Dean v. Coosa County Lumber Co.
Decision Date | 16 April 1936 |
Docket Number | 5 Div. 219 |
Citation | 167 So. 566,232 Ala. 177 |
Parties | DEAN v. COOSA COUNTY LUMBER CO. et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Coosa County; W.W. Wallace, Judge.
Bill for injunction, etc., by W.R. Dean, as administrator of the estate of C.T. Singleton, deceased, against the Coosa County Lumber Company and others. From a decree denying injunction complainant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Complaint which alleged that seller's successors upon declaring forfeiture of contract for sale of timber shortly after buyer's death, for nonpayment of monthly installment, had reentered premises and were wrongfully cutting and selling timber thereon which had been sold to buyer, held to state case for injunctive relief pending determination of cause. Code 1923, § 8304.
Pertinent parts of the agreement referred to in the opinion are as follows:
Basil A. Wood, of Birmingham, for appellant.
H.A. Teel, of Rockford, and Holley & Milner, of Wetumpka, for appellees.
The bill in this cause was filed by W.R. Dean, as administrator of the estate of C.T. Singleton, against the Coosa County Lumber Company and others, seeking relief against a forfeiture, discovery, and an accounting, for temporary and permanent injunction, and for general relief.
The bill was presented to Hon. W.W. Wallace, judge of the circuit court of Coosa county, Ala., for temporary injunction. However, Judge Wallace made an order, setting the application for hearing at Rockford, Ala., on March 24, 1936. Notice as required by the order of the judge was given the defendants, and, upon the hearing, the judge refused the writ of injunction, as prayed for, and from this order the present appeal is prosecuted by the complainant.
The application for injunction was heard upon the sworn bill as amended. No answer or demurrer was interposed by the defendants, and no evidence, either by way of affidavits or oral testimony, was offered by either party.
It appears from the averments of the bill that the Coosa Lumber Company and the said C.T. Singleton, deceased, on April 21, 1934, entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of all merchantable timber, as defined in said contract, upon the lands described in said agreement. The purchaser, the said C.T. Singleton, agreed to pay the said Coosa Lumber Company in cash for the timber, as the same was released to him, at the rate of $8.50 per thousand feet stumpage. The amount of stumpage sold and purchased had been ascertained and agreed upon at the time of the execution of the contract, and the agreement sets forth in an exhibit thereto the amount of stumpage on each governmental subdivision of said land.
At the time of the execution of the contract the said Singleton agreed to pay, and did pay, the said Coosa Lumber Company for 236,000 feet of said timber, at the rate of $8.50 per thousand feet, or the sum of $2,006. This purchase included the timber on the following described lands, viz.: Northeast quarter of southwest quarter and northwest of southwest quarter, section 8, township 22, range 19, Coosa county, Ala. The timber on this land was to be released by the Coosa Lumber Company to the said purchaser.
The contract, in paragraph 4, contained this further provision:
Paragraphs 5, 6, and 8 of the contract read:
Thereafter, on December 18, 1935, the said seller and purchaser entered into an agreement, extending the period within which the said Singleton should be allowed to cut and remove said timber, and making further provisions with reference to the cutting and paying for said timber. Paragraphs 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the new agreement appear in the report of the case.
The said C.T. Singleton, on December 18, 1935, the date of the execution of the extension agreement, paid the Coosa Lumber Company $952, being payment for 112,000 feet of stumpage, which was an excess of 12,000 feet over the amount required to be paid for by the terms of the new or extended contract, and for this excess the purchaser was to be given credit on the amount of stumpage he was required to purchase and pay for during the succeeding month of January, 1936.
It appears that the said C.T. Singleton died on January 23, 1936, without having made any other payment on the timber contract. At the time of his death he was in default as to the advance payment for 88,000 feet of stumpage, and we may concede that he had been in default as to that payment since January 18, 1936; that is to say, for five days prior to his death. However, at that time, and continuously since the execution of the original contract on April 21, 1934, the Coosa Lumber Company held in its possession $2,006 of Singleton's money, paid to it as advance payment on timber.
It further appears from the averments of the bill as amended that on the 7th day of February, 1936, just fifteen days after the death of said Singleton, the said Hamrick, Pearson and Little, who claimed to have succeeded, on the dissolution of the corporation of Coosa Lumber Company, to "the title to the contracts and title to the property described in the bill of complaint, in their individual capacities," proclaimed that the said Singleton was in default under said contracts in the payment for 188,000 feet of timber stumpage, and "declared all the interest and all of the payment theretofore made by Singleton, and all...
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