Dean v. Barber, 90-7172

• Decision Date: 27 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-7172,90-7172
• Citation: 951 F.2d 1210
• Parties: John D. DEAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David BARBER, Mel Bailey, Jefferson County's Sheriff's Department, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1210

951 F.2d 1210

22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 18

John D. DEAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David BARBER, Mel Bailey, Jefferson County's Sheriff's Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-7172.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 27, 1992.

Mitchell H. Damsky, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

Dominick, Fletcher & Yeilding, Birmingham, Ala., for Mel Bailey.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before KRAVITCH and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, John D. Dean sued Sheriff Mel Bailey of Jefferson County, Alabama, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department and Jefferson County District Attorney David Barber. Dean claimed his constitutional rights were violated by defendants' policies which led to a violent attack upon Dean by a fellow inmate of the Jefferson County Jail. Dean argues on appeal that the district court erred by (a) granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Sheriff Mel Bailey, (b) dismissing Dean's claim against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, (c) denying Dean's motion to join additional defendants, and (d) denying Dean's request for court-appointed counsel. We vacate the grant of summary judgment against Dean and remand for further consideration; we vacate as well the district court's denial of Dean's motion to add as a defendant the Chief Correctional Officer of the Jefferson County Jail. We affirm all other points on appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 1988, Dean was a pretrial detainee in the Jefferson County Jail in Birmingham, Alabama. He had been arrested on two counts of robbery. Because of the underlying robbery charges, Dean was classified as "violent" and held in the F Block of the Jail. F Block was one of seven cellblock houses on the Jail's eighth floor, each of which contained up to twelve prisoners classified as "violent."

Carnell Jackson was also an F Block inmate. Jackson had originally been imprisoned after being convicted and sentenced to death for murder and rape; but, in 1988, he was being held at the Jefferson County Jail awaiting a new trial following a successful appeal based upon purposeful discrimination during jury selection at Jackson's original trial. Jackson had already served six years on death row.

Dean and Jackson were apparently watching television, or perhaps standing by the television, in an area of F Block called the "dayroom." Jackson turned down the volume on the television and asked Dean if he could hear the television. Dean said he could not and reached to turn up the volume. For reasons unexplained in the record, Jackson then punched Dean in the face. Dean backed away from the assault, and Jackson reached into his shirt pocket and pulled out a knife-like weapon made from a toothbrush and a razor blade. Jackson wrestled Dean to the ground, where he slashed at Dean's neck with the knife and repeatedly pounded Dean's head on a concrete step. While other inmates dragged Jackson off Dean, one inmate alerted Deputy Sheriff James Burns, who had not seen Jackson attack Dean but who was the sole guard on duty at the time of the attack. The other two deputies assigned to duty on the eighth floor of the Jail were out to lunch.

Deputy Sheriff Burns, upon seeing the bleeding Dean, immediately called for help from the Jail's central control and also called for a medic. Three deputies responded to the incident, and Dean was removed from F Block to receive medical care within minutes.

As a result of the assault, Dean sustained head injuries and a four-inch gash on his neck that required fourteen stitches. Dean asserts that he has undergone brain surgery to remove damaged blood vessels near his brain caused by the injuries inflicted by Jackson.

Dean filed his pro se section 1983 claim against defendant-appellees in 1989. He claimed that, due to lack of inmate classification and inadequate security at the Jefferson County Jail, Dean's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated.

The district court judge referred Dean's claim to a magistrate judge, who recommended (1) granting Dean's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (2) dismissing Dean's complaint against District Attorney Barber because Dean had no judicially cognizable constitutional interest in the prosecution of another, ¹ (3) dismissing Dean's complaint against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department because the Department was not a proper party subject to suit under section 1983, and (4) allowing the suit against Sheriff Bailey to proceed and requiring Bailey to submit a special report that responded to Dean's allegations. Dean never objected to this first report and recommendation of the magistrate judge.

Dean filed interrogatories and production requests on June 8, 1989. On June 28, the magistrate judge ordered that Sheriff Bailey's special report would be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment and that Dean would have twenty days to object to the report. Dean also filed a motion to join as defendants various Jefferson County Commissioners and a fictitious defendant who allegedly was responsible for the supervision of the Jail.

Sheriff Bailey answered Dean's interrogatories; but Dean, who was dissatisfied with Bailey's responses, filed a motion to compel discovery and complete answers to Dean's interrogatories, listing specifically what he felt were deficient answers. At the same time Dean, who had been given three time extensions on this final response to Bailey's summary judgment motion, filed his second response to Bailey's special report.

The magistrate judge's second and final report recommended denying Dean's motion to add defendants and granting Bailey's summary judgment motion against Dean. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's reports and recommendations over Dean's objection. Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court judge mentioned Dean's motion to compel, which was never ruled upon. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

We note before addressing the merits of Dean's appeal that Dean proceeded as a pro se complainant in the district court. This circuit and the Supreme Court have stated that pro se complaints are given more leeway than complaints submitted by litigants represented by lawyers. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) ("[W]e hold [pro se complaints] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."); Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir.1984) (pro se prisoner complaint governed by less stringent standards than formal pleadings). Dean's pleadings, therefore, will be looked at with special care.

A. Summary Judgment

The district court erred by granting summary judgment without ruling on Dean's motion to compel discovery. Because discovery matters are "committed to the sound discretion of the district court, ... we review [this question] under an abuse of discretion standard." Patterson v. United States Postal Service, 901 F.2d 927, 929 (11th Cir.1990). By effectively ignoring Dean's motion to compel, the district court abused its discretion.

"[S]ummary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery." Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga., 859 F.2d 865, 870 (11th Cir.1988). Here, although Sheriff Bailey responded to Dean's interrogatories, we cannot say from the record that the responses were complete or that Dean had an adequate opportunity to discover the facts necessary to justify his opposition to Sheriff Bailey's motion for summary judgment. We note, for instance, that Dean asked for the procedures relied upon by the Jail to classify and to separate prisoners; in response, he got what appears to be the initial step in classification. See Record at Tab 17, attachment 1 (Jail Policy and Procedures: Operational Area, section 03.01--Classification of Inmates). Dean did not get the separate documents referred to in section 03.01 of the Jail Policy Procedures or the means by which section 03.01 was implemented. For another example, we see that Dean requested the Jail's history of violent incidents among prisoners, including the classification of the inmates involved; in response, Dean got nothing. As one final example, we note that Dean requested Jackson's history of violent acts while in jail; in response, he got the answer "Unknown." These requested items, and others not enumerated here, ² seem relevant to Dean's case and, barring a valid showing to the contrary by Sheriff Bailey, seem discoverable. A party opposing summary judgment should be given the opportunity to discover information relevant to the summary judgment motion. Snook, 859 F.2d at 870. We think Dean may have been denied this opportunity.

Because the district court abused its discretion by ignoring Dean's motion to compel, the grant of summary judgment on a potentially inadequate record was improper and must be vacated. ³ "On remand the district court should consider [Dean's] motion to compel in light of the rules governing discovery and should order the requested documents [and information] produced as appropriate. Once there is an adequate record, the district court may again consider [Sheriff Bailey's] motion for summary judgment." Snook, 859 F.2d at 871.

B. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department

The district court correctly dismissed Dean's claim against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department. We agree with the magistrate judge's conclusion, which was adopted by the district court, that the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department is not a legal entity and, therefore, is not subject to suit or liability under section 1983. In so concluding, we reject Dean's reliance on Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), where the...