Deahl v. Uni-Pak Corp.
| Decision Date | 03 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | UNI-PAK,No. BS-469,BS-469 |
| Citation | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2325,550 So.2d 122 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2325 Wayne DEAHL, Appellant, v.CORPORATION and Northbrook Property & Casualty Company, Appellees. |
Michael M. O'Brien and James R. Hooper of O'Brien & Hooper, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
Richard H. Weisberg and Thomas G. Portuallo of Cooper, Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett & Hurt, P.A., for appellees.
The claimant, Wayne Deahl, appeals a final order denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits. After careful review of the lengthy record in this case, we find no reversible error and affirm.
Mr. Deahl claims to have injured his head while working as a mechanic for his employer, Uni-Pak Corporation. He contended that while installing a machine, he rose suddenly, bumped his head on a piece of metal similar to angle iron, and immediately checked his head and felt blood on his fingers. Over the next few days he became very ill, running extremely high temperatures. About five days after the accident, he was taken to the hospital and diagnosed as suffering from meningitis. He was admitted to intensive care and, during several weeks in the hospital, he underwent bilateral leg amputations, a double heart valve replacement, and removal of his gall bladder. Mr. Deahl contended that the accident in which he cut his head served as the portal of entry for staphylococci bacteria, and that the staphylococci infection resulted in a staph endocarditis and bacterial meningitis that in turn resulted in the amputations, heart valve replacements, brain impairment, and other medical complications. The employer and carrier defended the claim on the ground that no such injury was caused by the accident.
Although the deputy commissioner found that Mr. Deahl was involved in an industrial accident as claimed, he further found that claimant's scalp was not lacerated. This latter fact was based on the finding that claimant made no mention of any head trauma or laceration to any medical provider until after the claim for compensation benefits had been filed, and the finding that medical providers had examined claimant's head for bumps and abrasions and found none. The deputy commissioner specifically rejected the testimony of claimant and his wife to the contrary. The order also recites that claimant was given the benefit of all presumptions provided by section 440.26, and that the logical cause doctrine was applicable but that claimant had failed to prove a logical cause under that doctrine. Accordingly, the deputy commissioner explained that the burden of proving that the injury did not arise from claimant's employment was not shifted to the employer and carrier. Even if the burden had so shifted, the deputy commissioner explained, the employer and carrier had carried that burden because the evidence showed many possible sources of entry for the bacterial infection, and no medical expert could testify that a scalp cut was a more probable portal of entry for the infection than other sites on the body. Claimant appeals this order, urging three points for reversal.
First, claimant argues that the deputy commissioner erred as a matter of law in failing to properly apply the logical cause doctrine and the statutory presumption in section 440.26, Florida Statutes (1985). We are unable to agree, however. The evidence of the nature and extent of claimant's injury was in dispute, and although the deputy commissioner found that claimant had suffered an industrial accident on the date alleged, the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the deputy commissioner's further finding of lack of causation between that accident and the injuries claimed to have resulted therefrom. Contrary to the claimant's contention, there is no presumption, statutory or otherwise, that an injury for which compensation is claimed is presumed to be causally connected to his employment. Rather, the claimant must prove a causal connection between his employment and the injury by competent, substantial evidence. Gadsden County Board of Public Instruction v. Dickson, 191 So.2d 562, 565 (Fla.1966). Although section 440.26(1) establishes a presumption that "the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter," this presumption is only applicable where an injury has indisputably occurred on the job and no evidence of causation is available. Hacker v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 396 So.2d 161 (...
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...claimant must prove a causal connection between his employment and the injury by competent, substantial evidence." Deahl v. Uni-Pak Corp., 550 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In other words, if there is conflicting evidence concerning the cause of injury, the claimant must prove a causal con......
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...a claimant in "any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation."5 See § 440.26, Fla. Stat. (1965) ; Deahl v. Uni–Pak Corp. , 550 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ; Hacker v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club , 396 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1981). Section 440.26 provided that, in the "absence of ......
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