Deakyne v. Lewes Anglers, Inc.

• Citation: 204 F. Supp. 415
• Decision Date: 11 April 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2272.
• Parties: Ethel C. DEAKYNE, Plaintiff, v. LEWES ANGLERS, INC., a/k/a Lewes Anglers Association, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

204 F. Supp. 415

Ethel C. DEAKYNE, Plaintiff, v. LEWES ANGLERS, INC., a/k/a Lewes Anglers Association, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 2272.

United States District Court D. Delaware, at Wilmington.

April 11, 1962.

Clement C. Wood, Wilmington, Del., and Basil C. Clare, Chester, Pa., for plaintiff.

Jackson W. Raysor, Tunnell & Raysor, Georgetown, Del., for defendant.

LEAHY, Senior District Judge.

An action in ejectment¹ was brought by Ethel C. Deakyne, a Pennsylvania resident, against Lewes Anglers, Inc., a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff avers the defendant corporation is in wrongful possession of her land and seeks to recover possession as well as mesne profits in the amount of $24,000. Plaintiff claims that in March 1960 she bought the property from Ernest and Anna Wingate Schoellner, who had purchased it in 1948 from Frederick P. Whitney, Trustee for Bessie Metcalf Wingate. Prior to that date, plaintiff avers the land was owned by the heirs of John Metcalf. Lewes Anglers, Inc., defendant (formerly the Lewes Anglers Association),^* does not claim title in its own name, but argues plaintiff's title is defective and if plaintiff should be declared the owner of the property in suit, only nominal damages should be awarded.

The land is situated in the Town of Lewes, in Sussex County, Delaware. It lies on the northeastern side of the Lewes and Rehoboth Canal and on the northern side of Market Street, bounded on the north by lands known as Lot 2 of Thomas Rodney, deceased, and on the east by public lands, and on the south by land of Alice Heskirth.

1. In an action in ejectment, the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of defendant's title. Caton's Lessee v. Hamilton, 1 Del.Cas. 445; Bratten's Lessee v. Wootten, 1 Del.Cas. 172; Pritchard v. Henderson, 3 Pennewill 128, 50 A. 217; Nevin v. Disharoon, 6 Pennewill 278, 66 A. 362; Littleton v. Johnson, 3 Boyce 97, 81 A. 47; Townsend v. Melson, 3 Boyce 78, 80 A. 352; Scotten v. Moore, 5 Boyce 545, 546, 93 A. 373; Ableman v. Short, 5 Boyce 491, 94 A. 900; Wedderburn v. Burbage, 5 W.W.Harr. 229, 162 A. 515. To prevail the plaintiff must either trace title back to the sovereign or original proprietary, or trace it back to an owner in possession of the locus in quo. Caton's Lessee v. Hamilton, supra; Reed v. Short, 5 Terry 103, 57 A.2d 90. In the case at bar, plaintiff claims that on both grounds she is entitled to be declared title-holder of the property.

I. ESTOPPEL

2. Plaintiff argues that before reaching either of her contentions, the defendant corporation is estopped from denying her title. Two copies of a lease allegedly entered into between defendant, as tenant, and the Metcalfs, predecessors in interest of plaintiff, as landlord, were offered at trial.^1a Plaintiff contends Delaware has codified the common law principle that a tenant may not deny his landlord's title and accordingly defendant Anglers is thus estopped from denying plaintiff Deakyne's title. 10 Del.Code § 9668 provides:

"(a) The tenant shall not be permitted to dispute his lessor's title, nor shall the estate or merits of the title, except title derived by heirs, or assigns, from the lessor, or claimed as reversioners, remaindermen, or alienees of the title, or estate, which the lessor had at the time of the demise, be inquired into.

"(b) The tenant shall not be permitted to set up a lease made by the lessor to another tenant, nor any other alienation, unless he can show some right, or authority, in himself to continue in possession through, or by means of such lease, or alienation."

