DeBolt v. Espy, 93-4023

• Decision Date: 05 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-4023,93-4023
• Citation: 47 F.3d 777
• Parties: Suella DeBOLT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael ESPY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 777

47 F.3d 777

Suella DeBOLT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael ESPY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-4023.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 9, 1994.

Decided Feb. 15, 1995.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing

En Banc Denied May 5, 1995.

Kalpana Yalamanchili (briefed), Ohio State Legal Services Ass'n, Columbus, OH, and Gary M. Smith (argued and briefed), Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, New Philadelphia, OH, for plaintiff-appellant.

John S. Koppel (argued), Michael Jay Singer, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Appellate Staff, Civ. Div.; Edward Swaine, and Jonathan Weinberg (briefed), U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees.

Edward G. Kramer (briefed), Stuart Reich (briefed), Kramer & Tobocman, Cleveland, OH, for amici curiae.

Before: BROWN, KENNEDY and SILER, Circuit Judges.

BAILEY BROWN, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff in this case, Suella DeBolt, seeks a larger government-subsidized Sec. 515 apartment to house her growing family. To accomplish this end, she brought a class action against the Farmer's Home Administration ("FmHA"), claiming that its policies encouraged private developers to construct and maintain small apartments for the elderly over large apartments for large families in violation of the Fair Housing Act's prohibition against family status discrimination. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 3604, 3605, and 3608 (1989). She also claimed that the FmHA did not properly enforce its regulations concerning lease provisions and notices of termination. The district court denied the plaintiff's claims, and granted summary judgment for the FmHA. The plaintiff appealed. We conclude that the plaintiff is without standing to pursue all but one of her claims, and that this other claim is moot. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court.

I.

Under Sec. 515 of the Rural Rental Housing Program, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1485 (1989), the FmHA provides low-interest loans to private developers willing to build and manage rural housing for the elderly, handicapped, or the poor. The FmHA also provides rental assistance for some of this housing, paying a portion of the tenant's rent.

Beginning in 1986, the plaintiff lived with her two children in a Sec. 515 two-bedroom apartment at Village Green Apartments in Roseville, Ohio. She lived in an apartment for which she received rental assistance from the FmHA and paid only $11 per month in rent. In 1988, she had her third child, and in January of 1991, she had her fourth child. The landlord then attempted to evict her because, according to a lease provision, no more than four persons could live in her two-bedroom apartment. She challenged the eviction, arguing that her termination notice and the manner of its delivery violated federal law. She then brought this lawsuit against Village Green Apartments, several other private defendants, and the FmHA. Village Green agreed to let her stay in the apartment for another year while they attempted to negotiate a settlement. In December of 1991, the plaintiff had her fifth child. In January of 1992, she settled the case with the private defendants, dropped her claims against them, and moved out of her apartment.

The plaintiff maintained her action against the FmHA, however, claiming in essence that the agency's Sec. 515 housing policies favor the elderly at the expense of large families in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Specifically, she contends that the FmHA discriminates against large families by establishing incentives which encourage private developers to build small apartments where only the elderly and small families can live instead of large apartments where large families can live. ¹ The plaintiff argues that private developers, who covet Sec. 515 funding, respond to these incentives by invariably proposing small-apartment units, resulting in a glut of one and two bedroom apartments, and a dearth of three, four and five bedroom apartments. ² If we were to simply order the FmHA to restructure its lending practices and "level the playing field" between the elderly and large families, the plaintiff asserts that private developers will respond to the changed incentives by building larger apartments, and she and her family will have a Sec. 515 apartment in which to live.

In addition to this major claim, the plaintiff also contends that the FmHA violated its own regulations by not properly reviewing the plaintiff's notice of termination of her lease. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the FmHA failed to properly supervise its Sec. 515 landlords and promulgated an illegal model lease agreement which resulted in the plaintiff's being subject to a month-to-month lease instead of a year-to-year lease.

The district court denied the plaintiff's claims, reasoning that large families are not a protected class under the Fair Housing Act, and that the "[p]laintiffs simply have no right to public housing, and the FmHA is not obligated to finance or compel private developers to build large apartment units." Debolt v. Espy, 832 F.Supp. 209, 215 (S.D.Ohio 1993). With regard to the plaintiff's termination notice and lease provision claims, the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise the first issue, and that the second issue was moot because the FmHA had changed its model lease agreement. We will not address the merits of the plaintiff's claims because she lacks standing to pursue all but her last claim, and that claim is moot.

II.

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a court has no jurisdiction over a case when the plaintiff does not have standing. Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 758 F.2d 1086, 1092 (6th Cir.1985). Standing is determined by applying a three-part test: (1) has the plaintiff suffered a direct or imminent injury in fact? (2) is there a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, or was the injury caused by "the independent action of some third party not before the court?" and (3) is there a "likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision?" Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2297 2301, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). In order to bring a claim under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff need only fulfill the Article III standing requirements. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 366-67, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972). Thus, we have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim so long as she satisfies the three basic prerequisites of constitutional standing.

The plaintiff here is attempting to obtain Sec. 515 housing by directly challenging the allegedly discriminatory actions of the FmHA, even though private developers are responsible for proposing, constructing, renting, and managing these apartment complexes. The plaintiff alleges that once the FmHA's discriminatory incentives are removed, private developers will construct the large apartments necessary to house her family. She thus conceives the FmHA's policies as the root cause of her injury. This case is therefore analogous to those housing cases where a plaintiff challenges the discriminatory actions of the government, when in actuality a third party is responsible for building, maintaining, or approving the low-income housing the plaintiff desires. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir.1994); Jaimes, 758 F.2d 1086; Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 738 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.1984).

In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court set out what a plaintiff must generally show in order to establish standing in this type of case. In Warth, the plaintiffs argued that the town's zoning ordinances prevented the construction of low-income housing, and thus discriminated against minorities in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing, reasoning that their injuries did not result from the discriminatory practices of the town's zoning commission, but rather from the independent acts of developers and builders. Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-05, 95 S.Ct. at 2208. The Court stated:

Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they would have been able to [obtain housing] and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed.

Id. at 503, 95 S.Ct. at 2207. The Court further noted that even though two developers had attempted to build low income housing projects in the proscribed neighborhood, there was no showing that these projects "would have satisfied petitioners' needs at prices they could afford, or that, were the court to remove the obstacles attributable to respondents, such relief would benefit petitioners." Id. at 506, 95 S.Ct. at 2209.

In Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 758 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.1985), a case involving a challenge to the practices of the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), this court further expounded on the analysis set forth in Warth. The plaintiffs in Jaimes argued that the practices of HUD and the Local Housing Authority discriminated against minorities by concentrating public housing in minority areas and away from suburban areas. Id. at 1091. In denying the plaintiffs standing, we first noted that a plaintiff must show a likelihood or substantial probability that the defendant's policies caused his lack of housing and also that favorable action by the court would cure that lack of housing. Id. at 1095. We then held that in order to demonstrate this substantial probability, a plaintiff must generally show that a developer proposed a particular project in which the plaintiff would...