Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Our Lady of Lourdes Health Care Servs.
| Docket Number | BUR-L-1235-19 |
| Decision Date | 12 May 2023 |
| Parties | DEBORAH HEART AND LUNG CENTER, Plaintiffs, v. OUR LADY OF LOURDES HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC., d/b/a LOURDES HEALTH SYSTEM, and VIRTUA HEALTH, INC., and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
Argued Argument Waived
Theodora McCormick, Esq., Anthony Argiropoulos, Esq., and Robert Lufrano, Esq. appearing on behalf of Plaintiff Deborah Heart and Lung Center.
Jane Silver, Esq. and Seth Goldberg, Esq. appearing on behalf of Defendants Our Lady of Lourdes Health Care Services, Inc. and Virtua Health Inc.
Plaintiff, Deborah Heart and Lung Center (hereinafter "Deborah"), filed a Motion seeking summary judgment on the issue of liability for a variety of its claims asserted in this matter. Defendants, Our Lady of Lourdes Health Care Services, Inc. d/b/a Lourdes Health System (hereinafter "Lourdes"), and Virtua Health Inc. (hereinafter "Virtua"), opposed the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and subsequently each filed their own Motions for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss all of the Plaintiff's claims. Additionally, the Defendants have filed two separate Motions to Bar the expert reports of Dr. David A. Argue, Ph. D, and of Mr. James R. Peterson, CFA.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will DENY the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Lourdes' Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENY Virtua's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court will also DENY both of the Defendants' Motions to Bar the expert reports.
This matter arises from a breach of contract action in which the Plaintiff is alleging the Defendants breached several agreements. After conceding their claims related to a November 21, 2008, Letter of Intent, Plaintiff now asserts the Defendants breached the Master Partnering Agreement (hereinafter the "MPA"), and the Satellite Emergency Department Lease Agreement (hereinafter the "SED Lease") when Lourdes was acquired by Virtua from Lourdes' then parent company, Maxis health, which is a subsidiary of Trinity Health.
Deborah and Virtua were involved in separate litigation that has since concluded. An initial case in Mercer County, Deborah Heart and Lung Center v. Virtua Health, Inc., et al., MER-L-1865-11 (hereinafter the "Mercer Litigation"), was settled shortly after opening statements. The second case, Deborah Heart and Lung Center v. Virtua Health, Inc., et al., No. 11-cv-1290 (D.N.J.), involved a federal antitrust case in the District of New Jersey in which Plaintiff alleged a conspiracy by Virtua and a group of cardiologists, the Cardiology Group, P.A. ("CGPA"), to push Deborah out of the market and deprive patients of competing choices for advanced cardiac interventional ("ACI") procedures in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. Summary judgment was granted in Defendant Virtua's favor based on the arguments that exclusive relationships between health care providers, like its partnership with CGPA and like the former Deborah/Lourdes partnership at issue in this case, are not anti-competitive. Defendant Virtua relied upon an expert report stating that such "[e]xclusive relationships are common and often pro-competitive."
The case at bar was instituted on April 04, 2019, when Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint, seeking to enjoin the agreement between Defendants Virtua and Lourdes based on the three related agreements between Plaintiff and Lourdes. On May 24, 2019, the Honorable Paula T. Dow, P.J. Ch. denied Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. On or about June 03, 2019, Judge Dow entered an Order transferring this matter from the Chancery Division to the Law Division. Following the transfer, Plaintiff moved to amend its Complaint to add claims against Defendant Virtua. On January 24, 2020, this Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint with respect to its proposed claims for tortious interference and unfair competition and denied Plaintiff's motion with respect to its proposed claims for procurement of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and equitable disgorgement.
On February 02, 2020, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, alleging six counts against Lourdes for breach of contract and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and two counts against Virtua for tortious interference and unfair competition. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Lourdes breached the SED Lease, the MPA, and that it violated the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. In Counts III and IV of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "Section 1.5 of the MPA provides that 'during the Term . . . of this Master Partnering Agreement neither party shall enter into any arrangement, partnership or affiliation related in whole or in part to the provision, management, marketing and/or oversight of cardiology services in Burlington County.'" Plaintiff further alleges that "Defendant Lourdes knowingly violated Section 1.5 of the MPA by agreeing to be acquired by Virtua." In Counts V and VI of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant Lourdes knowingly violated Paragraph[s] 12.1.7 [and 9.1] of the SED Lease Agreement by agreeing to be acquired by Defendant Virtua."
In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges tortious interference with a contractual relationship and contends that "Deborah had a contractual relationship with Lourdes, by virtue of the November 21, 2008, LOI, the January 15, 2009, MPA, and the February 12, 2009, SED Lease Agreement" and "Virtua knowingly and intentionally induced Lourdes to breach its contractual duties when it acquired Lourdes."
In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges unfair competition against Virtua and contends that Virtua induced Lourdes' breach of the agreements and that doing so "is an unlawful method of competition, and a continuation of the plan to 'shutter Deborah' about which the Appellate Division spoke in its July 16, 2019, Opinion."
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 31, 2023, to which the Defendants jointly filed an opposition. Defendants also filed their individual Motions for Summary Judgment and both Motions to Bar on March 31, 2023. The Plaintiff objected to each of the Defendant's Motions.
The Discovery End date in this matter elapsed on February 3, 2023, and, after three trial date adjournments, trial is currently scheduled for May 31, 2023. The matter is currently four years and one month old and involved 1387 days of discovery. On May 9, 2023, the Court distributed a tentative decision on the motions which was subsequently accepted by all parties who then waived oral argument on the pending motions.
The admissibility of expert testimony is guided by N.J.R.E. 702 and 703. N.J.R.E. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Under N.J.R.E. 702, in order for an expert's testimony to be admitted:
(1) The intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the keen of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.
Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 355 (2005) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. 127 N.J. 404, 413(1992)); see also Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 24 (2008).
An expert must be "suitably qualified and possessed of sufficient specialized knowledge to be able to express [an expert opinion] and to explain the basis of that opinion." Agha v. Feiner, 198 N.J. 50, 62 (2009). "When the subject matter of the testimony falls distinctly within the province of a particular profession, the witness should generally be a licensed member of that profession." State v. Frost, 242 N.J.Super. 601, 615 (App. Div. 1990). "An expert should not be permitted to testify when he possesses neither professional expertise in the field that he has been proffered for nor facts that would raise his testimony beyond mere conjecture." SMR v. Fairlawn Board of Adjustments, 152 N.J. 309, 334 (1998).
N.J.R.E. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
N.J.R.E. 703 requires an expert "to give the why and wherefore" of his or her opinion rather than a mere conclusion. Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J.Super. 533, 540 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 374 (1996). Therefore, experts "must be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions, explain their methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology are scientifically reliable." Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417 (1992).
Particularly, they must relate their conclusions to generally accepted, objective standards of practice, and "not merely to standards personal to the witness." Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127, 131 (1968).
An expert's conclusion is inadmissible as a net opinion when it is a bare conclusion unsupported by factual evidence. Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524 (1981); see also ...
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