Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville
Decision Date | 16 June 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 17135.,17135. |
Citation | 379 F.2d 321 |
Parties | DEANE HILL COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF KNOXVILLE and George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
William E. Badgett, Knoxville, Tenn., for appellant.
Robert L. Crossley, Knoxville, Tenn., for City of Knoxville.
Milton P. Rice, Nashville, Tenn., for McCanless, Atty. Gen.
Before CELEBREZZE and PECK, Circuit Judges, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.
In 1960, the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, (the "City") annexed approximately 150 acres of land owned by plaintiff pursuant to Ordinance No. 3050. In this action, plaintiff attacks the ordinance and the state act authorizing said ordinance as unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution.
The statutory provision pursuant to which Ordinance No. 3050 was adopted, section 6-309, Tenn.Code Anno., provides:
"A municipality * * * upon its own initiative when it appears that the prosperity of such municipality and affected territory will be materially retarded and the safety and welfare of the inhabitants and property thereof endangered, after notice and public hearing, by ordinance, may extend its corporate limits by annexation of such territory adjoining its existing boundaries as may be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and property owners of the affected territory as well as the municipality as a whole * * *."
The complaint charges that plaintiff's property has, as a result of the annexation, been subjected to liens for the payment of city taxes, the proceeds of which are and were partially applied to the City's preexisting bonded indebtedness. This allegedly constitutes a taking of plaintiff's property for public use without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The complaint further alleges that the ordinance and statute in question deprives plaintiff of its property without due process of law and deprives plaintiff of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution for the reasons that plaintiff was not represented on the City Council which enacted the ordinance; that plaintiff was afforded no voice or vote on the annexation proposal by means of referendum; that the statute empowers the City to withhold from the annexed area any and all municipal functions and services; and that the statute is invalid since it was enacted by a malapportioned Tennessee legislature. This latter contention was abandoned by plaintiff at oral argument before this court and it therefore will not be considered. Plaintiff requested that the City be enjoined from enforcement of Ordinance No. 3050 and that judgment be rendered against the City for the amount of taxes which were allegedly illegally exacted.
As the basis for federal jurisdiction, plaintiff relied solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3), so-called Civil Rights jurisdiction. This section provides in pertinent part:
Section 1343(3) being jurisdictional only, it was incumbent on plaintiff to direct the court to a "law" pursuant to which its suit was "authorized * * * to be commenced." Although plaintiff failed to do this, it may be surmised by the reference in its brief to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed. 2d 663 (1962), that plaintiff intended the action to be brought under 42 U.S.C. A. § 1983.
This section provides that:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
However, this statute is inapplicable in the present case. The Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), that municipalities were not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. Although the Court in Monroe was confronted with a case in which claimants sought damages against a municipal corporation, the Court seemingly settled the question of whether equitable relief against a municipality could be obtained under Section 1983. In a footnote, the Court referred to Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943) and Holmes v. City of Altanta, 350 U.S. 879, 76 S.Ct. 141, 100 L.Ed. 776 (1955), in which equitable relief had been sought against defendant municipalities under Section 1983. Noting that the question had not been raised in those cases, the Court stated, "Since we hold that a municipal corporation is not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases." Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. at 191, n. 50, 81 S.Ct. at 486. This court's decision in Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield, 6 Cir., 250 F.2d 700 (1957), was also cited approvingly by the Court in the footnote mentioned. Ibid. See also Wallach v. City of Pagedale, 359 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1966); Sheridan v. Williams, 333 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964); Spampinato v. City of New York, 311 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 980, 83 S.Ct. 1115, 10 L.Ed.2d 144 (1963). Thus Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has no application to the claim alleged against defendant City of Knoxville.
Nor can this action be maintained against defendant McCanless, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, under section 1983. Clearly the State of Tennessee is not liable as a "person" within the meaning of this section (See e. g., United States ex rel. Lee v. State of Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965)), and because section 1983 imposes liability only upon a person who "subjects, or causes to be subjected" any other person to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution, it is, briefly stated, the individual's conduct which forms the basis of liability. "The Act prescribes two elements * * * (1) the conduct complained of must have been done by some person acting under color of law; and (2) such conduct must have subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights. * * *" Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1965) (Emphasis added). The complaint sets forth no conduct by defendant McCanless which could possibly be construed as depriving plaintiff of any rights; it merely appears that McCanless was made a party defendant because a statute of Tennessee was claimed to be unconstitutional.
The District Court, relying on Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907); Hammonds v. City of Corpus Christi, 226 F. Supp. 456, aff'd 343 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 837, 86 S.Ct. 85, 15 L.Ed.2d 80 (1965); and Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Township School District, 247 F.Supp. 296, recently affirmed by this court, 378 F.2d 225 (1967)), for the principle "that the annexation of lands to a city or town is purely a political matter, entirely within the power of the legislature of the State to regulate," sustained the City's motion to dismiss the complaint.
In Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, supra, which was relied upon in both Hammonds and Detroit Edison, supra, the Court stated:
It is clear, for the reasons set forth in Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Township School District, supra, that Hunter precludes constitutional challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment to annexations by municipal corporations of adjoining territories on the basis of the procedure employed or authorized by the state or because of the pecuniary repercussions in the form of the ordinary incidence of city taxation. It follows that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint herein.
In addition to the above, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed as to defendant City on the ground of res judicata. That is, "appellant must...
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