Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse

• Decision Date: 16 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. 19653,19653
• Citation: 692 P.2d 779
• Parties: DEAN EVANS CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, and the State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Donald S. MORSE, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 779

692 P.2d 779

DEAN EVANS CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, and the State Insurance Fund Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Donald S. MORSE, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 19653.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Nov. 16, 1984.

James R. Black, Wendy B. Moseley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Robert J. Debry, Phillip B. Shell, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

HOWE, Justice:

Plaintiffs seek review of an Industrial Commission order awarding defendant Morse compensation for permanent partial disability.

Morse suffered a compensable injury to his back on November 25, 1975, while in the employment of Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth. An "Employer's First Report of Injury" form was prepared by the employer on the same day and received by the Industrial Commission on November 28. Morse's physicians sent the Commission three medical reports between December of 1975 and April of 1978 advising it that Morse had sustained permanent disability of indeterminate percentage. Morse was paid temporary total disability benefits by his employer's insurer, State Insurance Fund, through August 8, 1978.

On January 20, 1983, Morse filed a claim for permanent partial disability. In support of his application for a hearing, his attorney filed a petition to determine whether the tolling provision of the amended version of section 35-1-99 effective May 12, 1981, would apply to Morse's 1983 claim. ¹ The administrative law judge held that the claim was barred by that section, inasmuch as it had been filed more than three years after the last compensation was paid, and that the tolling provision of the 1981 amendment applied only to accidents occurring after its effective date. The Industrial Commission reversed on the ground that at the time the amendment took effect three years had not expired from the date of the last payment of compensation to Morse and that in the absence of notice to him by his employer of any denial of further liability, the tolling amendment would apply to his instant claim for permanent partial disability.

Plaintiffs contend that Morse's claim for permanent partial disability was barred under section 35-1-99 because it was filed more than three years after the date of last compensation, and that the Commission erred in applying the 1981 amendment to his claim. They have filed lengthy briefs, cited statistics to show the burdensome consequences of that decision, and submitted affidavits to show that it was not the legislature's intent to have the tolling amendment operate retroactively. For the reasons given below, we find it unnecessary to reach what both parties consider the sole legal issue, viz., retroactivity of the 1981 amendment.

Section 35-1-99 ² was created to protect the rights of an employee to be compensated for an industrial injury. It contains the twin elements of notice and claim that are necessary to set in action compensation and benefit rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. The first sentence requires the employee to give notice to the employer of the time and place where the accident and injury occurred so as to apprise the employer of the injury. It then explains what constitutes notice to satisfy the requirements of the statute. "The purpose is dual: first, to enable the employer to provide immediate medical diagnosis and treatment with a view to minimizing the seriousness of the injury; and second, to facilitate the earliest possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury." 2 A. Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.20 (1983) (footnote omitted). The second sentence of the statute contains a one-year period of limitations to give such notice. The third sentence provides that all rights to compensation shall be barred if no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three years after the accident or the last date the employee received any compensation. We held in Utah State Insurance Fund v. Dutson, Utah, 646 P.2d 707 (1982), that this third sentence, which requires the filing of a claim within three years, must be read in connection with section 35-1-100 which provides:

Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, the employee shall file with the commission, in writing, notice of such accident, with a copy to the employer; if such notice is so filed within three years of the time of the accident or within the time limitation provided in section 35-1-99, the commission shall obtain jurisdiction to make its award when the injury becomes apparent.

We also gave approval there to prior cases of this Court which recognized that a claim for compensation need not bear any particular formality and that liberality was to be given to the form and substance of a claim. Dutson, at 709. In the Dutson case, the employee filed for additional medical benefits more than three years from the date of the accident and from the date of the last payment of compensation to her by her employer's insurer. However, the Industrial Commission had received within the three-year limit an "Employer's First Report of Injury" from the employer, a "Medical Report" from the employer's physician, and a "Notice of Payment of Temporary Disability Compensation" from the employer's insurer. We held that those filings gave notice to all interested parties of all material facts and that the Commission obtained jurisdiction to consider her subsequent claim for the expenses of additional surgery.

To summarize, sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 clearly mandate that an employee timely notify his employer when he has been injured in an industrial accident, and that the accident be timely reported to the Industrial Commission. Several other sections of the Workers' Compensation Act provide for the various contingencies, such as temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial disability, and permanent total disability. U.C.A., 1953, §§ 35-1-65 to -67, respectively. Most of these sections contain time limitations on the filing for those benefits. Further support for this interpretation is found in section 35-1-78 which gives the Industrial Commission continuing jurisdiction over its cases and allows for destruction of records of inactive cas...