Defendant argues the statute merely proscribes defenses which "may not be raised before a Justice of the Peace on a proceeding to evict a holdingover tenant after a notice to quit."² The argument is not devoid of merit. The fact that § 9668 falls within the general section titled "Justices of the Peace"³ need not limit its applicability here, but the subsection titled "Forcible Entry, Detainer and Holding Over," in which § 9668 falls, apparently does limit its applicability.⁴ This subsection gives neither command nor hint that it should be applied in the type action⁵ tried in this court. But even if the statutory command of § 9668 be limited to cases involving forcible entry, detainer, and holding over, it need not be contested in all other cases. For, even without benefit of statute, Delaware has adopted the general rule, applicable in suits in ejectment,⁶ that a tenant is estopped to deny his landlord's lease.⁷ Monbar, Inc. v. Monaghan, 18 Del.Ch. 395, 162 A. 50; Loscolzo v. Eggner, 7 Pennewill 260, 23 Del. 260, 78 A. 607.⁸ Defendant's citation of Teagles' Lessee v. Waller, 1 Del.Cas. 132, in an attempt to limit the principle in cases involving leases is unconvincing because the indecisive words in the early (1797) Teagles' case "it is not perhaps true that defendant by renting the land from the plaintiff accepts the latter's title" have long since been clarified by the more recent rulings in the Monbar and Loscolzo cases, supra, establishing the general estoppel principle relating to land situate in Delaware.

3. It seems clear that a written lease was entered into between the defendant Anglers and the Metcalf heirs.⁹ Although the plaintiff was unable to introduce a signed copy of the lease in evidence,¹⁰ two identical unsigned copies¹¹ were offered and supported by compelling testimony of witnesses. For example, Howard Teal, president of Anglers at the time the negotiations over the lease took place, testified the copies introduced in evidence were of the lease he had signed representing the Anglers.¹² Mrs. Anna Wingate Schoellner testified she had frequently seen the signed lease in her house, complete as in the copies introduced in evidence.¹³ One copy of the lease that was offered had been in the files of Gulf Oil Company since 1937 and testimony of a representative of that company indicated but for the existence of such lease, Gulf would not have made various agreements it did with the Anglers.¹⁴ The other copy introduced in evidence, the same in every detail, was found in the files of Thomas Ingram, attorney for the Metcalf heirs,¹⁵ after his decease.

The rule of evidence with respect to the admission of copies of documents is that "a person who proposes to testify to the contents of a document, either by copy or otherwise, must have read it * * * The witness must speak from personal observation of the event or thing to be testified to * * *." 4 Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd Ed.) § 1278. These conditions having been met by the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, I conclude PX 4 and 21 offered as copies of the lease were true copies of a written lease, entered into between defendant Anglers and the Metcalf heirs.

4. The mere existence of the lease need not of itself decide the issue at bar. Ritualistic repetition of principles of landlord-tenant law is no substitute for factual analysis to determine if parties actually intended to become landlord and tenant.¹⁶ The word "lease", like all others, may mean different things defending upon its context.¹⁷ But the present case offers no escape for defendant because of failure of proof of a complete and formally signed copy of the lease by both landlord and tenant. Absence of the legal symbol of such a lease is supplied by the language-fact relationship which appears from the testimony of witnesses and what the parties did with respect to the locus in quo.¹⁸

Paragraph one of PX 4 and PX 21 states that the agreement is between the Metcalf heirs, "hereinafter called the lessor" and the Lewes Anglers Association, "hereinafter called the lessee." Paragraphs two and three describe the property involved in the lease. "Witnesseth, the lessor has this date and does by these presents lease unto the lessee * * *." Paragraph four states the rent to be paid. Paragraph five states that the lessee may change the topography of the land in various ways and limits the use of the property to purposes "essential to the fishing party industry." Paragraph six grants to the lessee a first option on purchase of the land during the term of the lease. Paragraph seven states provisions with respect to the removal of buildings, docks, etc. from the land. Paragraph eight states penalties for failure to pay "any installment of the rental as agreed" or failure to perform any other condition stated in the lease.

In short, the lease discloses no intent of the parties to become anything other than landlord and tenant and have any other legal rules applied to them than is ordinarily applied in such cases of tenancy.

5. Defendant argues, however, the land boundaries were unclear to all parties at the time the lease was signed, that "the defendants could not by such an agreement confirm the title of the Metcalf heirs in a tract of land whose dimensions and location were unknown, even to the heirs, and that defendant was, in fact, `buying peace' for a very nominal amount."¹⁹ This argument lacks validity. A party may confirm title so far as he is concerned to any piece of land he rents by lease so long as the boundaries of the land are not so vaguely stated as to be impossible of determination. The landlord may not actually have stainless title. Another party may challenge the landlord's title in a later suit, but the tenant is personally bound by his voluntary act of helping to create the tenancy.²⁰

True, a party may have any number of reasons for becoming a tenant. He may wish by doing so to "buy peace". Should that be his purpose, he is free to use the lease form to do so. Yet, once the form is adopted, barring countervailing considerations, he must accept all ordinary legal consequences of his act. One such consequence is his bar from denying his landlord's title.

No other general exception to the application of the estoppel rule has been claimed here by defendant. No other exception has been found by the Court that would bring the fact situation...