Day v. Wright County

CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtPer Curiam
CitationDay v. Wright County, 69 S.W.3d 485 (Mo. App. 2000)
Decision Date28 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. 23394.,23394.
PartiesBrenda DAY, Respondent, v. WRIGHT COUNTY, Missouri, Appellant.

Lynette B. Veenstra, Mansfield, for appellant.

James B. Fleischaker, Joplin, for respondent.

Before PREWITT, J., CROW, J., and Barney, C.J.

PER CURIAM.

Wright County, Missouri, ("County") appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Wright County declaring that County owes Brenda Day, County's assessor, ("Assessor") back pay and interest in the sum of $15,200.43, based on a per annum salary of $36,000.00, effective September 1, 1997; and a per annum salary of $38,000.00 (at the rate of $3,166.67 per month), from and after January 1, 1999, for the remainder of her term in office, "subject to any changes required by change in the assessed valuation of Wright County or changes in the statutory maximum." County raises three points of trial court error discussed below.

Assessor was County's assessor in 1995. She served on County's salary commission pursuant to section 50.333.3, RSMo 1994. We discern from our review of section 50.333, RSMo 1994, and its later amended versions discussed below, that the General Assembly sought to vest authority in a county salary commission, composed of certain elected county officers, to set compensation for certain county offices, referencing differing salary schedules based on the offices involved. See Cantwell v. Douglas County Clerk, 988 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App.1999).

The statute in effect when the county salary commission met on February 16, 1995, was section 50.333, RSMo 1994. Subsection 7 thereof provided, in pertinent part:

For the year 1989 and every second year thereafter, the salary commission shall meet in every county ... for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be paid to county officials... [t]he salary commission shall then consider the compensation to be paid for the next term of office for each county officer to be elected at the next general election.

Subsection 8 thereof also provided, in pertinent part that:

The salary commission shall issue ... a report of compensation to be paid to each officer and the compensation so set shall be paid beginning with the start of the subsequent term of office of each officer.

Furthermore, subsection 9 set out:

For the meeting in 1989 and every meeting thereafter in the event a salary commission... fails, neglects or refuses to meet as provided in this section, or in the event a majority of the salary commission is unable to reach an agreement and so reports or fails to certify a salary report to the clerk of the county commission by December fifteenth of any year in which a report is required to be certified by this section, then the compensation being paid to each affected officer on such date shall continue to be the compensation paid to the affected officer during the succeeding term of office.

The salary commission met on February 16, 1995. The minutes of that meeting reflect that Assessor served as chair of the commission. At that meeting, the members of the commission, including Assessor, voted to set the county officers' salaries "at 100% of what the Legislators had set in the RSMo Statutes for each office plus any increases due to increased population or assessed evaluation [sic] or maximum changes."

At the time the salary commission met in 1995, and at the time Assessor was re-elected in November of 1996,1 the maximum allowable compensation for the office of assessor for Wright County, a county of the third classification, was $32,400.00 per year, pursuant to the schedule contained in section 53.082.1, RSMo 1994.2

The legislature, however, amended section 53.082, effective August 28, 1997. See L.1997, S.B. 11 § A; § 53.082, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997. In subsection 1, a new and augmented schedule of maximum allowable compensation was included. The same legislative bill also amended portions of section 50.333, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997 which had been previously amended in 1995 and 1996. Nevertheless, none of these changes substantively altered that portion of the foregoing statute which provided that "[t]he salary commission shall... consider the compensation to be paid for the next term of office for each county officer to be elected at their next general election." See §§ 50.333.7, RSMo 1994; RSMo Supp.1995; RSMo Cum.Supp.1997.

County's salary commission met on September 15, 1997, and again on November 13, 1997. As in 1995, Assessor was elected to chair the commission. At the latter meeting, the members of the commission agreed, by a vote of seven to three, to "lower salaries to 82% of the scale," based, as we discern, on the augmented schedule as provided in section 50.082.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997. Assessor was one of the three who voted against this proposal.

