Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Parisi
Decision Date | 08 March 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 2011–0340.,2011–0340. |
Parties | DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. PARISI. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Gary C. Schaengold and Mark A. Tuss, Dayton, for relator.
Konrad Kuczak, Dayton, and Dianna M. Anelli, Dublin, for respondent.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Georgianna I. Parisi of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0022538, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1982. In August 2009, relator, Dayton Bar Association, filed a complaint alleging that Parisi had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of Professional Conduct by representing both the proposed guardian and ward in a guardianship proceeding, collecting legal fees from her client's account without court approval while the application for guardianship was pending, and collecting a clearly excessive fee from an elderly client with diminished mental capacity.1
{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a hearing, at which it received the parties' stipulations of fact, witness testimony, and numerous exhibits. Having considered the evidence, the panel found that Parisi had engaged in a conflict of interest and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and had charged a clearly excessive fee. The board adopted the panel's findings of fact and misconduct and its recommendation that Parisi be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that she commit no further misconduct.
{¶ 3} Both parties have objected to the board's report. Parisi challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, raises constitutional challenges to several of the ethical rules that she has been found to have violated, and seeks dismissal of relator's complaint. Relator argues that the clearly excessive fee charged by Parisi is tantamount to misappropriation and therefore warrants a period of actual suspension.
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we overrule the objections of both parties and adopt the board's findings of fact and misconduct, as well as its recommended sanction.
{¶ 5} The board found that Parisi began to provide legal services for Sylvia Demming, a 93–year–old woman who claimed that she was being held against her will in a nursing home. Concerned about Demming's financial welfare and having observed her confusion and disorientation, on November 8, 2007, Parisi applied for guardianship in the Warren County Probate Court. In her guardianship application, Parisi alleged that Demming was incompetent as a result of Alzheimer's-related memory loss, and Parisi submitted an evaluation from a licensed physician diagnosing Demming with dementia. Seven weeks later, Parisi had Demming sign a durable power of attorney designating Parisi as her attorney-in-fact. The next month, Parisi withdrew her own application and filed a separate application for guardianship on behalf of Demming's niece.
{¶ 6} Believing that the court no longer had jurisdiction after Demming informed the court that she had left the county and intended to move out of state, Parisi sent her bill to Demming's niece for review. The guardianship proceeding was not dismissed as Parisi had anticipated; but acting as Demming's attorney-in-fact, Parisi paid her own fees of more than $18,000 without first obtaining the court's approval. The probate court later removed Parisi as counsel for both women, and Parisi returned the money to Demming's account.
{¶ 7} The board found that by representing both Demming and her niece in the guardianship proceeding, Parisi violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2) ( ). The panel also found that by obtaining a power of attorney over her client's affairs while her guardianship application was pending and using it to pay $18,820 of her own legal fees, Parisi violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) ( ). Citing the duplication of other claimed violations and the insufficiency of the evidence, the board recommended the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(a) ( ) and (b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty or trustworthiness).
{¶ 8} Parisi challenges the board's findings of fact and misconduct with respect to her representation of Demming. First, she argues that this court has held as a matter of law that simultaneous representation of a proposed ward and an applicant for guardianship does not present a conflict of interest that requires disqualification. In support of this argument, Parisi cites In re Guardianship of Love (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 111, 48 O.O.2d 107, 249 N.E.2d 794; In re Clendenning (1945), 145 Ohio St. 82, 30 O.O. 301, 60 N.E.2d 676; and In re Guardianship of Santrucek, 120 Ohio St.3d 67, 2008-Ohio-4915, 896 N.E.2d 683.
{¶ 9} None of the cases, however, stands for the proposition that an applicant for guardianship has no interest in the determination of the proposed ward's competence or incompetence or that an applicant cannot have an interest that is adverse to that of the proposed ward. Indeed, the far-reaching and life-altering consequences of an incompetency determination—involving a judicial determination that a mental or physical illness or disability has left a person so mentally impaired that the person is incapable of taking proper care of the person's self or property—create an inherent conflict between the proposed ward and the applicant for guardianship, even if guardianship is ultimately in the proposed ward's best interest. Nevertheless, Parisi contends that Prof.Cond.R. 1.14(b) and 1.7(b) and the comments thereto permit attorneys to simultaneously represent both the proposed ward and the applicant for guardianship and that any contrary interpretation of those rules cannot constitutionally be applied to her because she had no notice that her conduct was unethical.
{¶ 10} Prof.Cond.R. 1.14(b) provides: "When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial, or other harm unless action is taken, and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian."
{¶ 11} Prof.Cond.R. 1.14(a) directs that "the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client," and comment 92 to the rule emphasizes, "A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client." Thus, the emergency provisions of Prof.Cond.R. 1.14 do not entirely abrogate a lawyer's duties to the client under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Therefore, when taking actions authorized by Prof.Cond.R. 1.14, the lawyer must still determine whether the representation of one client will be directly adverse to the other and whether there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for one client will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client. Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a).3
{¶ 12} The American Bar Association ("ABA") Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has addressed this situation. ABA Committee on Ethics & Professionalism, Formal Ops. No. 96–404 (1996) ( ). The ABA recognizes that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14 (1983, as amended), which is identical to our Prof.Cond.R. 1.14 in all material respects, permits a lawyer to file a petition for guardianship of a client when no less-restrictive alternatives are available, but concludes that "a lawyer with a disabled client should not attempt to represent a third party petitioning for a guardianship over the lawyer's client." The ABA observes: Id.
{¶ 13} We concur in this analysis and conclude that the guardianship proceeding that Parisi initiated on behalf of Demming's niece, no matter how well-intentioned, was necessarily adverse to Demming. Therefore, Parisi's...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Ass'n Certified Grievance Comm.
...Bar Assn. v. Parisi , Supreme Court case No. 2012-0060 ("Parisi II "), both of which had long been resolved. See Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi , 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012-Ohio-879, 965 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 2 ; Parisi v. Heck , S.D.Ohio No. 3:14-cv-346, 2015 WL 3999300, *4 (July 1, 2015).{¶ 3} In a let......
-
State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Ass'n Certified Grievance Comm.
...Certified Grievance Committee against Parisi, concerning Parisi's clients R.J.G. and S.D. Verified Petition at ¶ 16; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi , 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012-Ohio-879, 965 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 18. We understand "Parisi II " to refer to an August 2012 complaint between the same parties......
-
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Framm
...because “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client.” MLRPC 1.7(a)(1); see Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Parisi , 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 965 N.E.2d 268 (2012) (“[Rule 1.14] does not authorize a lawyer to represent a third party in seeking to have a court appoint a guardi......
-
In re Thetford
...Id. cmt. b.48 Id.49 Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Framm , 449 Md. 620, 144 A.3d 827, 848 (2016) ; Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Parisi , 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 965 N.E.2d 268, 274 (2012) ; In re Wyatt's Case , 159 N.H. 285, 982 A.2d 396, 410 (2009) ; In re Discipline of Laprath , 670 N.W.2d 41, ......