Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc.

Decision Date28 August 2009
Docket NumberNo. 06-1063.,06-1063.
Citation772 N.W.2d 1
PartiesElizabeth Chacey DEBOOM, Appellant, v. RAINING ROSE, INC., Chart Acquisition Corp., Charles Hammond, and Estate of Art Christoffersen, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Beth A. Townsend of Townsend Law Office, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.

Patrick M. Roby and Robert M. Hogg of Elderkin & Pirnie, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

STREIT, Justice.

Elizabeth DeBoom was fired from her job at Raining Rose, Inc. shortly after returning from maternity leave. She filed suit against the company alleging she was impermissibly fired because of her sex and pregnancy. After a defense verdict, DeBoom appealed alleging several deficiencies in the jury instructions. We hold the district court should have instructed the jury it could infer discrimination if it believed Raining Rose's proffered reasons for terminating DeBoom were a "pretext." Further, DeBoom was prejudiced by an erroneous definition of "determining factor" in the jury instructions. We remand for a new trial.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Elizabeth DeBoom began working for Raining Rose in May 2003 as the company's marketing director.1 A few weeks later, DeBoom informed Charles Hammond, the company's president, she was pregnant. Hammond asked DeBoom if she planned to return to work after the baby was born, and she said "yes." When Art Christoffersen, the chairman of the board of directors, learned of the pregnancy, he asked DeBoom if she was going to "be like all those other women who find it's this life-altering experience and decide to stay home." DeBoom assured him she was committed to the company. After being on bed rest for approximately two weeks, DeBoom gave birth to a son on January 12, 2004.

Prior to her maternity leave, DeBoom received favorable feedback regarding her work from her employers, especially Hammond. Hammond visited DeBoom after the baby was born and told her the company was eager to have her back. DeBoom returned to work part-time on March 11, 2004. She testified she had a massive list of projects to be completed. Hammond and Christoffersen gave DeBoom a work evaluation she missed due to her maternity leave. They told her she was doing a great job and gave her a 15% raise. DeBoom began working full-time on April 12. She was terminated on April 20. Hammond told DeBoom her position was being eliminated and she was no longer a good fit for the company. Hammond told DeBoom they were very frustrated she had not completed a major project which she began before maternity leave. He also expressed dismay she had sent "Butt Balm" to a radio deejay for a promotion because Raining Rose did not own the name and had no plans to market the product. According to DeBoom, Hammond told her she "wasn't catching up fast enough from the maternity leave and that they had begun to doubt whether [she] was still committed to [the] job." Hammond denied making that statement. Hammond offered DeBoom the opportunity to do free-lance work for the company, but she declined.

DeBoom filed a claim with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission alleging Raining Rose fired her because of her sex and pregnancy. After the Commission issued a right-to-sue letter, DeBoom filed this lawsuit in the district court.2 After both parties presented their evidence at trial, Raining Rose made a motion for a directed verdict, asserting DeBoom was not a member of a protected class (i.e., pregnant) at the time of her termination, and she did not present competent evidence to support an inference of discrimination or to support that the reasons given by Raining Rose for terminating her employment were pretext for discrimination. The motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Raining Rose. DeBoom filed a motion for a new trial alleging the district court made several errors with respect to the jury instructions. After the motion was denied, DeBoom appealed on the same grounds. Raining Rose responded the instructions were proper but even if they contained errors, the judgment for Raining Rose should be upheld because the district court should have granted the motion for directed verdict.

II. Scope of Review.

"We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict for correction of errors of law." Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 343 (Iowa 2006). A directed verdict is required "only if there was no substantial evidence to support the elements of the plaintiff's claim." Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Iowa 2005). Evidence is substantial when "reasonable minds would accept the evidence as adequate to reach the same findings." Easton v. Howard, 751 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2008). "Where reasonable minds could differ on an issue, directed verdict is improper and the case must go to the jury." Stover v. Lakeland Square Owners Ass'n, 434 N.W.2d 866, 873 (Iowa 1989).

"We review alleged errors in jury instructions for correction of errors at law." Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741, 748 (Iowa 2006). It is error for a court to refuse to give a requested instruction where it "correctly states the law, has application to the case, and is not stated elsewhere in the instructions." Vaughan v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 1996). Any error in the instructions given "does not merit reversal unless it results in prejudice." Wells v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Midwest, 690 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Iowa 2004). Jury instructions should be considered "in their entirety." Anderson v. Webster City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 620 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 2000). Reversal is warranted if the instructions have misled the jury. Id. Prejudicial error occurs when the district court "materially misstates the law." Id.

III. Merits.

Under the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, it is an "unfair or discriminatory practice" to discharge an employee "because of ... sex." Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2003). Similarly, it is unlawful for an employer to terminate the employment of a woman disabled by pregnancy "because of" her pregnancy. Id. § 216.6(2)(d). "[T]he legislature's purpose in banning employment discrimination based on sex was to prohibit conduct which, had the victim been a member of the opposite sex, would not have otherwise occurred." Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983).

This case was tried shortly after we held plaintiffs seeking damages under the Iowa Civil Rights Act were entitled to a jury trial. See McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394-95 (Iowa 2005). On appeal, DeBoom alleges the district court made four errors with respect to jury instructions. First, she contends the district court erred by refusing to give a "pretext" instruction, i.e., an instruction stating the jury may infer discrimination if it does not believe the employer's proffered reasons for the termination. Second, she claims the district court erred by refusing to give her requested instruction on inconsistent testimony. Third, DeBoom argues the instruction providing the elements of her discrimination claim impermissibly added unnecessary elements, including damages, to her burden of proof. And finally, she claims the instructions that defined "determining factor" were inconsistent and increased her burden of proof.

Raining Rose argues the district court's instructions were proper. Alternatively, the company claims DeBoom was not prejudiced even if the jury instructions were erroneous because Raining Rose was entitled to a directed verdict for two reasons: 1) DeBoom was not a member of the protected class (i.e., pregnant)3 when she was terminated and 2) she did not present substantial evidence to support an inference of discrimination or to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory explanation put forth by Raining Rose.

A. Pregnancy Discrimination.

The Iowa Civil Rights Act prevents an employer from firing an employee because of her sex or pregnancy. The general provisions provide "[i]t shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any ... [p]erson ... to discharge any employee ... because of ... sex...." Iowa Code § 216.6(1). Section 216.6(2)(d) deals with pregnancy directly: "An employer shall not terminate the employment of a person disabled by pregnancy because of the employee's pregnancy." Raining Rose contends DeBoom could not qualify for protection under Iowa Code section 216.6 because she was not pregnant at the time of her termination. Raining Rose also contends the district court should not have submitted DeBoom's case to the jury because she did not present substantial evidence to support a claim of discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) she was pregnant; (2) she was qualified for her position; and (3) her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 2005). The burden then shifts to the defendant "to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination." Id. at 15. "If the employer offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason the plaintiff must show the employer's reason was pretextual and that unlawful discrimination was the real reason for the termination." Id.

Raining Rose asserts DeBoom does not have a valid pregnancy claim because her status as a "new mom" is not part of the protected class of pregnant women. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir.1997) ("[Employee's] claim of discrimination based on [employee's] status as a new parent is not cognizable under the [federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act]."). While we agree the Iowa statute does not recognize a discrimination claim based on DeBoom's status as a new parent, we think there is substantial evidence linking DeBoom's termination to her pregnancy.

Although we have not yet determined whether the prohibition against termination of "a person disabled by pregnancy because of the employee's pregnancy" under Iowa Code section 216.6(2)(d)...

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