Deal v. Mass. Parole Bd.

• Decision Date: 06 April 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-12746
• Citation: 142 N.E.3d 77,484 Mass. 457
• Parties: Timothy DEAL v. MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

484 Mass. 457

142 N.E.3d 77

Timothy DEAL

v.MASSACHUSETTS PAROLE BOARD.

SJC-12746

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Argued November 5, 2019

Decided April 6, 2020

Merritt Schnipper (Barbara Kaban also present) for the plaintiff.

Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Benjamin Niehaus, Boston, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

BUDD, J.

The plaintiff, Timothy Deal, is serving a life sentence for committing murder in the second degree when he was seventeen. He sought review of the parole board's (board's) denial of his application for parole in the Superior Court, alleging that the board abused its discretion by failing to analyze properly the "distinctive attributes of youth" in coming to its decision. See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 675, 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) (Lenk, J., concurring) ( Diatchenko I ), quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The judge entered judgment in favor of the board, and the plaintiff appealed. We allowed Deal's application for direct appellate review, and for the reasons detailed infra, we affirm the judge's order allowing the board's motion for judgment on the pleadings.¹

Background. 1. Underlying facts. We recount the facts as found by the board, supplemented by uncontested facts presented in Deal's parole application and hearing. The victim and Deal were next-door neighbors and close friends. In September 2001, the victim, who was facing drug charges, agreed to become an informant for police and purchased marijuana from Deal in a "controlled buy." Based on information provided by the victim, police secured a warrant to search Deal's home, where Deal shared a bedroom with his older brother, and subsequently arrested Deal and his brother on drug and firearm charges.

In January 2002, after Deal's release on bail, he and a companion went to the victim's home. A fight ensued between Deal and the victim, during which Deal stabbed the victim multiple times. The victim died from his wounds that evening. Two days after his arrest on murder charges, Deal telephoned the victim's mother; when she asked why he killed her son, Deal responded, "[The victim] was a snitch.... [W]e tried to keep it from you."

Deal was seventeen years old at the time of the killing. He was indicted and tried for murder in the first degree, and a jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. Deal was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years, making him eligible for parole in early 2017.

2. The parole hearing. Deal applied for parole in December of 2016. In advance of his parole hearing, Deal submitted a memorandum describing his childhood, his rehabilitation, and his plans for housing and employment if paroled. Deal also submitted a report by a forensic psychologist concluding that Deal would be a low risk for recidivism if paroled based on risk assessments and an interview with Deal. The application included submissions in support of parole from more than ten friends and family members, including the victim's mother. The Boston police department and the district attorney for the Suffolk district submitted letters in opposition, both alleging that Deal killed the victim in retaliation for acting as an informant.

At the hearing in December 2016, Deal gave an opening statement apologizing to the victim's family and stating his responsibility and regret for the murder. When asked to give his account of the killing, Deal stated that he had not planned or intended to kill the victim in retaliation for cooperating with police; rather, an argument over "something petty" escalated into a fight during which Deal grabbed a knife from a friend and then stabbed the victim multiple times. Board members noted their concern that Deal may have killed the victim in retaliation for acting as a police informant, questioning in particular why, two days after Deal's arrest for murder, he called the victim's mother and told her the victim was a "snitch." In response, Deal characterized the telephone call as an attempt to give context for why he, a close friend of the victim's family, ended up fighting and killing the victim.

In its written decision, the board denied parole and scheduled Deal's next review for December 2020, determining that Deal "[had] not demonstrated a level of rehabilitative progress that would make his release compatible with the welfare of society," and that Deal's "version of the offense ... [was] not plausible." After exhausting his administrative appeals, Deal challenged the board's decision by bringing a complaint in the nature of certiorari in the Superior Court. See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 30, 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) ( Diatchenko II ). A judge in the Superior Court granted the board's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Deal's cross motion for the same, concluding that the board's decision was not an abuse of discretion. We allowed Deal's application for direct appellate review.

Discussion. General Laws c. 127, § 130, sets forth the standard the board is to apply when making parole decisions. The board may grant parole only where it finds,

"after consideration of a risk and needs assessment, that there is a reasonable probability that, if the prisoner is released with appropriate conditions and community supervision, the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that release is not incompatible with the welfare of society."

Id.

The board is afforded significant deference with regard to its parole decisions. As the granting of parole is a discretionary function of the executive branch, generally the judiciary's role is limited to reviewing the constitutionality of the board's decision and proceedings. Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 302-303, 10 N.E.3d 1081 (2014). See, e.g., Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 477 Mass. 106, 74 N.E.3d 618 (2017) (reviewing claims that parole decision violated constitution and statutes, and remanding for further development of record); Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834, 673 N.E.2d 42 (1996) (reviewing constitutional claims that board may not consider refusal to admit guilt in parole determination); Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 18 N.E.3d 1096 (2014) (reviewing alleged due process violations in parole revocation proceeding, and conducting certiorari review of merits of board's decision to revoke parole).

Parole decisions for juvenile homicide offenders like the plaintiff are handled differently, however. Unlike adult offenders, juveniles have "diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, and, therefore, they do not deserve the most severe punishments," including sentences of life without parole (quotations omitted). Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 659-660, 1 N.E.3d 270, citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455. "[B]ecause the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed, either structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence that a particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably depraved." Diatchenko I, supra at 670, 1 N.E.3d 270. In particular, "[r]elying on science, social science, and common sense," the United States Supreme Court has pointed to three "distinctive characteristics of youth" that make juveniles constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Id. at 660, 663, 1 N.E.3d 270.

These characteristics include what are commonly referred to as the Miller factors: (1) children's "lack of maturity" and "underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking"; (2) their "vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers," and relatedly, their "limited control over their own environment" and inability to "extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings"; and (3) their "unique capacity to change as they grow older" (alteration and quotations omitted). Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 30, 27 N.E.3d 349, citing Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 660, 1 N.E.3d 270. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

Thus, we held that juvenile offenders who have been convicted of murder in the first degree may not be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 669-671, 1 N.E.3d 270. We went on to hold that juvenile offenders sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison, (i.e., those convicted of murder in the first or second degree) are entitled to a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release [on parole] based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" (citation omitted). Id. at 674, 1 N.E.3d 270. See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 62-63, 26 N.E.3d 1092 (2015) ; G. L. c. 119, § 72B. We further held that a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" means that the board must consider the "distinctive attributes of youth" in determining whether the juvenile is likely to reoffend. Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 23, 27 N.E.3d 349.

In addition, although in the normal course parole decisions are not subject to judicial review, Cole, 468 Mass. at 302-303, 10 N.E.3d 1081, we have determined that to ensure that juvenile homicide offenders receive a meaningful opportunity for parole, they are entitled to judicial review of board decisions on their parole applications under the abuse of discretion standard.² Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 14, 31, 27 N.E.3d 349. "In this context, a denial of a parole application by the board will constitute an abuse of discretion only if the board essentially failed to take [the Miller ]...