Deaton v. Deaton, CA
| Decision Date | 25 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. CA,CA |
| Citation | 668 S.W.2d 49,11 Ark.App. 165 |
| Parties | Freemont DEATON, Appellant, v. Patsy Fay DEATON, Appellee. 83-137. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Charles P. Allen, West Helena, for appellant.
Douglas Anderson, Helena, for appellee.
In this divorce case the appellant alleges that the trial court erred in declaring the appellant's retirement fund to be marital property, in awarding a $1,200.00 attorney's fee, and in the manner the personal property was divided. We find no merit to any of the appellant's arguments, and therefore, we affirm.
Generally, the facts are not in dispute. Mr. Deaton has a retirement account with his employer, which the trial court found to be vested. There is scant evidence in the record concerning the retirement account, apparently because the appellant refused to furnish any information concerning the account. We cannot say that the trial court erred in finding the retirement account to be vested and that, therefore, it was marital property. The appellant argues that such benefits which are vested but not currently due and payable are not marital property, and cites as authority for that proposition Knopf v. Knopf, 264 Ark. 946, 576 S.W.2d 193 (1979), and Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595, 593 S.W.2d 21 (1980). However, on January 30, 1984, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984). In Day, the Court apparently overruled Knopf and Sweeney, and a number of other cases which were in accord with them. See Day, supra, (dissenting opinion). Therefore, we affirm the chancellor's finding that the plan constituted marital property, and that Mrs. Deaton was entitled to one half of it. The decree however, should be modified so as to provide that the value of her interest is fixed as of the date of the decree, and that any contributions made by Mr. Deaton after the date of the decree will increase his portion of the retirement account and will accrue only to his benefit. The appellant should also be required to maintain Mrs. Deaton as beneficiary on her half of the account. Because the case at bar was decided before the decision in Day, supra, and because of the pending litigation concerning the pension plan, this case must be remanded to the trial court so that the dollar amount of the appellees' interest can be fixed as of the date of the divorce decree.
The second point raised by the appellant is that the chancellor erred in awarding additional attorney's fees. He bases this argument on the fact that the appellee did not...
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