Day v. Westmoreland Cnty., 2:20-CV-01710-MJH
| Decision Date | 28 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-CV-01710-MJH |
| Parties | TRAVIS DAY, Plaintiff, v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Travis Day, brings claims for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) (Counts I, II, and III) and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV) against Defendant, Westmoreland County. The County has filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 59). The matter is now ripe for consideration.
Upon review of Mr. Day's Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 57) the County's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 59), the respective briefs (ECF Nos. 60 and 61), and for the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
On February 26, 2018, Mr. Day, an African American, was hired as a deputy by the Westmoreland County Sheriff's Office. (ECF No. 57 at ¶ 11). After he was hired, Mr. Day alleges that he experienced various forms of discriminatory treatment at the Sheriff's Office, where, among other things, lower ranking Caucasian deputies were given responsibilities and perks that were denied to him; he was not given proper uniforms and equipment; his supervisory authority was diminished; and he was not timely provided with the handgun qualifying course and denied the use of the firing range. Id. at ¶ 17. Mr. Day further alleges that he complained to Sheriff Jonathan Held that he was being treated less favorably because of his race. Id. at ¶ 20. In response, Sheriff Held allegedly placed Mr. Day under surveillance and altered his timecard. Id. at ¶¶ 20-26.
On or about July 2018, Mr. Day commenced mandatory basic training for deputy sheriffs at the Sheriff Training Academy (Academy) through the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD or Commission), which is statutorily created agency. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Mr. Day alleges that he witnessed and experienced racial discrimination at the Academy, and that he heard racial slurs during training. Id. at ¶ 29. Mr. Day avers that, after he reported the racial discrimination to the Academy and Sheriff Held, the Academy encouraged peers to provide false information to use against him. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. After meeting with the County and Sheriff Held to discuss discrimination at the Sheriff's Office and at the Academy, Mr. Day alleges that he was expelled from the Academy. Id. at ¶¶ 32-34. Mr. Day alleges that his dismissal was based on racial discrimination and that this prevented him from completing his training. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. Because he was dismissed from the Academy and failed to complete training, Mr. Day alleges that the County suspended his employment without pay. Id. at ¶ 39. However, Mr. Day avers that he was entitled to another six months to complete training at the Academy. Id. at ¶42. Mr. Day's employment was terminated on March 15, 2019. Id. at ¶ 47. At the time of his termination, Mr. Day alleges that he was aware that several Caucasian deputies committed a variety of infractions unrelated to racial discrimination against him and were not disciplined for their misconduct. Id. at ¶ 48. Mr. Day alleges that his employment was terminated because of his race and/or in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination at the Sheriff's Office and at the Academy. Id. at ¶ 53.
In its Motion to Dismiss, the County argues that Mr. Day's Title VII and PHRA claims (Counts I, II, and III) fail as a matter of law because 1) Mr. Day's expulsion from sheriff's training rendered him unqualified to work as a deputy sheriff; 2) the Sheriff, not the County, was Mr. Day's employer; 3) Mr. Day's allegations of racial discrimination against the County are insufficient to state a claim; 4) the County is not responsible for discriminatory acts that occurred during deputy sheriff training provided by the PCCD; and 5) Mr. Day fails to state a cause of action of retaliation. The County also contends that Mr. Day has not stated a plausible Section 1983 equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against the County (Count IV).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008)). “To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].'” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.2016) () (citing Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n. 1 (3d Cir.2014)).
Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 (3d Cir.1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline [ ] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-327, (1989).
When a court grants a motion to dismiss, the court “must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Further, amendment is inequitable where there is “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] unfair prejudice.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Amendment is futile “where an amended complaint ‘would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' ” M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F.Supp.3d 612, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 175).
Mr. Day's Third Amended Complaint offers a plethora of facts regarding conduct by both the Westmoreland County Sheriff's Office and the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency.[1] However, those factual allegations aside, Mr. Day's employment discrimination and retaliation claims against the County pursuant to Title VII and PHRA must meet certain threshold criteria before the Court can reach the merits of said allegations. As explained below, Mr. Day cannot meet these thresholds in his pursuit of employment discrimination and retaliation claims (Counts I, II, and III).
First, the County contends that Mr. Day cannot maintain his Title VII and PHRA claims[2]for discrimination and retaliation because his expulsion from basic sheriff training rendered him unqualified to work as a deputy sheriff in Pennsylvania. Specifically, it argues that Mr. Day failed to satisfy objective, externally-imposed standards necessary for employment. Mr. Day maintains that he did in fact possess the minimum qualifications to maintain the position of deputy sheriff. Further, Mr. Day contends that at the time of his suspension and dismissal, he was entitled, by law, to another six months to complete his training. On this second point, the County argues that, as a matter of law, it did not have authority to grant Mr. Day additional time to complete basic sheriff training.
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