DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.
• Citation: DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13 (R.I. 2005)
• Decision Date: 14 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2004-31-Appeal.,2004-31-Appeal.
• Parties: Maria L. DeCAMP v. DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC., et al.

875 A.2d 13

Maria L. DeCAMP v. DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC., et al.

No. 2004-31-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 14, 2005.

Michael F. Drywa, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Michael A. Gamboli, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Maria L. DeCamp (plaintiff), appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (Dollar Tree), and the plaintiff's supervisor, Kenneth Braz (Braz) (collectively defendants), dismissing the plaintiff's suit, which alleged employment discrimination based upon her sex and her disability. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the entry of summary judgment on the claim of sex discrimination and affirm the entry of summary judgment on the claim of disability discrimination.

I Facts and Travel

Before plaintiff's employment, Dollar Tree investigated Braz, a district manager, after it received several complaints about his improper treatment of employees in late 1999. Dollar Tree regional human resource manager Karen Dravenstott (Dravenstott) testified in her deposition that she verbally counseled Braz about his treatment of women because Dollar Tree was on notice that Braz treated women differently.¹ Dollar Tree hired plaintiff as a store manager in May 2000. Braz was plaintiff's supervisor for her entire tenure with Dollar Tree. In answers to interrogatories propounded by defendants, plaintiff chronicled multiple incidents of inappropriate treatment by Braz.²

In September 2000, Braz warned plaintiff in front of another employee not to dress "like a bum." She believed that he targeted her specifically because she previously had worked for a competitor of Dollar Tree. The plaintiff wore slacks and shoes, rather than jeans and sneakers, to work; she was the only person of forty-five employees dressed so formally.

In October 2000, Braz asked plaintiff what she was doing. When she responded that she was working, Braz said "that remains to be seen." When she asked why he spoke to her in that manner, he replied, "Only to you because you deserve it."

Also in October 2000, plaintiff, after notifying the store opener ahead of time, arrived thirty minutes late to work because she had a doctor's appointment. When she arrived at work, Braz told her to get her "s___ together" and that managers were not allowed to be late. After he learned that plaintiff had cleared her late arrival with another employee, Braz demanded to know why she had gone to the doctor. Braz repeated this request until plaintiff admitted that she had gone for a mammogram.

Also in October 2000, plaintiff, who was scheduled to work at 12:30 in the afternoon, arrived at 12:15. Braz accused her of being late. When he learned that she was not scheduled to begin her shift until 12:30, Braz contended that she should come to work a half-hour before her shift. During the rest of her shift Braz verbally harassed plaintiff and rushed her through her dinner break.

Later in October 2000, plaintiff was having trouble balancing the registers at the end of her shift. Braz repeatedly yelled at her because she was adding the checks too slowly. After plaintiff told Braz to add the checks himself, he replied "If I wanted to do it myself, I would not have hired you." The plaintiff then inadvertently hit the clear button as she added up the checks. Braz responded by pounding his fist on the desk and screaming at her to get out of the store. When Braz locked the door behind her after she left, plaintiff realized she had left her keys in the store. Locked out and waiting to get her keys, plaintiff was joined outside by a coworker who asked whether she was alright. After the two spoke, Braz called plaintiff back into the store. He proceeded to yell at her for telling the coworker his business, told her she was unprofessional, again told her she needed to get her "s____ together," suggested that she "rethink" her position with the company, and advised her that she needed to relax. The plaintiff replied that she could not relax with someone yelling at her, and she began to cry. Braz then attempted to console her by telling her she was a good manager with a bright future in the company, and also attempted to joke around and make light of the situation.

When the store's bathroom facilities flooded in November 2000, plaintiff was unable to seek authorization to hire a plumber because she did not have the home office's phone number. The plaintiff could not call another store to get the number because Braz was using the phone, so she proceeded to do other work in the store. Braz then asked plaintiff whether she had called for authorization; she said she had not because he was on the phone. In front of coworkers and customers Braz told plaintiff that "anyone with half a brain could've gotten that done by now" and screamed that he would do it himself.

In December 2000, Braz kicked over a register full of money in the back office in front of plaintiff and another coworker. After the coworker ran from the office crying, Braz ordered plaintiff to clean up the money. While plaintiff picked up the money on the floor, Braz stood over her and laughed.

In late December 2000, plaintiff sought medical treatment. A psychiatrist diagnosed her with a major depression, which in his opinion was "related to a demanding, abusive and deteriorating relationship with her immediate supervisor." He treated her symptoms with individual psychotherapy and a prescription for Paxil. The doctor concluded that plaintiff's symptoms had cleared and that she could return to work for an employer other than Dollar Tree on June 14, 2001.

Soon after beginning treatment, plaintiff called Dravenstott in human resources to complain about Braz's behavior. Dravenstott then conducted "a thorough field investigation" of Braz. The investigation revealed some general negative comments about Braz's treatment of associates; it uncovered no documentation of mistreatment of females specifically. In her deposition, Dravenstott acknowledged that, in the course of her investigation into plaintiff's complaint, she did not ask other employees about Braz's treatment of plaintiff. After this investigation, Braz attended three to four hours of antidiscrimination training.

Dollar Tree initially granted plaintiff six weeks of medical leave. During that leave, plaintiff and Dravenstott discussed plaintiff's future with Dollar Tree. The plaintiff testified in her deposition that she suggested different solutions that would have allowed her to return to work.³ Dravenstott informed her that her leave expired on February 2, 2001, and that when she returned to Dollar Tree she would be working for Braz. The plaintiff followed her doctor's instructions and did not return to work. Dollar Tree sent plaintiff a letter dated February 6, 2001, informing plaintiff that her failure to return to work was being considered a "voluntary resignation."

The plaintiff first filed a discrimination claim with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights. After waiting the requisite period of 120 days pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-5-24.1, plaintiff brought an employment discrimination lawsuit against defendants in Superior Court, based on the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, G.L.1956 chapter 5 of title 28, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L.1956 chapter 112 of title 42.⁴ She alleged that Braz's inappropriate treatment constituted sex discrimination, and Dollar Tree's decision to terminate plaintiff while she was on medical leave constituted disability discrimination. After the completion of discovery, defendants brought a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion justice granted the motion and dismissed both the sex discrimination and disability discrimination claims.⁵ The plaintiff appeals, claiming the motion justice erred with respect to each discrimination claim.

II Analysis

This Court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standards as the motion justice. Ritter v. Mantissa Investment Corp., 864 A.2d 601, 604 (R.I.2005). Rule 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." We will review this evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritter, 864 A.2d at 604. That nonmoving party then must prove "`by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Id.

A Employment Discrimination in Rhode Island

The State Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) prohibits an employer from either discharging an employee or discriminating against an employee with respect to "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" based on that employee's sex or disability. Section 28-5-7(1)(i), (ii). One of the ways the statute defines disability is "any physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of an impairment, or is regarded as having an impairment by any * * * employer." Section 28-5-6(4).

The statute further defines "[m]ajor life activities" as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Section 28-5-6(4)(ii). FEPA further prohibits an employer from refusing "to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise, or business." Section 28-5-7(1)(iv).

The Civil Rights Act of 1990 (R...