Daywitt v. Minnesota
| Decision Date | 17 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Court File No. 14-cv-4526 (MJD/LIB) |
| Parties | Kenneth S. Daywitt, et al., Plaintiffs, v. State of Minnesota, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint or in the Alternative Stay the Case, [Docket No. 36]. On February 24, 2015, the Honorable Michael J. Davis, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, referred the present motion to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Order of Referral [Docket No. 37]). The Court held a motion hearing on April 16, 2015, and at that time the Court instructed the parties to meet and discuss two outstanding, threshold issues: (1) Plaintiffs' failure to serve a number of individual Defendants, and (2) Defendants' motion to stay the present case in light of Plaintiff Daywitt's concurrent claims in Karsjens, et al. v. Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al., No. 11-cv-3659 (DWF/JJK) (D. Minn.). (Minute Entry [Docket No. 47]). The Court instructed the parties to file a joint letter with the Court clarifying the two issues, and the Court took Defendant's motion under advisement on April 30, 2015, upon receipt of the parties' joint letter, [Docket No. 48].
For reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint or in the Alternative Stay the Case, [Docket No. 36].
Plaintiffs Kenneth S. Daywitt and Merel E. Bishop ("Plaintiffs"), individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), initiated the present case on October 28, 2014. (Compl. [Docket No. 1]). On February 10, 2015, after Defendants filed responsive motions, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, [Docket No. 25], pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, generally, have violated and continue to violate Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and have interfered and continue to interfere with Plaintiffs' religious rights, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. (First Amended Compl. [Docket No. 25], ¶ 2). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege one count of violation of the First Amendment against Defendants Jesson, Johnston, Moser, Basaraba, Zimmerman, Benoit, Kulas, Ninneman, Anderson, Monson, Wolfgram, Fahland, Vargason, Kottke, Stecyk, Shelton, and Wagner in their individual capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; one count of violation of the First Amendment against the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, MSOP, and Defendants Jesson, Johnston, Moser, Basaraba, Zimmerman, Benoit, Kulas, and Ninneman in their official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; one count requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, MSOP, and the individual Defendants in their official capacities; and one count of violation of RLUIPA against the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, MSOP, and the individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. (Id. at Counts 1-4). Plaintiffs demand money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and 2000cc. (Id. ¶ 1).
Plaintiffs practice Orthodox Judaism. (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiffs allege that their religious beliefs require Plaintiffs to wear a yarmulke at all times and a suit coat "while in public." (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that MSOP Policy 303.020 (Client Hygiene/Dress Code) ("the Policy") violates Plaintiffs' constitutional and religious rights because it prohibits Plaintiffs from complying with these aspects of their religion. The Policy provides, in relevant part, that MSOP clients may not possess or wear any clothing resembling an MSOP staff uniform or any clothing "possibly causing them to be mistaken for any MSOP employee[,]" including blazers, sport coast, or suits. (Cariveau Aff. [Docket No. 39], Ex. 1). However, as of November 4, 2014, MSOP Policy 303.020 permits Plaintiffs to wear a yarmulke at all times. (Id.; First Amended Compl. [Docket No. 25], ¶ 14).
Plaintiffs allege that the inability to comply with aspects of their religion while civilly committed "substantially interferes with and substantially burdens Plaintiffs' ability to practice their Jewish faith . . . [and] causes Plaintiffs to experience depressed mood, emotional distress, feelings of inadequacy, diminished self-esteem, and diminished quality and enjoyment of life." (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12). Plaintiffs argue that the restrictions have "no rational or reasonable security basis." (Id. ¶ 19).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have reprimanded, criticized, and disciplined Plaintiffs for exercising their religious right to wear a yarmulke and/or suit coat. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23). Plaintiffs have received "numerous" Behavioral Expectation Reports as a result of wearing a yarmulke or suit coat in violation of the Policy. (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiffs generally allege that the seventeen (17) individually identified Defendants are "directly responsible for the violations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights . . . [and] are responsible for creating, implementing, and enforcing MSOP policies and procedures related to Plaintiffs' constitutional and/or religious rights[.]" (Id. ¶ 8).
Defendants move the Court for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Docket No. 36]). In the alternative, Defendants move the Court for an order staying Plaintiffs' claims pending resolution of Karsjens, No. 11-cv-3659 (DWF/JJK). (Id.)
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and prompts the Court to examine whether it has the authority to decide the claim(s). Uland v. City of Winsted, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1117 (D. Minn. 2008). "A court must dismiss an action over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Pomerenke v. Bird, No. 12-cv-1757 (DSD/JJG), 2014 WL 30363, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may challenge the sufficiency of a pleading on its face or the factual truthfulness of its allegations. See Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729, n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). In the event the motion challenges the pleading's factual allegations, courts may consider materials outside of the pleadings, and no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the pleading's factual allegations. Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729-30, n.6.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P.8(a)(2). When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, "[courts] look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Riley v. St. Louis County of Mo., 153 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Double D Spotting Serv., Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 136 F.3d 554, 556 (8th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1178 (1999). Courts draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Maki v. Allete, Inc., 383 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 2004).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulistic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," and "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-67). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 664.
Courts undertake the "context-specific task" of determining whether a plaintiff's allegations "nudge" its claims against a defendant "across the line from conceivable to plausible." See id. at 679-81. The plaintiff must "plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than asheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Farnam Street Fin., Inc. v. Pump Media, Inc., No. 09-cv-233 (MJD/FLN), 2009 WL 4672668, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
A federal district court's power to stay an action pending on its docket is "incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and...
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