Dean v. MacDonald
| Decision Date | 10 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000–121.,2000–121. |
| Citation | 786 A.2d 834,147 N.H. 263 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | Charles DEAN and another v. John MacDONALD d/b/a Lee USA Speedway and another. |
Edward F. Wallace, of North Chelmsford, Massachusetts, by brief and orally, for the plaintiffs.
Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., of Concord (Edward M. Kaplan and Sarah S. Murdough on the brief, and Mr. Kaplan orally), for the defendants.
The plaintiffs, Charles and Jean Dean, appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Abramson , J.) granting summary judgment to the defendants, John MacDonald d/b/a Lee USA Speedway and National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., upon Mr. Dean's negligence claim. We affirm and remand.
The relevant undisputed facts follow. Mr. Dean became involved in automobile racing in 1968. In August 1998, while attending a race at the Lee USA Speedway (the Speedway), he sought entrance to the pit area to work on a race car. Before entering the pit area, he was required to sign a "Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnity Agreement" (Release) that purported to release the defendants from liability for negligence claims. On the approximately six other occasions on which Mr. Dean entered the pit area at the Speedway, he was required to sign a similar form. He has also signed a similar form each time he entered the pit area of any race track in the five years preceding the accident.
The top portion of the Release form stated that it was a "RELEASE OF LIABILITY." It instructed the reader to "CAREFULLY READ" the document, and stated that signing the Release was required to enter any "RESTRICTED AREA," defined to include "the racing surface, pit areas, [and] infield." The top portion of the Release also stated that before entering a restricted area, the signer agrees and represents that he or she has inspected the area and found it to be safe and that if, at any time, he or she feels unsafe, he or she will advise officials and leave the restricted area.
The bottom portion of the Release stated that the signer "acknowledges and agrees that the activities of the event are very dangerous and involve the risk of serious injury and/or death" and that the signer has read and signed the Release voluntarily. The signature lines also stated, "THIS IS A RELEASE OF LIABILITY" and "I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE."
Mr. Dean signed the Release before entering the infield pit area. At some point, he left the infield pit area to measure tires. Before crossing the track to return to the infield, he waited for a race official to indicate that it was safe to cross. Once the official so indicated, Mr. Dean began to cross the track and was struck by a race car doing practice laps.
Mr. Dean brought a negligence claim and his wife brought a loss of consortium claim. The defendants moved for summary judgment upon the negligence claim, arguing that it was barred by the Release. The trial court granted the motion. The parties then filed a joint motion to stay proceedings on the loss of consortium claim pending a decision by this court upon the plaintiffs' appeal from the grant of summary judgment. The trial court granted the stay. Under these circumstances, we waive the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 8 and treat the plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal as properly before us. See Sup.Ct. R. 1.
On appeal, Mr. Dean argues that the Release is unenforceable because: (1) he did not contemplate the risk that he would be injured while crossing the track at a race official's direction; (2) he was not given an opportunity to read the release; and (3) the Release failed to identify the defendants by name.
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we look at the affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." N.E. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Rochester, 144 N.H. 118, 120, 740 A.2d 135 (1999) (quotation omitted). "We will affirm if the evidence reveals no genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Forbes Farm Partnership v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 146 N.H. 200, ––––, 769 A.2d 366, 368 (2001) (quotation omitted). "We review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo." Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 145 N.H. 190, 193, 761 A.2d 417 (2000).
Before addressing Mr. Dean's claims, we begin by reviewing the law pertaining to exculpatory contracts. Although New Hampshire law generally prohibits exculpatory contracts, we will enforce them if: (1) they do not violate public policy; (2) the plaintiff understood the import of the agreement or a reasonable person in his position would have understood the import of the agreement; and (3) the plaintiff's claims were within the contemplation of the parties when they executed the contract. See Barnes v. N.H. Karting Assoc., 128 N.H. 102, 106–07, 509 A.2d 151 (1986). Mr. Dean first asserts that the Release is unenforceable because his claims were not contemplated by the parties.
To determine the scope of the Release, we examine its language. See id. at 109, 509 A.2d 151. In interpreting a release, we "give [the] language used by the parties its common meaning [and] give the contract itself the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person." Id. (citation omitted). "As long as the language of the release clearly and specifically indicates the intent to release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the defendant's negligence, the agreement will be upheld." Id. at 107, 509 A.2d 151. We strictly construe exculpatory contracts against the defendant. Id.
Mr. Dean urges us to determine the scope of the Release according to his subjective intent, arguing that it was not intended to cover the risk that he would be injured while crossing the race track at an official's direction because neither he nor the defendants had ever known anyone to be injured in this way. We "judge the intent of the parties by objective criteria rather than the unmanifested states of mind of the parties," however. Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713, 715, 766 A.2d 708 (2001) (quotation omitted); see also Barnes, 128 N.H. at 107, 509 A.2d 151.
In Barnes, we held that the parties need not have contemplated the precise occurrence that caused the plaintiff's injuries. Barnes, 128 N.H. at 107, 509 A.2d 151. "They may adopt language to cover a broad range of accidents ... by specifying injuries involving negligence on the part of the defendants." Id.
See id. at 105, 109, 509 A.2d 151. This language "clearly and specifically" indicates the intent to release the defendants from liability for the consequences of their own negligence and is sufficient "to cover a broad range of accidents" occurring at automobile races. Id. at 107, 509 A.2d 151. Moreover, Mr. Dean's claim fits within this broad scope. He sustained injuries while in or upon a restricted area (the racing surface) due to the alleged negligence of one of the Releasees (a race official).
Our conclusion is consistent with cases in other jurisdictions. For instance, in Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill.2d 82, 46 Ill.Dec. 139, 413 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1980), the plaintiff, an experienced race car driver, had signed a release relieving the defendants from all personal injury claims "whether caused by the negligence of Releasees or otherwise while the Undersigned is upon the Restricted Area." The court ruled that the plaintiff's accident, caused by the collapse of the upper track embankment, was within the contemplation of the parties. Id. 46 Ill.Dec. 139, 413 N.E.2d at 1253–54. As the court explained:
The racing of automobiles at a high speed in limited areas gives rise to various situations which have resulted in the death or injury to drivers, mechanics and spectators at these events. These accidents may occur because of factors involving mechanical failures, defective design of...
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