Dean ex rel. Estate of Dean v. Raytheon Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 05-CV-10155-PBS.,05-CV-10155-PBS.
• Citation: 399 F.Supp.2d 27
• Parties: Yisel DEAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Steven Dean, deceased, et al., Plaintiff, v. RAYTHEON CORPORATION, Raytheon Aircraft Holdings, Inc., Raytheon Aircraft Co., Raytheon Credit Corporation, and Colgan Air, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

399 F.Supp.2d 27

Yisel DEAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Steven Dean, deceased, et al., Plaintiff, v. RAYTHEON CORPORATION, Raytheon Aircraft Holdings, Inc., Raytheon Aircraft Co., Raytheon Credit Corporation, and Colgan Air, Inc., Defendants.

No. 05-CV-10155-PBS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 16, 2005.

Thomas B. Almy, Dombroff & Gilmore, P.C., McLean, VA, Anthony L. DeProspo Jr., Sherin and Lodgen LLP, Boston, MA, Mark A. Dombroff, Dombroff & Gilmore, McLean, VA, Andre M. Gregorian, Dombroff & Gilmore, P.C., McLean, VA, Gary W. Harvey, Morrison, Mahoney, & Miller LLP, Boston, MA, Michael G. Jones, Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P., Wichita, KS, Christopher A. Kenney, Sherin and Lodgen LLP, Boston, MA, Peter C. Knight, Morrison Mahoney LLP, Boston, MA, Tory A. Weigand, Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, LLP, Springfield, MA, for Defendants.

Jodi Flowers, Robert Haefele, Mount Pleasant, SC, Jack McConnell, Jr., Motley Rice LLC, Providence, RI, Robert J. McConnell, Motley Rice LLC, Don Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Providence, RI, Ronald L. Motley, Mount Pleasan, SC, Mary Schiavo, Mount Pleasant, SC, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of a fatal air crash off the Cape Cod shore. Plaintiff Yisel Dean ("plaintiff") brings this action as administratrix on behalf of the estate of Steven Dean ("Dean"), her husband, for gross negligence against Dean's employer, Colgan Air, Inc. ("Colgan").¹ Alleging that Colgan required Dean to fly a defective, unreasonably dangerous, and unairworthy aircraft, plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages for Colgan's gross negligence pursuant to Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 408.001(b).

Arguing that Texas law does not apply, Colgan moves to dismiss on the ground that Massachusetts law precludes this action under the workers' compensation statute. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 23.

After hearing and a review of the supplemental papers, the motion to dismiss is ALLOWED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

Dean, an employee of Colgan, served as First Officer of U.S. Airways flight 9446. On August 26, 2003, the aircraft took off from Barnstable Municipal Airport in Hyannis, Massachusetts and crashed into the water off the coast of Yarmouth, Massachusetts.

The aircraft was operated by Colgan, a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Manassas, Virginia and engaged in business in other states, including Massachusetts. The aircraft was manufactured by Raytheon Aircraft Company and owned by Raytheon Credit Corporation, which leased it to Colgan. Immediately prior to the fatal flight at the Barnstable Municipal Airports, Colgan maintained and repaired the aircraft in Massachusetts. Plaintiff asserts that Colgan's gross negligence in Massachusetts resulted in the crash.

At the time of the fatal accident, Dean was a resident of Texas working out of Colgan's base in Massachusetts. The widow and child are also residents of Texas. Colgan, knowing that Dean was a resident of Texas, paid for a hotel room for Dean so that he could be based out of Massachusetts. Colgan, which had no business operations in Texas, provided workers' compensation insurance for Dean in Massachusetts pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152. Colgan filed Dean's workers' compensation claim in Massachusetts, and Colgan's workers' compensation insurance is currently paying benefits to the Dean family as a result of his death. The widow did not apply for or complete applications for any workers' compensation benefits.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), the Court should treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment if it considers undisputed facts outside the four corners of the complaint. The parties have agreed that the Court can consider the undisputed facts submitted in the supplemental pleadings. Therefore, although Colgan has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court will treat the motion as one for summary judgment.

"Summary judgment is appropriate when `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1113, 116 S.Ct. 914, 133 L.Ed.2d 845 (1996). "To succeed [in a motion for summary judgment], the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position." Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir.1990); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

"Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who `may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Barbour, 63 F.3d at 37 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "There must be `sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.'" Rogers, 902 F.2d at 143 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (citations and footnote in Anderson omitted). The Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barbour, 63 F.3d at 36.

B. Choice of Law

The parties disagree on whether this Court should apply Massachusetts or Texas law to plaintiff's claim against Colgan. The first step in applying choice of law principles is to determine whether an actual conflict of law exists between Massachusetts and Texas. Reicher v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 360 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2004).

Under Massachusetts law, plaintiff has no cause of action against Colgan, Dean's employer, because the workers' compensation statute provides the exclusive remedy, not only for the insured employee, but also for his family.³ Peerless Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 48 Mass.App. Ct. 551, 554-555, 723 N.E.2d 996 (2000). The Texas workers' compensation statute provides a surviving wife and heir with a cause of action for punitive damages against an employer whose gross negligence caused the employee's death.⁴ Smith v. Atl. Richfield Co., 927 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.App.-Houston (1st Dist.) 1996); Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 26 (Vernon 1993) (Every person, "corporation, or company, that may commit a homicide, through willful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs ..."). Thus, the laws of Massachusetts and Texas conflict.

The next question is whether this Court should apply Massachusetts or Texas law to plaintiff's claim of gross negligence. In an action based on diversity jurisdiction, this Court must apply conflict of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477, 1480 (1941); Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448, 464 (1st Cir.1992). Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Massachusetts has adopted a "functional" approach. Reicher, 360 F.3d at 5. Courts "determine the choice-of-law question by assessing various choice-influencing considerations" including "the interests of the parties, the States involved, and the interstate system as a whole." Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 631-32, 473 N.E.2d 662, 668 (1985). In doing so, Massachusetts courts apply the substantive law of the state which has the more significant relationship to the transaction in litigation. Hendricks & Assoc., Inc. v. Daewoo Corp., 923 F.2d 209, 213 (1st Cir.1991). To determine the significance of a state's interest, Massachusetts courts consider a variety of factors, including those set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971).⁵ See Reicher, 360 F.3d at 5.

The Restatement has two additional provisions which assist in resolving this choice-of-law dispute. First, § 146 provides:

In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971); see also Bergin v. Dartmouth Pharm., Inc., 326 F.Supp.2d 179, 183 (D.Mass.2004) (holding that under Massachusetts law, "tort claims are governed by the law of the state where the alleged injury occurred, unless another state has a more significant relationship to the cause of action") (citation omitted); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 359, 358 N.E.2d 416, 417 (1976) (reaffirming the rule of lex loci delecti as "firmly established as the general tort conflicts rule," particularly where the issue involves "standards of conduct"). See, e.g., Spencer v. Kantrovitz, 392 F.Supp.2d 29, 35 (D.Mass. 2005) (holding that Massachusetts law applied to a New Hampshire plaintiff where the accident occurred in Massachusetts and benefits were paid to the plaintiff from a Massachusetts workers' compensation plan); King v. Williams Indus., Inc., 565 F.Supp. 321, 324 (D.Mass.1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.1984) (holding that Indiana law applied to a Massachusetts plaintiff, where that decedent was employed in Indiana, the alleged negligence and injury occurred in Indiana, and the decedent was insured under Indiana's workers' compensation act).

Second, § 184 provides:

Recovery for tort or...