Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 18468.

• Decision Date: 02 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18468.,18468.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Patricia DAYNERv.ARCHDIOCESE OF HARTFORD et al.

301 Conn. 759

23 A.3d 1192

32 IER Cases 1020

Patricia DAYNER

v.ARCHDIOCESE OF HARTFORD et al.

No. 18468.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 16, 2011.Decided Aug. 2, 2011.

Lorinda S. Coon, with whom, on the brief, was Jeffrey C. Pingpank, Hartford, for the appellants (defendants).Henry F. Murray, with whom, on the brief, was Nicole M. Rothgeb, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.NORCOTT, J.

This appeal requires us to consider the contours of the ministerial exception, under the first amendment to the United States constitution,¹ to Connecticut courts' subject matter jurisdiction over certain employment related claims brought against religious institutions. The plaintiff, Patricia Dayner, brought this action against the defendants, the Archdiocese of Hartford (archdiocese) and Father Stephen Bzdyra, pastor of Saint Hedwig's Parish in Naugatuck, claiming that their refusal to renew her contract for employment as the principal of Saint Hedwig's School (school) constituted, inter alia, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of implied contract and breach of promissory estoppel. The defendants appeal ² from the decision of the trial court denying their motion to dismiss the action on the ground that adjudication of the plaintiff's claims calls for impermissible judicial interference in the internal governance of the archdiocese with respect to its selection of religious leaders. After determining that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983), we further conclude that, in considering whether the ministerial exception is applicable in a particular case, a Connecticut state court must follow the standard articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208–209 (2d Cir.2008), and consider whether: (1) the employment relationship is religious in nature; and (2) if so, whether adjudicating the particular claims and defenses in the case would require the court to intrude into a religious institution's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization. Having applied this standard to the various claims in the plaintiff's complaint, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to render judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety.

The record reveals the following facts, as set forth in the complaint, and procedural history. The plaintiff was employed by the archdiocese since 1975 as a teacher and Catholic school administrator; she served as principal of the school from 1988 until 2005. In the plaintiff's last comprehensive performance evaluation,³ dated June 24, 2004, which reviewed the 2003–2004 school year, Sister Loretta Francis Mann, who was employed as assistant superintendent of elementary school education at the archdiocese, gave the plaintiff a positive review, along with some written “recommendations” regarding specific areas of improvement. In July, 2004, the plaintiff accepted from Bzdyra, who as parish pastor was the plaintiff's supervisor, a signed contract of employment as principal for the 2004–2005 school year. On August 9, 2004, the plaintiff attended the meeting of the school's board of education, and shared aloud her performance evaluation, stating that she would make the necessary efforts to improve in the noted areas.

Thereafter, on August 22, 2004, Bzdyra, accompanied by a deacon, met with the plaintiff after a Mass. Bzdyra then informed the plaintiff in writing of his concerns regarding her performance as principal, particularly in light of a report issued by the Commission on Independent Schools. The letter concluded that the school “faces many challenges in the coming school year and beyond. I want you to reflect about the steps you will take to improve in these areas. I want to sit down with you in the beginning of the school year so we may discuss the changes you will make and implement, and your plans for the school year.”

In September, 2004, the plaintiff and Bzdyra met in her office at the school to discuss her improvement plans. Bzdyra refused, however, to discuss the changes that the plaintiff already had implemented, or her future plans. Instead, he became abusive and ended the meeting after telling the plaintiff that she “ ‘wasn't a leader,’ ” “ ‘could do nothing to improve,’ ” and “ ‘never should have been a principal.’ ”

Thereafter, on or about November 23, 2004, Bzdyra initiated a conversation with the plaintiff in the school cafeteria and asked her intentions for the following school year. The plaintiff was confused and stunned by the inquiry, but stated that she intended to remain as principal of the school. After again insulting the plaintiff's leadership abilities, Bzdyra then told her that if she did not leave, he would tell the school board that he would not renew her contract and would request her removal from the school. At the conclusion of their discussion that day, however, Bzdyra offered the plaintiff an alternate position for the following school year teaching third grade and told her to contact Mann if she was interested in that job. The following day, the plaintiff told Bzdyra that if she could not continue as principal, she nevertheless was interested in remaining as a teacher. Bzdyra then demanded that the plaintiff submit to him a letter of resignation.

