Dechon v. Dechon, 08-94-00125-CV

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
Citation909 S.W.2d 950
Docket NumberNo. 08-94-00125-CV,08-94-00125-CV
PartiesJohn Francis DECHON, Appellant, v. Dorothy Adele DECHON, Appellee.
Decision Date26 October 1995

Don Studdard and Jeffrey T. Weikert, Studdard & Melby, P.C., El Paso, for Appellant.

C. Jeff Minor, Semko & Minor, P.C., El Paso, for Appellee.

Before LARSEN, McCLURE and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

McCLURE, Justice.

This is an enforcement and clarification suit from a property settlement agreement entered incident to a divorce granted in 1971. Appellee, Dorothy Adele Dechon ("Dorothy"), filed a motion in the trial court in 1993 seeking enforcement of the property settlement agreement and clarification of one of its provisions. Appellant, John Francis Dechon ("John"), contested personal jurisdiction through a special appearance. Hearing was had on Dorothy's special appearance which was overruled by the trial court. The cause was then tried to the bench and the trial court entered judgment granting all relief sought by Dorothy.

In Point of Error No. One, John complains that the trial court erred in overruling his special appearance as he is a resident and domiciliary of Nevada and therefore not amendable to process issued by a Texas Court. In his second point of error, John complains that the trial court exceeded its authority to enforce and clarify the parties' property settlement agreement by entering an order which impermissibly modifies and changes the division of the parties' military retirement benefits agreed to in their 1971 divorce decree. Alternatively, he argues that even if the trial court's interpretation of the parties' settlement agreement did not constitute an impermissible modification, that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that the parties intended to divide John's gross benefits as opposed to his net benefits. In his third and final point of error, John complains that the trial court erred by applying a ten-year statute of limitations rather than a two-year statute of limitations in its award of an arrearage judgment to Dorothy for sums due under the property settlement agreement, all in contravention of Section 3.70(c) of the Texas Family Code. 1 We affirm the judgment as modified.

SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

On November 4, 1971, the Court of Domestic Relations of El Paso County signed a final decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between John and Dorothy. The decree approved and incorporated a property settlement agreement executed by the parties pertaining to the division of their community estate, including the parties' military retirement benefits. The agreement states in relevant part:

I.

[John] shall have and receive as his sole and separate property and estate the following:

. . . . .

d. One-half of any benefits received by [John] of whatsoever kind or nature as a result of [John]'s service in the Armed Forces of the United States, [John] to see that [Dorothy] promptly and timely receives the other one-half. Ownership interest shall be fifty percent (50%) to each of the Parties as to whatever sum such benefit might be now or hereafter. Vouchers will be promptly provided upon request to verify the amount of benefits.

e. One-half of any benefits received by [Dorothy] of whatsoever kind or nature as a result of [Dorothy]'s service in the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

. . . . .

II.

[Dorothy] shall have and receive as her sole and separate property and estate the following:

. . . . .

d. One-half of any benefits received by [Dorothy] of whatsoever kind or nature as a result of [Dorothy]'s service in the Armed Forces of the United States, [John] to credit such amount against payments to [Dorothy] as provided in Paragraph I.d herein. Ownership interest shall be fifty percent (50%) to each of the Parties as to In July 1977, John left El Paso and moved first to Louisiana and then to Las Vegas, Nevada. He has continued his residency and domicile in Nevada since 1989. John's last physical presence in Texas occurred in August 1977.

whatever sum such benefit might be now or hereafter, vouchers to be promptly provided upon request to verify the amount of benefit.

Between 1971 and 1981, John performed his obligations under the property settlement agreement. In 1981, however, John ceased payment of that portion of his military retirement benefit awarded Dorothy. 2 On March 30, 1993, Dorothy filed her First Amended Motion for Clarification of Prior Order and for Enforcement of the settlement agreement. Following service of citation, John filed a special appearance pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 120a asserting that he was not amendable to process issued by a Texas court because he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Texas for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction; alternatively he argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because the jurisdictional requirements of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (Supp.Pamphlet 1995) (the "Act") were not satisfied under the facts of the case at bar. 3

On August 20, 1993, the trial court conducted a hearing on John's special appearance and entered an order overruling the special appearance on October 1, 1993. John then filed his Answer to the Motion for Clarification of Prior Order and for Enforcement and reiterated his challenge to the trial court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction.

