Deacon v. Gilbert
Decision Date | 05 January 2000 |
Citation | 995 P.2d 557,164 Or. App. 724 |
Parties | Shauna DEACON, Respondent, v. Gary GILBERT and Stephanie Gilbert, Defendants, and David Woodruff, dba Woodruff Construction, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
R. Daniel Lindahl and John T. Kaempf, Portland, for appellant.
Alan Gladstone and Abbott, Davis, Rothwell, Mullin & Earle, P.C., Portland, for respondent.
Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and ARMSTRONG and BREWER, Judges.
Defendant1 appeals a judgment entered on an arbitration award, challenging only the trial court's denial of defendant's exceptions to the arbitrator's award of attorney fees to plaintiff. Plaintiff moves to dismiss the appeal, asserting that, under ORS 36.425(3), defendant's failure to file a notice of appeal and request for trial de novo of the action pursuant to ORS 36.425(2)(a) precludes defendant from challenging the court's disposition with respect to attorney fees. Plaintiff relies particularly on Loving v. Portland Postal Employees Credit Union, 124 Or.App. 373, 862 P.2d 556 (1993). We conclude that Loving is not controlling and, particularly, that ORS 36.425(6), which was enacted after Loving, contemplates appeal and review of the attorney fee disposition in these circumstances. Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss.
The material facts are undisputed. Following mandatory court-annexed arbitration, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff damages of $1,386 and attorney fees of $11,374. On February 18, 1999, plaintiff filed the arbitration award with the trial court pursuant to ORS 36.425(1). On February 24, defendant filed written exceptions directed solely to the attorney fee award pursuant to ORS 36.425(6).
The trial court failed to enter a decision within 20 days on defendant's exceptions. Consequently, the fee award was affirmed, by operation of law, on March 16. See ORS 36.425(6). On March 26, the trial court entered judgment on the arbitration award. Defendant appealed from that judgment on April 23, 1999.
Plaintiff moves to dismiss the appeal, asserting that, because defendant did not seek a trial de novo of the entire arbitrator's award pursuant to ORS 36.425(2)(a)—but, instead, filed exceptions to the attorney fee award only—the court's March 26 judgment was final and nonappealable under ORS 36.425(3). Defendant counters that ORS 36.425(6) provides that, even if a party does not challenge the "merits" of the arbitration award, that party may, nevertheless, challenge an arbitrator's award or denial of attorney fees. Defendant further contends that, as a matter of statutory construction and practical necessity, ORS 36.425(6) qualifies the finality principle of ORS 36.425(3) and provides for appellate review of the trial court's disposition of timely exceptions to the arbitrator's award or denial of fees. Defendant reasons:
(Emphasis in original.)
We begin with the text of ORS 36.425. Three provisions are pertinent. First, ORS 36.425(2)(a) provides, in part:
"Within 20 days after the filing of a decision and award with the clerk of the court under subsection (1) of this section, a party against whom relief is granted by the decision and award or a party whose claim for relief was greater than the relief granted to the party by the decision and award, but no other party, may file with the clerk a written notice of appeal and request for a trial de novo of the action in the court on all issues of law and fact."
ORS 36.425(3) provides:
"If a written notice is not filed under subsection (2)(a) of this section within the 20 days prescribed, the clerk of the court shall enter the arbitration decision and award as a final judgment of the court, which shall have the same force and effect as a final judgment of the court in the civil action and may not be appealed."
Finally, ORS 36.425(6) provides, in part:
For reasons that will soon become apparent, we emphasize that ORS 36.425(6) was enacted in 19952—12 years after the enactment of ORS 36.425(2) and (3)3 and nearly two years after our holding in Loving. At the time we decided Loving, the text of the present subsection (6) was incorporated in a Uniform Trial Court Rule, UTCR 13.230.
In Loving, the arbitrator, following court-annexed arbitration, awarded the plaintiff $200 in damages on a breach of contract claim but denied the plaintiff's request for attorney fees. After the award was filed with the trial court, the plaintiff, pursuant to former UTCR 13.230 ( ), filed timely exceptions to the arbitrator's denial of fees. Twenty-two days after the award was filed, and 19 days after the filing of the exceptions, the court informed the parties that it was allowing the plaintiff's exceptions and directed the plaintiff to submit a motion and affidavit in support of fees pursuant to ORCP 68. Before the plaintiff could do so, however, the court entered a "judgment of arbitration" that incorporated the arbitrator's award in its entirety, including the denial of fees. The court subsequently entered a "judgment order" awarding the plaintiff attorney fees. Loving, 124 Or.App. at 376,862 P.2d 556.
The plaintiff appealed from the "judgment of arbitration," asserting that it erroneously adjudicated the fee issue. The defendant appealed from the subsequent "judgment order," contending that the original judgment was final and precluded any subsequent allowance of fees. The defendant also asserted that the plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed because the "judgment of arbitration" was final and nonappealable under ORS 36.425(3)—that is, because the plaintiff had not requested a trial de novo of the arbitrator's entire award pursuant to ORS 36.425(2)(a), the entire award (including the denial of fees) became final within 20 days of filing, and any appeal from the judgment embodying that award could not be appealed.
We allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal from the "judgment of arbitration." In so holding, we concluded:
124 Or.App. at 377-78, 862 P.2d 556.4
Here, plaintiff, not surprisingly, invokes Loving as controlling. We disagree, for two related reasons. First, there has been a material change in the statute: when we decided Loving, ORS 36.425 did not include subsection (6). Second, although in Loving we parenthetically referred to then-UTCR 13.230, we did not focus on the content of that rule or its relationship to ORS 36.425(2)(a) and (3). That was proper because the rule had not been codified at that time. See generally ORS 1.002(1)(a) ( ). Now, however, subsection (6) is part of the statute, and its application must be squarely addressed.
As we concluded in Loving, subsections (2)(a) and (3), if read in isolation, would compel the dismissal of this appeal. We conclude, however, that the subsequent enactment of subsection (6), with its particular prescription for review of attorney fee dispositions, prevents us from reading subsections (2)(a) and (3) in isolation and alters the result when the only issue on appeal is the propriety...
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