The record shows that County paid $2,700.00 per month salary to Assessor in September and October of 1997 in accordance with an annual rate of compensation of $32,400.00, as authorized by the schedule set out in section 53.082.1, RSMo 1994. However, thereafter, pursuant to the decision made at the November 13, 1997 meeting of its salary commission, County commenced payment to Assessor of a salary of $2,460.00 per month, based on an annual salary of $29,520.00, which represented 82% of the maximum annual allowable compensation of $36,000.00 for assessors of counties with County's assessed valuation.3

A little over a year after the November 13, 1997, meeting, Assessor sought a judgment: (a) declaring that she was entitled to a salary of 36,000.00 a year for the period of September 1, 1997, through the end of December 1998; and (b) declaring that she was entitled to an annual salary of $38,000.00 beginning January 1, 1999. These claims were based upon the changes to the salary schedule for assessors effective September 1, 1997, and upon a change in County's assessed valuation in 1998.4 See § 53.082.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997.

As previously set out, the trial court entered a judgment declaring that as of September 1, 1999, Assessor was entitled to receive $15,200.43 in back pay and interest; and declaring she was entitled to a salary of $3,166.67 per month, or $38,000.00 per year, "subject to any changes required by change in the assessed valuation of Wright County or any changes in the statutory maximum." The monetary award of the trial court represented the difference in pay between the amount the trial court found Assessor to be entitled to less the amount County paid to Assessor, plus interest from the date Assessor's petition was filed.5

As best we can discern from our review of County's points and attendant arguments County first contends that the trial court erred in determining that its salary commission was not authorized to meet in 1997 to permit the salary commission to decrease Assessor's salary in 1997 to 82% of the maximum level as set out in section 53.082.1 and .4, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997. In its second point, County asseverates error in the trial court's declaration that Assessor was entitled to receive an automatic increase of her annual salary (to $36,000.00), pursuant to the new, augmented schedule of payments found in section 53.082.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997. Finally, in its third point, County posits trial court error in declaring that Assessor was entitled to an increase in her annual salary of an additional $166.67 per month at the per annum rate of $38,000.00, beginning January 1, 1999.

A primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning. Metro Auto Auction v. Director of Revenue, 707 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Mo. banc 1986); see also Cantwell, 988 S.W.2d at 54-55. "Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the language as written and will not resort to statutory construction" Cantwell, 988 S.W.2d at 55. "If construction is necessary, we will construe a statute, or a provision thereof, in context." Id. "In order to shed light on a statute's meaning, appellate courts may consider other statutes that involve similar or related subject matter." Id. "Further, `statutes relating to the same subject are to be considered together and harmonized if possible so as to give meaning to all provisions of each.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel. Lebeau v. Kelly, 697 S.W.2d 312, 315(Mo.App.1985)). "When two statutes appear to conflict, we will attempt to reconcile them and give effect to both." Id. at 56. "If the conflict is otherwise irreconcilable, the general statute must yield to the more specific statute." Cantwell, 988 S.W.2d at 56; see also Habjan v. Earnest, 2 S.W.3d 875, 881 (Mo.App.1999).

I.

In our review of County's first point, we observe that section 53 .082.2, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997 sets out that:6

The compensation for county assessors in second, third and fourth classification counties for the term of office beginning September 1, 1997, shall be calculated pursuant to the salary schedule in this section using the percentage increase approved by the county salary commission when establishing the compensation for the office of county assessor at the salary commission meeting in 1997. This salary shall become effective on September 1, 1997.

Furthermore, section 53.082.4, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997 provides that:

The county assessor in any county, except a first classification county, shall not, except upon two-thirds vote of all the members of the salary commission, receive an annual compensation in an amount less than the total compensation being received for the office of county assessor in the particular county for services rendered or performed on the date the salary commission votes.

County contends, in particular, that section 53.082.4, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997, stands as authority for the salary commission to reduce the salary of the Assessor in 1997 after approval by...

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