Dean v. Negley

• Decision Date: 27 January 1862
• Citation: 41 Pa. 312
• Parties: Dean and Wife <I>versus</I> Negley and Cuthbert.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

41 Pa. 312

Dean and Wife versus Negley and Cuthbert.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 27, 1862.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Allegheny county.

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Charles Shaler and Bruce & Negly, for plaintiffs in error, argued that they were entitled to prove the open adulterous intercourse between Mr. Johnston and Mrs. Bolton, and the circumstances of his family relation in connection with such evidence, as substantial facts tending to prove their part of the issue, and maintain their allegation of undue influence: citing and relying on Patterson v. Patterson, 6 S. & R. 55; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 Id. 93; Brown v. Moliston, 3 Whart. 134; McTagart v. Thompson, 2 Harris 162; McMahon v. Bryant, 8 Id. 331; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 11 Id. 378; Miller v. Miller, 3 S. & R. 267; Moritz v. Bough, 16 Id. 403; Small v. Small, 4 Greenl. 220; Denslow v. Moor, 2 Day 12; Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & Johns. 269; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 688; Nesseur v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. 326; Denton v. Franklin, 9 B. Monroe 28; Glover v. Hay, 4 Cushing 580; Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Gill 10; Bayard v. McElroy, 21 Alabama 30; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 22 Id. 529; Morris v Stokes, 20 Geo. 709; Taylor v. Wilson, 5 Bennet (Miss.) 306; 1 Kernan 157; 17 Barbour 236; 2 Comstock 498.

Marshall & Brown, for defendants in error, cited and relied on McMahon v. Ryan, 8 Harris 329; Miller v. Miller, 3 S. & R. 267; Carroll v. Marton, 3 Br. Surr. Rep. 291; Bleeker v. Lynch, 1 Bradford 458; 1 Wm. on Ex. 44, note; Trumbull v. Gibbon, 2 Zabr. (N. J. Rep.) 117; Lowe v. Williamson, 1 Gr. Ch. Rep. 82; Browne v. Molliston, 3 Wh. 138; McMasters v. Blair, 5 Casey 302, 303, 304, 305; Irish v. Smith, 8 S. & R. 572; Hoshauer v. Hoshauer, 2 Casey 407.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 27th 1862, by LOWRIE, C. J.

The will of a man who has testamentary capacity cannot be avoided merely because it is unaccountably contrary to the common sense of the country. His will, if not contrary to law, stands for the law of descent of his property, whether his reasons for it be good or bad, if indeed they be his own, uninduced by unlawful influence from others. Lawful influence, such as that arising from legitimate family and social relations, must be allowed to produce its natural results, even in influencing last wills. However great the influence thus generated may be, it has no taint of unlawfulness in it; and there can be no presumption of its actual unlawful exercise merely from the facts that it is known to have existed, and that it has manifestly operated on the testator's mind as a reason for his testamentary dispositions. Such influences are naturally very unequal, and naturally productive of inequalities in testamentary dispositions; and as they are also lawful in general, and the law cannot criticise and measure them so as to attribute to them their proper effect, no will can be condemned because the existence of such an influence is proved, and because the will contains in itself proof of its effect. It is only when such influence is unduly exerted over the very act of devising, so as to prevent the will from being truly the act of the testator, that the law condemns it as a vicious element of the testamentary act; so the law always...