Deaton v. Dugger

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; BARKETT
• Citation: Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1993)
• Decision Date: 07 October 1993
• Docket Number: 77274,Nos. 73035,s. 73035
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Weekly S529 Jason Thomas DEATON, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, etc., Respondent. Jason Thomas DEATON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Page 4

635 So.2d 4

18 Fla. L. Weekly S529

Jason Thomas DEATON, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, etc., Respondent.

Jason Thomas DEATON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 73035, 77274.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 7, 1993.

Rehearings Denied Feb. 24 and May 2, 1994.

Michael J. Minerva, Interim Capital Collateral Representative, Martin J. McClain, Chief Asst. CCR, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, and Billy H. Nolas and Julie D. Naylor, Sp. Appointed CCR, Ocala, for petitioner, appellant/cross-appellee.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Diane Leeds and Joan Fowler, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, and Anita J. Gay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent, appellee/cross-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Jason Thomas Deaton appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief as to his conviction for first-degree murder and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. ¹ The State cross-appeals the trial court's grant of rule 3.850 relief as to Deaton's sentence of death and direction that a new penalty proceeding be conducted. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus, affirm the denial of the rule 3.850 motion as to Deaton's conviction, affirm the granting of the rule 3.850 motion as to Deaton's sentence, and remand this cause for a new sentencing proceeding in accordance with the trial court's judgment.

The Facts

Deaton was convicted and sentenced to death for first-degree murder. Testimony at trial revealed that Deaton and Kerry Hall conspired to abduct and murder the victim in order to obtain the victim's car and money. After the two had abducted the victim, Deaton strangled the victim with an electrical cord and placed the body in the trunk of the victim's car. Deaton and Hall, along with three teenage girls, then drove the car to Tennessee, where Deaton and Hall dumped the body in a well. Police subsequently spotted the victim's car and arrested Deaton and Hall, after which, in separate trials, both were found guilty of murder and Deaton was sentenced to death.

In Deaton v. State, 480 So.2d 1279 (Fla.1985), we affirmed Deaton's conviction and sentence. Deaton subsequently filed a rule 3.850 motion before the trial court and a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court. In the meantime, the governor signed a death warrant, which was stayed by the trial court pending an evidentiary hearing on the 3.850 motion. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief as to Deaton's conviction, but granted relief as to Deaton's sentence.

Deaton's Claims

In seeking relief as to his conviction, Deaton alleges that: (1) the jury should have been given an instruction regarding jurisdiction as an element of the crime for which he was charged; (2) Deaton's counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately investigate and prepare Deaton's defense and because he had a conflict of interest; (3) Deaton did not receive an adequate mental health examination; (4) Deaton was, in all likelihood, incompetent and should not have been allowed to stand trial; (5) the exclusion of taped statements made by codefendant Hall deprived Deaton of the right to present a self-defense defense; (6) Deaton's counsel was ineffective for failing to effectively litigate the suppression of statements made by Deaton; and (7) certain evidence that the State introduced was inadmissable and prejudicial. Deaton also raises a number of issues regarding the penalty phase proceeding in the event we find that the State's cross-appeal has merit.

In his first claim, Deaton contends that one of the factual issues at trial was whether the victim was killed in Florida or Tennessee and that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of Florida. According to Deaton, the jury was incorrectly instructed that venue had to be proved to a reasonable certainty when the jury should have been instructed that jurisdiction had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. He additionally asserts that this issue is not procedurally barred because jurisdiction cannot be waived and that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request an instruction on jurisdiction.

The State, on the other hand, asserts that jurisdiction was not an element that needed to be proved in this case, that jurisdiction was not raised as a defense, that an instruction on jurisdiction was not requested, and that no such instruction was necessary. Moreover, the State contends that this issue is procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal. In any event, the State asserts that the failure to receive an instruction on jurisdiction was harmless because sufficient evidence exists within the record to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was done or begun in Florida.

In Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022 (Fla.1980), we discussed the principles of jurisdiction when a factual question exists as to whether or not a crime was committed in Florida. There we stated:

We agree with the Supreme Court of Vermont which stated in State v. Harrington, 128 Vt. 242, 250, 260 A.2d 692, 697 (1969):

It is not essential to criminal responsibility that the accused do every act necessary to accomplish the crime within the jurisdiction where he is prosecuted.... Where the crime is composed of an interstate series of acts, it is jurisdictionally competent for a state to attach legal consequences to any overt act committed within its boundaries, even though the final impact and injury may occur elsewhere. [Citations omitted.]

This principle is more appropriate today than it ever was in view of the increased transient nature of our society. We recognize that this holding grants to the State of Florida broader jurisdiction than many of our other sister states, but we find it is allowed by the United States Constitution and has been directed by the legislature of this state. This broader jurisdiction nonetheless requires that the prosecution establish beyond a reasonable doubt that essential elements of the offense were committed within the jurisdiction of the State of Florida. In the instant case that would mean establishing either that the premeditation to murder the victim was formulated in the State of Florida or that the underlying felony, in this case the robbery, occurred in the State of Florida.

Under the instant circumstances, our holding that Florida has jurisdiction to try the appellant is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana in Conrad v. Indiana, 262 Ind. 446, 317 N.E.2d 789 (1974). In Conrad the formulation in Indiana of the premeditated design to effect the death of a victim coupled with a continuous course of action commenced in Indiana to carry out that purpose was held sufficient to give Indiana jurisdiction even though the fatal blows and death of the victim occurred in the State of Ohio.

388 So.2d at 1028. Additionally, we noted that the issue of jurisdiction is a factual one to be determined by a jury upon appropriate instruction, and we adopted the majority view that territorial jurisdiction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.

Under the facts in Lane, the State conceded its inability to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the fatal blow was struck in Florida, and the evidence indicated that the fatal blow or blows were probably struck in Alabama. However, the State argued that the evidence indicated that the crime was commenced in Florida. Although, as noted above, we did find that commencement in Florida was sufficient to support jurisdiction in Florida, under the facts in Lane, we found that the jury instructions given regarding jurisdiction were too general and that the jury must be given specific instructions regarding jurisdiction. Consequently, we remanded the case for a new trial.

In this case, a factual issue was presented as to whether the murder occurred in Tennessee or Florida. Deaton argued that the murder occurred in Tennessee as a result of self-defense. No instruction, however, was requested or given regarding jurisdiction. Instead, defense counsel requested and the jury received Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Crim.) 3.03 on venue:

Venue, it must be proved only to a reasonable certainty that the alleged crimes were committed in Broward County, Florida.

The State is obligated to prove the court's jurisdiction over the defendant. Lane. Upon the request of the defendant, the court should instruct the jury on jurisdiction when the evidence is in conflict on the issue. However, because no such instruction was requested and there was substantial evidence that the criminal acts at issue except the actual disposal of the body were done or begun in Florida, no error occurred in this case. Even though counsel's failure to request an instruction on jurisdiction could be characterized as ineffective, the evidence was such that if an instruction had been given, there is not a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Therefore, we reject this claim.

In his second claim, Deaton argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare a proper defense and because counsel placed himself in a position of conflict. During Deaton's trial, his counsel was advised of two witnesses who were willing to testify that they had seen the victim alive in Tennessee after the date on which the victim was purportedly murdered. Additionally, codefendant Hall contacted Deaton's counsel and provided him with a taped statement in which Hall stated that Deaton had killed the victim in self-defense. Based on these facts, Deaton contends that his counsel was...