During that November 23, 2004 conversation, Bzdyra referred to the plaintiff's failure to “ ‘stick up for [him]’ ” in October, 2003, when an eighth grade student and her mother met with the plaintiff and complained that Bzdyra's use of sexually explicit language while he taught his weekly religion course made the student and other girls uncomfortable. When the plaintiff subsequently spoke to Bzdyra about the student's concerns,⁴ he demanded that she summon the student to the office immediately. After the student came to the office, Bzdyra berated her to tears, requiring the plaintiff to comfort the student before she could return to class. Later that day, Bzdyra told the plaintiff that he would no longer teach the religion class and that the student had “ ‘serious problems.’ ” Bzdyra then ordered the plaintiff to call the department of children and families (department) to report the student; the plaintiff, however, refused, believing that as a mandated reporter,⁵ she did not have information warranting a department referral, and that Bzdyra's demand was simply retaliation against the student for exercising her right to make a complaint.⁶

At the Sunday Mass following the November, 2004 meeting, Bzdyra asked the plaintiff about the status of the letter of resignation that he had requested. When she told him that she was working on it and had not yet spoken to Mann, he became abusive and began to yell at her. On Monday, November 29, 2004, the plaintiff submitted a letter indicating that she was resigning as principal effective June 30, 2005, and noting her understanding that she would receive a full-time teaching contract for the 2005–2006 school year. On or about November 30, 2004, the plaintiff requested a meeting with Mann. She informed Mann about her interactions with Bzdyra; Mann asked why she had submitted the resignation letter. When the plaintiff stated that she had felt forced to do so, Mann told her instead to respond to the annual letter of intent form (form) that the archdiocese would issue in January, 2005.

In January, 2005, the plaintiff completed the form and advised the archdiocese of her intent to return as principal. Later that month, however, the plaintiff was surprised and upset to see a job opening for her position listed in a newsletter written by Dale Hoyt, the superintendent of the archdiocese's schools, which was distributed to school faculty, staff and school boards throughout the archdiocese. Thereafter, on January 20, 2005, the plaintiff sent to Bzdyra and Hoyt a letter formally rescinding her earlier letter of resignation and stating that she did not understand Bzdyra's reasons for not renewing her employment contract or why he did not give her the opportunity to address the performance concerns.⁷

The plaintiff subsequently received a letter from Bzdyra dated March 21, 2005, informing her that her contract of employment as principal would not be renewed for the following school year, and that her last day of employment would be June 30, 2005.⁸ On or about June 23, 2005, the plaintiff learned that the archdiocese had relieved her from all further duties as principal. After it removed her as principal, the archdiocese did not offer the plaintiff a teaching or administrative position at the school or elsewhere.

The plaintiff then brought this action for money damages ⁹ against the defendants in a six count complaint claiming that, by not renewing her contract of employment, the archdiocese: (1) breached an implied contract, created by its formal performance evaluation procedures; see footnote 3 of this opinion; following Bzdyra's refusal to engage in that process; (2) breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) breached the doctrine of promissory estoppel; (4) terminated her employment in violation of public policy, in retaliation for her refusal of Bzdyra's order to make a false report to the department; and (5) negligently inflected emotional distress on her through its actions. In the sixth count, the plaintiff alleged that Bzdyra had tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's business expectancies and relationships with the archdiocese.

Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, claiming that her action is barred under the “ ‘ministerial exception’ to judicial authority [that] precludes a court from adjudicating employment disputes between religious institutions and...