Dean v. State, 95-2788
Decision Date | 02 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 95-2788,95-2788 |
Citation | 690 So.2d 720 |
Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D837 Michael DEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael D. Gelety, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant, Michael Dean (defendant), raises multiple errors in his trial that he argues mandate a reversal of his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. We agree that reversal for a new trial is mandated because of the improper admission of testimony by the arresting detectives regarding the general behavior patterns of drug traffickers.
Two plainclothes detectives, assigned to interdict the flow of narcotics in and out of Broward County, were on duty at the Fort Lauderdale Amtrack Rail Station. The detectives observed defendant sitting on a baggage cart and decided to "do a random encounter." The detectives identified themselves and asked if they could speak with him. They explained that there was a large drug problem in South Florida and that the detectives were randomly approaching individuals and, with permission, searching their luggage.
After explaining that compliance was voluntary, the detectives asked defendant for identification and consent to search his luggage. Defendant produced an Amtrack ticket in the name of "James Bolton," but indicated that he had no form of identification.
A large quantity of cocaine was discovered when the detectives searched defendant's luggage. After the detectives placed defendant under arrest, a subsequent inventory search revealed a driver's license bearing the name "Michael Dean." We previously addressed the propriety of the search of defendant's luggage, and defendant's voluntary consent, in State v. Dean, 639 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), where we reversed the trial court's order suppressing the cocaine.
The defense at trial was that defendant was unaware of the cocaine in his luggage. In support of this defense, counsel pointed to defendant's voluntary consent to the search and the fact that he was not carrying a large quantity of money at the time of his arrest.
Over repeated objections from defense counsel, the prosecution elicited testimony from the detectives about their past experience with the general behavior of drug traffickers, including that: (1) people often consent to a search of their luggage, even when it contains contraband; (2) "mules" carrying contraband sometimes do not carry much money and generally are not paid until delivery; and (3) people traveling with a false name on their tickets generally are involved in illegal activity.
Defendant did not take the stand. The defense of lack of knowledge was thus developed on cross-examination. For example, on cross-examination of one of the detectives, defense counsel brought out that defendant had voluntarily consented to the search. On re-direct, over defense objection, the prosecution was allowed to elicit testimony about the detective's observations based on thousands of other random encounters:
(Emphasis supplied).
On the issue of the amount of money defendant was carrying at the time of his arrest, defense counsel elicited on cross-examination only that defendant did not have "a lot of money with him." However, on redirect, once again over the repeated objections of defense counsel, the prosecutor elicited testimony about the behavior of certain drug carriers known as "mules":
(Emphasis supplied).
Finally, the prosecutor elicited testimony that the detective had encountered people traveling under assumed names "many times" and that, based on his personal knowledge and experience in "hundreds" of encounters, "[m]ore times than not they were involved in illegal activity."
During closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized the testimony concerning the general practices of drug dealers and mules:
[The detectives] indicated they have done this hundreds of thousands of times and during those times people have consented to the searches, knowing full well that their bags contained contraband.... The fact that he was traveling under an assumed name and you heard [the detective] indicate yes, he's coming [sic] across people traveling under in the course of his experience traveling under assume [sic] names. Generally it's not for any legitimate reason and you heard that in any of the reasons in this case no explanation.
This court has repeatedly condemned testimony about behavior patterns of criminals, including drug dealers, based upon an officer's observations in other cases. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 673 So.2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Dawson v. State, 585 So.2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Osario v. State, 526 So.2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Hargrove v. State, 431 So.2d 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
General criminal behavior testimony is not allowed as substantive proof of a defendant's guilt because "every defendant has the right to be tried based on the evidence against him, not on the characteristics or conduct of certain classes of criminals in general." Lowder v. State, 589 So.2d 933, 935 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), dismissed, 598 So.2d 78 (Fla.1992). In Lowder, the court found reversible error where the detective was allowed to testify that "[p]eople who sell narcotics usually have cash in their pocket." Id.
In Thomas, the defendant claimed that he had abandoned his intent to sell cocaine and had simply stood by while another individual completed the transaction. This court reversed his conviction based upon impermissible testimony from the detective that often one individual is actually in possession of the drugs while another person collects the money.
In Shelton, the defendant sold a cocaine rock to an undercover officer for $20. On cross-examination of the officer, defense counsel brought out that the defendant did not have the $20 in his possession when he was arrested. 654 So.2d at 1296. On redirect, the officer was allowed to testify that money marked for identification was not always recovered and the lack of recovery would not be considered abnormal. Id. This court reversed, finding this testimony to be "inadmissible and highly prejudicial." Id.
In Hargrove, we condemned testimony of a police officer that based on his experience, the post-arrest statement that "I don't mess with the stuff" was a phrase uttered frequently by drug dealers to throw suspicion off themselves. 431 So.2d at 732. In condemning the testimony, this court found that Id. at 733.
We emphasize once again why the type of testimony allowed in this case is impermissible and highly prejudicial. Even if such testimony were marginally relevant, it would be substantially outweighed by the "danger of unfair prejudice." See § 90.403, Fla.Stat. (1995). The danger is that this type of testimony allows a jury to consider not only the facts relevant to that defendant's case but also events at other points in time unrelated to the defendant's conduct. The jury is asked to infer that because defendant's behavior was similar to the behavior of other drug dealers that the officer had previously arrested or observed, defendant must likewise be guilty. The only purpose of testimony regarding criminal behavior patterns "is to place prejudicial and misleading inferences in front of the jury." Nowitzke v. State, 572 So.2d 1346, 1356 (Fla.1990). The prejudicial effect is compounded because the defendant is deprived of any meaningful ability to cross-examine concerning the officer's prior experience to determine whether the other cases are in fact similar.
Testimony about other drug transactions is also condemned based upon the rule of "res inter alios acta" which
forbids the introduction against an accused of evidence of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Keesecker
...since defendant was only person other than his girlfriend who could have explained the possession of the credit cards); Dean v. State, 690 So.2d 720 (Fla.App.1997) (holding that comment on defendant's failure to explain why he had been traveling under assumed name was susceptible to interpr......
-
Salcedo v. People
...1210-13 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983); Lee, 959 P.2d at 802; Dean v. State, 690 So.2d 720, 722 (Fla.App.1997); State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 547, 554 (La.1979); People v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 548 (Minn. 1994); Valcarcel v. State, 765......
-
Rodriguez v. State, SC90153.
...tension between our decision in Marshall and our earlier decision in White v. State, 377 So.2d 1149 (Fla.1979). See Dean v. State, 690 So.2d 720, 724 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Crawford v. State, 473 So.2d 700, 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (Glickstein, J., specially concurring), quashed, 491 So.2......
-
Beckman v. State, 3D15–304
...reversible error where "the only person who could have testified at trial" as to what took place was the defendant. Dean v. State, 690 So.2d 720, 724 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ; Marshall v. State, 473 So.2d 688, 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), quashed on other grounds by State v. Marshall, 476 So.2d 150......