreover, this rule applies regardless of whether the change is constitutional, judicial or statutory. Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of the City of Durham (1969), 393 U.S. 268, 282, 89 S.Ct. 518, 526, 21 L.Ed.2d 474, 484. As we pointed out inHaines, however, there is an exception to the general rule when application of a new law would result in manifest injustice, which we have defined as occurring when application of the new law impairs...