Dean v. McKinney

• Decision Date: 02 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-1383,19-1383
• Citation: 976 F.3d 407
• Parties: Felicia Harkness DEAN, as Guardian and Conservator FOR AND ON BEHALF OF Janel HARKNESS, an incapacitated adult, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. Stephen B. MCKINNEY, Defendant – Appellant, and Chad McBride, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Anderson County Sheriff's Office; The Anderson County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

976 F.3d 407

Felicia Harkness DEAN, as Guardian and Conservator FOR AND ON BEHALF OF Janel HARKNESS, an incapacitated adult, Plaintiff – Appellee,

v. Stephen B. MCKINNEY, Defendant – Appellant,andChad McBride, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Anderson County Sheriff's Office; The Anderson County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.

No. 19-1383

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 31, 2020

Decided: October 2, 2020

ARGUED: James William Logan, Jr., LOGAN & JOLLY, LLP, Anderson, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jordan Christopher Calloway, MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC, Rock Hill, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stacey Todd Coffee, LOGAN & JOLLY, LLP, Anderson, South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert V. Phillips, MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC, Rock Hill, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz joined. Judge Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion.

GREGORY, Chief Judge:

This civil action arises out of claims for injuries suffered in an automobile collision. Stephen B. McKinney appeals the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I.

On October 19, 2016, Anderson County, South Carolina Deputy Sheriff Stephen B. "Brent" McKinney was on patrol in his government-owned SUV. At approximately 10:30 p.m., fellow Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Lollis radioed a request for assistance with a traffic stop. Believing that Lollis's voice sounded as if he was "shaken," J.A. 149, Shift Supervisor Lieutenant Scott Hamby issued a "Code 3" for available officers to assist Lollis. Per Sheriff's Office policy governing "Emergency Vehicle Operations" and state law,¹ a "Code 3" represents an "emergency response" where "human life or safety is threatened." J.A. 75. A Code 3 is the only time officers are permitted to exceed posted speed limits or otherwise disregard traffic regulations. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-760. Other than with respect to certain exemptions described in Section 56-5-760(C) —none of which apply here—officers are required to use emergency lights and sirens for every Code 3 response. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-5-4700 ; 56-5-4970.²

McKinney activated his emergency lights and siren and proceeded to Lollis’ location. "[A] few seconds" later, Lollis radioed that units could "back down on emergency response but continue to him ‘priority.’ " J.A. 149. Hamby cancelled the Code 3 but advised responding officers to continue to Lollis's location. McKinney acknowledged Hamby's cancellation of the Code 3 and "cut back to normal run," J.A. 43, a non-emergency response where officers must abide by all traffic laws. J.A. 75, see S.C. Ann. §§ 56-5-760. McKinney deactivated his emergency lights and siren, and, according to McKinney, "began to reduce the speed of [his] vehicle." J.A. 40. As he continued along the road to assist Lollis, McKinney passed Hamby, who was travelling in the opposite direction. Approximately two minutes after Hamby cancelled the Code 3, McKinney lost control of his vehicle on a curved and unlit section of the road. He crossed the center line and struck Janel Harkness's sedan nearly head-on. Harkness sustained extensive and severe orthopedic and neurological injuries

. An accident reconstruction determined that McKinney was travelling at least 83 miles per hour when he began to skid around the curve—at least 38 miles per hour over the 45 mile-per-hour speed limit.³ The Traffic Collision Report indicates, and McKinney does not contest, that he "contributed to [the] collision" and was "driving too fast for conditions." J.A. 68.

As a sheriff's deputy, McKinney received training on the operation of a police vehicle, including when department policy and state law required him to use his emergency lights and siren, and when and under what circumstances he could exceed the speed limit. His training also included instruction on the risks of night driving. The rules regarding safe vehicle operations were reinforced during remedial counseling McKinney received following his involvement in a series of incidents involving his operation of police vehicles.

Harkness's mother, Felicia Harkness Dean (the "plaintiff"), acting as Harkness's Guardian and Conservator, filed a civil action in state court against McKinney, Anderson County Sheriff Chad McBride, and the Anderson County Sheriff's Office. The complaint included a claim pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that McKinney violated Harkness's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by "driving his vehicle at such an extreme rate of speed without responding to an emergency [or] chasing a criminal suspect," exhibiting "conscience-shocking deliberate indifference" to Harkness's life and safety. J.A. 13. The complaint also included a claim asserting negligence and gross negligence under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq .⁴

McKinney removed the case to federal court, and thereafter moved for summary judgment, asserting that he was entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim because the plaintiff failed to establish a violation of Harkness's substantive due process right. The district court denied McKinney's motion, finding that (1) a reasonable jury could conclude that McKinney violated her substantive due process right; (2) McKinney is not entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) the Parratt - Hudson doctrine does not preclude her § 1983 action.

We affirm the decision of the district court. We find that McKinney was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. A reasonable jury could conclude that McKinney violated Harkness's clearly established substantive due process right. Further, the Parratt - Hudson doctrine does not bar the plaintiff's substantive due process claim.

II.

A.

A district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is reviewed de novo . Iko v. Shreve , 535 F.3d 225, 237 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Caudill , 475 F.3d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 2007) ). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See also Williams v. Strickland , 917 F.3d 763, 768 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Iko , 535 F.3d at 234 ) (a court, when viewing facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, must determine whether defendant is entitled to qualified immunity); Brown v. Elliott , 876 F.3d 637, 641–42 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[W]hen resolving the issue of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a court must ascertain the circumstances of the case by crediting the plaintiff's evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In considering a qualified immunity defense, the court must consider whether the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ; Miller v. Prince George's Cty ., 475 F.3d 621, 627-28 (4th Cir. 2007).

McKinney argues on appeal that he is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions in driving his vehicle did not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation that was clearly established at the time of the collision. We examine each prong of qualified immunity analysis in turn.

B.

1.

First, McKenney asserts that the district court erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation. To establish a substantive due process violation, the plaintiff must show that McKinney's behavior was "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Terrell v. Larson , 396 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) ). The parties agree that this "shocks the conscience" standard applies to § 1983 claims alleging a violation of substantive due process based on alleged police misconduct. See Temkin v. Frederick Cty. Commissioners , 945 F.2d 716, 722 (4th Cir. 1991). As a threshold matter then, we must first determine what level of culpability is required for McKinney's actions to be considered "conscience shocking." Lewis , 523 U.S. at 850, 118 S.Ct. 1708.

The Supreme Court in Lewis described a "culpability spectrum" along which behavior may support a substantive due process claim. Id. at 848-49, 118 S.Ct. 1708. The Court rejected "customary tort liability as any mark of sufficiently shocking conduct" and held that "liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process." Id. At the other the end of the spectrum, the Court explains, is behavior "that would most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure [that is] in some way unjustifiable by any government interest." Id. at 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708. "[This] sort of official action is most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id . "[C]loser calls," however, are presented by conduct that is "something more than negligence but ‘less than intentional.’ " Id. A determination as to which of these standards of culpability—"intent to...