Daye v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Decision Date | 03 August 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1769,72-1840.,72-1769 |
Citation | 483 F.2d 294 |
Parties | Hubert DAYE, et al., Appellants, v. The COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al. Mindy MEYERS, an infant, by her parent and natural guardian, Marvin Meyers, et al., Appellants. v. The COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Richard F. Stevens, Theodore J. Zeller, Jr., Butz, Hudders & Tallman, Allentown, Pa., for appellant in No. 72-1769.
James B. Zane, Zane and Zane, New York City, for appellant in No. 72-1840.
Daniel J. Ryan, John J. Walsh, Jr., LaBrum & Doak, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee in No. 72-1769.
J. Shane Creamer, Atty. Gen., Edward V. A. Kussy & Edward A. Hosey, Asst. Attys. Gen., Harrisburg, Pa., for appellee in No. 72-1769 and No. 72-1840.
Before VAN DUSEN, GIBBONS and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered on June 30, 19721 which granted the motions of defendants to dismiss the complaints brought in a tort action for damages arising out of a bus accident allegedly caused by the improper design, construction and maintenance of an interstate highway and its safety devices.
The plaintiffs in No. 72-1769 are the driver and the corporate owner of the bus (hereafter jointly referred to as Daye). They demanded damages for injuries suffered in the accident by the driver and the bus company. They also sought to bring a class action under F. R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of the injured and deceased passengers.2 The defendants in Daye are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Department of Transportation in that state and named individuals, who were officials with the Department of Transportation.
The complaint in No. 72-1840 was filed by Marvin Meyers on behalf of his daughter Mindy, and by Stanley Bienenfeld on behalf of his daughter Lynda (hereafter jointly referred to as Meyers). In this action the defendants were the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the County of Lehigh, Pennsylvania.3
The tragedy occurred on July 15, 1970 when a chartered tour bus carrying a group of young people, aged 10 to 17, and their counselors was proceeding westbound on U.S. 22 (Interstate 78) about 12 miles west of Allentown, Pennsylvania. A light rain was falling at the time and had been preceded by a heavy shower. The wet pavement allegedly caused the front wheels of the bus to hydroplane, which initiated a skid from which the driver was unable to recover. The bus rotated one hundred and eighty degrees (180°) clockwise through the guardrail alongside the highway and off the northern embankment. It overturned at the bottom of the embankment, ejecting eighteen persons and pinning six of them under the left side of the bus. Seven children were fatally injured.4
The study by the National Transportation Safety Board suggested that contributing factors to the accident included:
5
Motions to dismiss were filed by the defendants in both Daye and Meyers. The Commonwealth in essence argued that it had not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution,6 that the action was not authorized by the laws of the Commonwealth and it was in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.7 The Department of Transportation entered a similar motion to dismiss. The named defendants in their motion to dismiss contended that the motion was not maintainable as a class action; and that the defendants were public employees and officials of the Commonwealth and were acting within the course and scope of their official duties. The motions to dismiss were granted and this appeal followed.
The parties raise a number of contentions, but the issue central to both their appeals is whether the Commonwealth by its acceptance of funds under the Federal-Aid Highway Act8 entered into an area of federal preemption resulting in a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, or whether Congress in enacting the Highway Safety Act9 intended to create implied causes of action that would permit private parties to pierce the states' sovereign immunity statutes in order to be compensated for injuries sustained as a result of a state's violation of the regulations promulgated under that Act?
Both Daye and Meyers suggest that since our decision in Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3rd Cir. 1962) the Congress has enacted legislation which clearly establishes an intention that states receiving federal highway funds will waive their immunity from suit.10 They also contend that the recently enacted Highway Safety Act indicates an implied, if not an express, intention by Congress to regulate the interstate highway systems,11 and thus subjects the states to Congressional regulation under the power reserved to the federal government by the commerce clause of the Constitution.12
In Mahler the contention was made by the plaintiff that the United States failed to fulfill its duty by causing to be approved defective highway plans, by failing to discover faulty construction, and by failing to provide for and make inspections after construction on the interstate highways was completed.13 This court rejected those arguments holding:
Mahler, supra, 306 F.2d at 721, 722; see also Daniel v. United States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970); Delgadillo v. Elledge, 337 F.Supp. 827 (E.D.Ark.1972).
It is clear that the Eleventh Amendment denies the federal courts jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a private party against a state absent that state's consent. E. g., Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare of Missouri, et al. v. Department of Public Health & Welfare of Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945). However, a state may, of course, waive its immunity from suit. Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 186, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Comm'n., 359 U.S. 275, 79 S.Ct. 785, 3 L.Ed.2d 804 (1959).
In Parden a suit was brought against a State-owned railroad to recover damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Fund. The Court held that Alabama by entering into interstate commerce as a rail carrier waived its immunity from suit and "necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that Act." 377 U.S. at 192, 84 S.Ct. at 1213.
In Petty the Court recognized that a state may also waive its immunity by forming an interstate agency pursuant to a compact entered into with consent of Congress, which specifically creates a right "to sue and be sued" in that agency. Both Parden and Petty demonstrate that a waiver most likely will take place when a state "leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation. . . ." At that point, "its subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation." 377 U.S. at 196, 84 S. Ct. at 1215. However, mere entry into such sphere alone will not constitute a waiver. "Congress must express an intent to override the state's immunity." Red Star Towing and Transportation Co. v. Department of Transportation of N. J., 423 F.2d 104, 106 (3rd Cir. 1970); see Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare, supra.
Although a state at its pleasure may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the conclusion by a court that there has been a waiver will not be lightly inferred. Petty, supra 359 U.S. at 276, 79 S.Ct. 785. The cases make clear that when a waiver does take place it must be clear and unequivocal. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 1972); O'Neill v. Commonwealth of Penna., 459 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1972); Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415 (2nd Cir. 1971).
We do not find such a waiver merely because Pennsylvania receives federal highway funds. We have carefully examined the various provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act and the Highway Safety Act, the committee reports explaining the sections of those Acts,14 and debates that took place when the Acts were considered and passed. We are...
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