Prior to trial, Dorothy filed her Second Amended Motion for Clarification of Prior Order and for Enforcement (the "second amended motion"). Trial was had to the bench. The only factual issues presented were whether the property settlement agreement constituted an agreement to divide gross benefits or net benefits, and the issue of Dorothy's recovery of attorney's fees. The legal issues presented dealt with whether a two-year or ten-year statute of limitations applied to Dorothy's recovery of arrearages, and whether cost of living increases could be awarded.

The parties entered into various agreed stipulations relating to the amounts owed by John depending on the usage of net or gross benefits and the application of the two- or ten-year statute of limitations. The court heard evidence of the parties' intent regarding the division of benefits when they entered into the agreed property settlement. Ultimately, the trial court entered an order applying the ten-year statute of limitations and granting Dorothy her requested relief based upon John's gross benefits, awarding her a judgment in the sum of $106,020 plus prejudgment interest of $29,333.94, for a total judgment of $135,353.94. John duly requested and obtained findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court. From the order, John has perfected this appeal.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Whether a trial court is vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate a cause is an issue A trial court has inherent power to clarify or enforce its previously entered decree. Spradley v. Hutchison, 787 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.70 (Vernon 1993). Such jurisdiction encompasses both subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute and personal jurisdiction over the parties originally affected by the decree. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.70(a). Furthermore, it is established law in Texas that a trial court may have jurisdiction over a party as to one issue and lack jurisdiction as to another. In the Interest of S.A.V. and K.E.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 83-84 (Tex.1992) (holding that court may have jurisdiction over child custody and visitation yet not have jurisdiction over support and visitation expenses).

of law. While the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon an appellate court if supported by sufficient evidence, its conclusions of law are not binding. Instead, we are free to draw our own legal conclusions. County of El Paso v. Ortega, 847 S.W.2d 436 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1993, no writ); Muller v. Nelson, Sherrod & Carter, 563 S.W.2d 697 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1978, no writ). Moreover, a trial court's conclusions of law are always reviewable de novo. Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The record reflects that the first amended motion sought an order which, whether intentional or inadvertent, omitted the offset from John's payment obligation equal to one-half of the benefits received by Dorothy with regard to her own military service. As such, the first amended motion apparently sought a modification rather than a clarification of the original property settlement agreement. 4 At the time of the hearing on John's special appearance, the trial court lacked both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over John for purposes of Dorothy's motion for clarification. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(4). Nevertheless, the trial court did obtain both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over John to enforce the original divorce decree and property settlement agreement. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.70(a). Therefore, in light of John's generic special appearance which contested the trial court's jurisdiction as to "the entire proceeding," rather than contesting jurisdiction as to the modification only, we find that the trial court was correct in overruling John's special appearance. 5 Any error as to jurisdiction was ultimately cured through the timely filing of Dorothy's second amended petition, which reinserted the previously omitted offset. Accordingly, at the time of the entry of judgment, the trial court possessed jurisdiction as to both the enforcement and clarification actions. Point of Error No. One is overruled.

CLARIFICATION NOT TANTAMOUNT TO MODIFICATION

The first sub-part of John's second point of error contends that the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the terms of the original property settlement agreement. Enforcement of the division of property...

To continue reading

Request your trial
40 cases
  • Chandler v Chandler, 8
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 15 Abril 1999
    ...are governed by the law of contracts, not by the law of judgments. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984); Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, no writ). If a contract is unambiguous, the courts will give effect to the intention of the parties as e......
  • Chandler v. Chandler
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • 15 Abril 1999
    ...are governed by the law of contracts, not by the law of judgments. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, no writ). If a contract is unambiguous, the courts will give effect to the intention of the parties as ex......
  • Marriage of Reinauer, Matter of, 07-96-0013-CV
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • 13 Marzo 1997
    ...... Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, no writ). And, if for nothing else, § ......
  • Appraisal Review Bd. of El Paso v. Fisher, 08-01-00223-CV.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • 17 Octubre 2002
    ...court's conclusions of law are not binding on the reviewing court; instead, we are free to draw our own legal conclusions. Dechon v. Dechon, 909 S.W.2d 950, 954-55 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ). A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable under the de novo standard. Walker v. Packe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT