Dean v. Redmiles

• Decision Date: 19 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 24,24
• Citation: 374 A.2d 329,280 Md. 137
• Parties: Robert E. DEAN et al. v. Douglas Thomas REDMILES, Personal Representative of the Estate of Douglas Thomas Redmiles, Jr., et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 137

280 Md. 137

374 A.2d 329

Robert E. DEAN et al. v. Douglas Thomas REDMILES, Personal Representative of the Estate of Douglas Thomas Redmiles, Jr., et al.

No. 24.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 19, 1977.

Edward P. Camus, Riverdale (Camus & Perry and Darlene G. Perry, Riverdale, on the brief), for Muller.

William R. Hymes, Ellicott City (John C. Corbley, Annapolis, on the brief), for Robert E. Dean.

Frederick J. Green, Jr., Baltimore (G. Joseph Sills, Jr. and Lord, Whip, Coughlan & Green, P.A., Baltimore, Lansdale G. Sasscer, Jr., Upper Marlboro and Foster H. Fanseen, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and ELDRIDGE, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

Once again we must consider the proper application of the "boulevard law." ¹ In this instance the issue presented arises under Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl.Vol.) Art. 661/2, § 11-404 relative to "enter(ing) or cross(ing) a highway from a private road or driveway . . . ." The most common application, however, arises under § 11-403 stating that vehicles on "through highways" (a term defined in § 1-198) are to have the right-of-way.

We are concerned here with the liability of a favored driver to a passenger in his vehicle. Since we conclude that the trial judge (Taylor, J.) correctly determined that the boulevard law did not insulate this driver from liability to his passenger, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in Redmiles v. Muller, 29 Md.App. 304, 348 A.2d 291 (1975).

The facts are fully set forth in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. We shall only relate such facts here as are necessary for a clear understanding of the opinion.

Appellants, Clara W. Muller and Robert E. Moore, parents of Terry Ann Moore (passenger in the favored vehicle who was fatally injured), and Clara W. Muller, administratrix of her estate, sued Douglas Thomas Redmiles, personal representative of the estate of Douglas Thomas Redmiles, Jr., deceased (the Redmiles estate or the estate); Mr. Redmiles, Sr.; and Robert E. Dean (Dean) (owner and operator of the unfavored vehicle). Redmiles, Jr. (Redmiles) was the operator of the favored vehicle which was owned by his father. After a jury trial a judgment for costs was entered in favor of Mr. Redmiles, Sr. Judgments for monetary damages were recorded against Dean and the estate in favor of the estate of Miss Moore and her surviving parents. The Redmiles estate appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Dean did not appeal. However, he appears as an appellant here, indicating that he would like company in the matter of the judgment for damages. The Court of Special Appeals "conclude(d) that the Boulevard Rule was applicable (,) . . . that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the favored driver which was the proximate cause of the collision (, and thus) (t)he lower court erred . . . in refusing to grant a directed verdict in favor of appellant Redmiles."

The sole issue presented by the appellants is whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the negligence of the favored driver should not have been submitted to the jury. Our conclusion that it did err presents the issue which the Redmiles estate asks that we decide in the event of such a conclusion, whether the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. The latter point was not decided by the Court of Special Appeals because of its decision relative to the boulevard law. We decide the point in the interest of economy of judicial time.

1. The facts

The incident in question occurred shortly before midnight on Friday, January 14, 1972, on U. S. Rt. 1 in front of the Red Rooster Inn in Howard County. The highway at that point runs generally north and south. It is a four lane highway with a double yellow line separating northbound and southbound traffic. The speed limit in the area was 50 miles per hour. The weather was clear; the temperature, cold; and the roadway, dry. The Red Rooster Inn is located on the west side of the highway about 400 feet south of the crest of a hill.

Dean had been traveling in a southerly direction on Rt. 1. At the request of his female companion he turned around and proceeded north to visit the Red Rooster Inn. He made a left turn across southbound traffic for the purpose of parking in front of the door in the center of the Red Rooster Inn building so that when his vehicle was parked it would be perpendicular to the flow of traffic on the highway. He found that his proposed parking space was not wide enough for the front of his car since the two vehicles on each side of the space were parked at such an angle that they were closer together in the front than in the rear. He began to back out of the space after, as he put it, "making certain there was no approaching southbound traffic." His car stalled, not being equipped with an automatic transmission. A collision ensued between the vehicle operated by Redmiles and the Dean vehicle. Redmiles and his passenger, Terry Ann Moore, were killed in the collision. There was testimony that the time the Dean vehicle was stopped in the boulevard prior to the collision "might have been a minute, maybe a little longer." At the speeds here involved this could have meant that Redmiles was a mile down the road when Dean's car stalled.

