Deans v. Wilmington & W.R. Co.
Decision Date | 06 November 1890 |
Citation | 12 S.E. 77,107 N.C. 686 |
Parties | DEANS v. WILMINGTON & W. R. CO. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Civil action for damages tried before MACRAE, J., at March term 1890, of Wayne superior court. The issues were: (1) Was B. F Deans (the plaintiff's intestate) killed by the negligence of the defendant? (2) Did he by his own negligence contribute to his death? (3) What damage, if any, is the plaintiff administratrix entitled to recover? The plaintiff introduced the following evidence. W. A. Deans testified that Witness further testified as to the value of the life of the intestate. On cross-examination, the witness stated that P. Taylor testified: (Witness motioned by raising his hand towards the engineer who was looking out the window of his cab.) On cross-examination: Upon the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, his honor intimated that he would instruct the jury to find the first issue in the negative, and, in deference thereto, the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit, and appealed.
When a train running at the rate of about 20 miles an hour runs over a man, who could have been seen by the engineer at a distance of three-fourths of a mile, lying apparently helpless on the track, the question of the company's negligence is for the jury.
Aycock & Daniels, for plaintiff.
W. R. Allen and Isaac F. Dortch, for defendant.
AVERY J., (after stating the facts as above.)
When this court, in the case of Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N.C 312, adopted the rule laid down in Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. 545, that "notwithstanding the previous negligence of the plaintiff, if at the time when the injury was committed it might have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence on the part of the defendant, an action will lie for damages," it was thenceforth aligned with one of two classes, holding widely divergent views as to the effect of contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff, under certain circumstances, upon his right of recovery. That ruling has been expressly approved in a large number of later cases, and is now firmly grounded as a part of our system, in so far as it is distinct from that of any other courts where the common law of England prevails. Farmer v. Railroad Co., 88 N.C. 564; Turrentine v. Railroad Co., 92 N.C. 638; Aycock v. Railroad Co., 89 N.C. 321; Troy v. Railroad Co., 99 N.C. 298, 6 S.E. Rep. 77; McAdoo v. Railroad Co., 105 N.C. 140, 11 S.E. Rep. 316 ; Daily v. Railroad Co., 106 N.C. 301, 11 S.E. Rep. 320; Lay v. Railroad Co., 106 N.C. 404, 11 S.E. Rep. 412; Bullock v. Railroad Co., 105 N.C. 180, 10 S.E. Rep. 988; Carlton v. Railroad Co., 104 N.C. 365, 10 S.E. Rep. 516; Wilson v. Railroad Co., 90 N.C. 69. See, also, Weymire v. Wolfe, 52 Iowa, 533, 3 N.W. 541; Railroad Co. v. Kellam, 92 Ill. 245; Meeks v. Railroad Co., 56 Cal. 513; Kenyon v. Railroad, 5 Hun, 479. In those states where the very opposite view was taken, it was held that where one went upon the track of a railroad company at a point other than a crossing, where the public have a right of way, without special license, he was a trespasser and could not recover for any injury inflicted upon him through the negligence of such company's agents or employes, unless it was wanton. Mulherrin v. Railroad Co., 81 Pa. St. 366; Rounds v. Railroad Co., 64 N.Y. 129; Pennsylvania Co. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301; Donaldson v. Railroad, 21 Minn. 293; Beach, Contrib. Neg. § 67 et seq.; Express Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 434. In delivering the opinion in Manly v. Railroad Co., 74 N.C. 655, Justice BYNUM, foreshadowed by an intimation the subsequent adoption by this court, in Gunter v. Wicker, supra, of the principle stated in Davies v. Mann, and after it had been approved in so many well-considered opinions, it became apparent that it would be illogical and inconsistent to adhere to the rule laid down in Herring v. Railroad Co., 10 Ired. 402, or the interpretation generally given to Judge PEARSON'S language by the leading text-writers of this country. In that case, the engineer might have seen two little negroes who were lying on the track asleep, according to conflicting testimony, from 200 yards to a half-mile, before his engine reached them. He did not actually discover that the children, were asleep till he was within 25 or 30 yards of them. The testimony showed also that the train could have been stopped by the engineer within from 75 to 100 yards. The judge below charged the jury that the railroad company was not liable for the neglect...
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