Dean v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 01 December 2022
• Docket Number: 3:19-cv-1191-MMH-MCR
• Parties: SHAMEEN A. DEAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

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SHAMEEN A. DEAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

No. 3:19-cv-1191-MMH-MCR

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

December 1, 2022

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Status

Petitioner Shameen A. Dean, an inmate of the Florida penal system initiated this action on October 18, 2019,^[1]by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).^[2]Dean also filed a memorandum of law (Memorandum; Doc. 9). In the Petition, Dean challenges a 2009 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed burglary. He raises nine grounds for relief. See Petition at 4-24. Respondents submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response (Doc. 11). They also submitted exhibits. See Docs. 11-1 through 11-4. Dean filed a brief in reply. See Reply (Doc. 16). Dean's Petition is ripe for review.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On December 10, 2008, the State of Florida charged Dean by information with second-degree murder (count one), armed robbery (counts two and three), armed burglary (count four), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count five). Doc. 11-1 at 30-31. The State later charged Dean with the same offenses in an indictment: first-degree murder (count one), armed robbery (counts two and three), armed burglary (count four), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count five). Id. at 51-54. The State also filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, which it withdrew when Dean waived his right to a twelve-person jury. Id. at 55, 80. Dean proceeded to a trial on counts one through four, and on December 3, 2009, a jury found him guilty as to all counts. Id. at 83-89. On December 18, 2009, the trial court sentenced Dean to concurrent mandatory minimum terms of life imprisonment. Id. at 223-33.

On July 12, 2010, Dean filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion, arguing that the trial court illegally sentenced him to mandatory minimum terms of life imprisonment for counts two through four.

Doc. 11-3 at 15-18. The trial court denied Dean's Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion without prejudice. Id. at 19. On direct appeal, Dean, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that the trial court erred when it: denied his Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion (ground one); limited the defense's crossexamination of a witness (ground two); and allowed the State to admit an autopsy photograph (ground three). Id. at 28-50. The State filed an answer brief. Id. at 52-74. On January 24, 2011, the First DCA affirmed Dean's convictions, but reversed his mandatory minimum sentences for counts two through four and remanded for the entry of twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentences on those counts. Id. at 81; onlinedocketsdca.flcourts.org, Shameen A. Dean v. State of Florida, 1D10-230 (Fla. 1st DCA). On March 22, 2011, the First DCA granted the State's motion for rehearing, withdrew its January 24th opinion, and affirmed Dean's convictions and sentences in light of Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740 (Fla. 2010).^[3]Doc. 11-3 at 80-81. The court issued the mandate on April 19, 2011. Id. at 83. Dean invoked the discretionary jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, id. at 85-86, and on July 6, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed Dean's petition for review, id. at 87.

On April 5, 2012, Dean filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. at 95-114. Dean alleged counsel was ineffective when he failed to: file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search in which law enforcement obtained involuntary consent to search Dean's house (ground one); call alibi witnesses Bernard Jordan and “Nardo” (ground two); withdraw as counsel because of a conflict of interest (ground three); object to testimony from a DNA analyst (ground four); and ensure the trial court properly determined Dean's competency (ground five). Id. Dean filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion on March 20, 2013, raising an additional claim that counsel was ineffective when he misadvised Dean about his right to a speedy trial (ground six). Id. at 118-24. On January 15, 2014, Dean filed a second amended Rule 3.850 motion, raising an additional four grounds for relief. Id. at 125-39. He alleged counsel was ineffective when he failed to: challenge the probable cause affidavit for the search warrant (ground seven); challenge the search of Dean's house where law enforcement exceeded the boundaries of the location described in the search warrant (ground eight); object to Dean's arrest where law enforcement did not have an arrest warrant (ground nine); and interview or call exculpatory witness Heather Gwin (ground ten). Id. On April 18, 2016, the postconviction court dismissed the claims in grounds seven through ten as untimely and ordered the State to respond to grounds one through six. Id. at 180-81. The State filed a response, id. at 186-206, and on January 19, 2017, the postconviction court summarily denied relief, Doc. 11-4 at 40-171. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a written opinion on January 25, 2019, id. at 175, and issued the mandate on February 22, 2019, id. at 177. Dean filed a motion to recall the mandate, which the First DCA denied on April 23, 2019. Id. at 181-88.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Dean's] claim[s] without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed' and ‘highly deferential.'” Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523

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