Redmiles was proceeding in a southerly direction on Rt. 1. He and Miss Moore were returning from a visit to the nearby home of a friend. William E. Welte (Welte) had visited the same home. Welte and Redmiles left within a few minutes of each other. Welte, too, was proceeding south on Rt. 1. In response to a question as to whether "the Redmiles car (was) in front of . . ., alongside, or behind" him when he reached the crest of the hill immediately north of the Red Rooster to which reference has been previously made, Welte replied:

"I can't really recall whether it was in front of me or behind me, but it was close to me, more or less beside me, maybe a little in front or a little behind. I can't be sure."

He observed the Dean vehicle "sitting sideways in the slow lane, south, on the south part of the Red Rooster." Welte "hit (his) brakes" when he observed the Dean vehicle. He "guess(ed) they locked up and (he) skidded and went off to the left to get out of the way." His vehicle ultimately stopped at a service station across the road from the Red Rooster. Welte observed no oncoming northbound traffic on Rt. 1 when his vehicle was veering to the left, nor did he see any obstructions in the general area of the Red Rooster other than the Dean vehicle. He indicated that as he was swinging to the left and skidding, as far as he knew "the inside southbound lane and the two northbound lanes (were) clear of traffic." Welte said that "after (he) more or less got (his) car in full control, (he) looked over to the right and (he) seen tail lights sliding down the road and (he) seen him strike the other car and it went up on its side," indicating he was referring to the Redmiles vehicle. Welte was in the service station parking lot when he observed the Redmiles vehicle collide with the Dean car. The investigating officer said that the Welte vehicle laid down approximately 200 feet of skid marks while the Redmiles car left about 234 feet of skid marks. All of the Redmiles skid marks were in the "slow" lane of travel.

Welte originally told the police that he was traveling at a speed of 45 to 50 miles per hour and Redmiles, at 55 to 60 miles per hour. He later changed this to indicate that he was traveling at 50 to 55 miles per hour and that Redmiles was going 65 to 70 miles per hour. At trial he said that he could not "really

say" what his speed was. His vehicle was equipped with

power brakes.

2. Our prior holdings relative

to the boulevard law, speed, and

statutory violations as

evidence of negligence

We shall first review our prior holdings relative to the boulevard law as well as our prior holdings concerning whether statutory violations, such as speeding, are evidence of negligence.

Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl.Vol.) Art. 661/2, § 11-403(b) states that "(t) he driver of a vehicle shall come to a full stop . . . at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles approaching on the through highway." Similar provisions are contained in § 11-403(c) with reference to "obedience to a stop sign" and § 11-403(d) relative to "a street or roadway on which a 'yield right-of-way' or 'yield' sign is erected facing the driver on the approach to an intersection or merging point with another street or roadway . . . ." In Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 122 A.2d 570 (1956), and Grue et al. v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 157, 205 A.2d 260 (1964), among other cases, this Court has held that the language of Art. 661/2, § 11-404 relative to entering a highway from a private road or driveway and entering a paved public highway from an unpaved public highway is to be accorded the same interpretation as that given § 11-403. We have also held that automatic traffic signals come within the boulevard rule and, therefore, the law with reference to them should be accorded an interpretation similar to that relative to the statute pertaining to boulevards and stop signs. See, e. g., Clemons v. Bullock, 250 Md. 586, 598, 244 A.2d 240 (1968); Thompson v. Terry, 245 Md. 480, 486, 226 A.2d 540 (1967); and Eastern Contractors v. State, 225 Md. 112, 123, 169 A.2d 430 (1961).

Many persons regard the boulevard rule as having been originally announced in Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 132, 8 A.2d 888, 895 (1939), where the Court said that the progenitor of the present § 11-403 was

"mandatory, that it is the positive and imperative duty of a person driving an automobile over an unfavored highway, when he approaches an intersecting highway lawfully designated as a 'boulevard' or 'stop street,' to stop before entering the intersection, and having stopped, to...