DBDFW 3 LLC v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

• Decision Date: 06 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. 3:18-cv-3148-C-BN,3:18-cv-3148-C-BN
• Parties: DBDFW 3 LLC, Plaintiff, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

DBDFW 3 LLC, Plaintiff, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant.

No. 3:18-cv-3148-C-BN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

February 6, 2019

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Senior United States District Judge Sam R. Cummings. See Dkt. No. 17.

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMC") has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 9 & 10. Plaintiff DBDFW 3, LLC ("DBDFW 3") has filed a response, see Dkt. No. 15, and JPMC has filed a reply, see Dkt. No. 19.

The undersigned magistrate judge issues the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation.

Background

This lawsuit involves property located at 4219 Towne Lake Court in Irving, Texas (the "Property") and JPMC's attempts to foreclose on the Property.

On April 7, 2015, 2012 Properties LLC ("2012 Properties") purchased the Property for $9,630 at a sheriff's sale. The Sheriff's Deed conveying the Property was filed in the Dallas County Property Records. See Dkt. No. 6 at 2 (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint); Dkt. No. 11-1 at 2-3 (Sheriff's Deed).

2012 Properties transferred the Property to DBDFW 2, LLC ("DBDFW 2") on November 21, 2016. The General Warranty Deed conveying the Property was filed in the Dallas County Property Records. See id. at 5-7.

DBDFW 2 transferred the Property back to 2012 Properties on June 19, 2017. The General Warranty Deed conveying the Property was filed in the Dallas County Property Records. See id. at 9-11.

JPMC posted the Property for foreclosure sale on July 4, 2017. See id. at 23.

2012 Properties filed an Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order (the "First Lawsuit") against JPMC in state court. See id. at 20-28. On August 24, 2017, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, which dismissed all claims with prejudice. See id. at 30-35.

On December 21, 2017, DBDFW 2 purported to transfer the Property to DB2017 LLC ("DB2017"). The General Warranty Deed purportedly conveying the Property was filed in the Dallas County Property Records. See id. at 13-15.

JPMC posted the Property for foreclosure sale on July 3, 2018. See id. at 39.

DB2017 filed an Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction (the "Second Lawsuit") against Defendant in state court. See id. at 37-50. On August 24, 2018, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissalwith Prejudice, which dismissed all claims with prejudice. See id. at 53-57.

On October 1, 2018, DB2017 purportedly transferred the Property to DBDFW 3, the plaintiff here. The General Warranty Deed purportedly conveying the Property was filed in the Dallas County Property Records. See id. at 17-19.

JPMC posted the Property for foreclosure sale on November 6, 2018. See Dkt. No. 1-3 at 11.

DBDFW 3 filed this lawsuit against JPMC on November 2, 2018. DBDFW 3 filed its Original Petition and Application for Restraining Order in state court, see id. at 9-17; JPMC timely removed the case to this Court, see Dkt. No. 1; and Judge Cummings ordered DFDWB 3 to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Dkt. No. 4.

In its First Amended Complaint, DBDFW 3 alleges that it is the record owner of the Property. DBDFW 3 alleges that the Property was purchased by 2012 Properties, that DB2017 subsequently became the owner of the Property, and that DBDFW 3 purchased the Property from DB2017. DBDFW further alleges that it attempted to obtain the payoff amount of the note held by JPMC so that it can pay the note and preserve its legal interest in the Property, but JPMC failed to give DBDFW 3 that information and refused to recognize DBDFW 3 as the legal owner of the Property. DBDFW 3 further alleges that JPMC provided it with a payoff amount on December 12, 2018, but JPMC's conduct and delay in providing the payoff amount caused the payoff amount to increase with interest and penalties. See Dkt. No. 6 at 2.

DBDFW 3 seeks a declaratory judgment that it is the legal owner of the Property with the right and authority to pay the note and communicate with any valid mortgagee or valid mortgagee servicer administering the note. DBDFW 3 also asserts claims for tortious interference with contract, to quiet title, and equitable redemption. See id. at 3-4.

JPMC moves to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, arguing that DBDFW 3 lacks standing to bring its claims, that DBDFW 3's claims are barred by res judicata, and that DBDFW 3 fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for quiet title, tortious interference, or equitable redemption and that, because DBDFW 3 failed to sufficiently plead any of its substantive claims, it is not entitled to declaratory relief.

The undersigned now concludes that the motion to dismiss should be granted.

Legal Standards

In deciding a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiffs must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is implausible on its face when 'the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, Plaintiffs must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the Plaintiffs' allegations as true, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. But, "to survive a motion to dismiss" under Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only "plead facts sufficient to show" that the claims asserted have "substantive plausibility" by stating "simply, concisely, and directly events" that Plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); accord N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) ("To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but it must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief - including factual allegations that, when assumed to be true, raise a right torelief above the speculative level." (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The United States "Supreme Court has made clear that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion turns on the sufficiency of the 'factual allegations' in the complaint." Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App'x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted," Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 346. That rationale has even more force in this case, as the Court "must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally." Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006).

A court cannot look beyond the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). Pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context include attachments to the complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Documents "attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be part of the pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)). "Although the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Fifth Circuit has not articulated a test for determining when a document is central to a plaintiff's claims, the case law suggests that documents are central when they are necessary to establish an element of one of the plaintiff's claims. Thus, when a plaintiff's claim is based on the terms of a contract, the documents constituting thecontract are central to the plaintiff's claim." Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D. Tex. 2011). "However, if a document referenced in the plaintiff's complaint is merely evidence of an element of the plaintiff's claim, then the court may not incorporate it into the complaint." Id.

In addition, "it is clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record." Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); accord Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2008) (directing courts to "consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily...