Decina v. Horry Cnty. Police Dep't

Decision Date24 August 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 4:19-cv-02079-JD-KDW
Parties Kristen DECINA, Plaintiff, v. HORRY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT and Amos Berry, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Amy Suzanne Lawrence, Justin Michael Lovely, The Lovely Law Firm, Myrtle Beach, SC, James Bernice Moore, III, Scott Christopher Evans, Evans Moore LLC, Georgetown, SC, for Plaintiff.

Amanda Kurzen Dudgeon, J.W. Nelson Chandler, James Matthew Johnson, Chandler and Dudgeon, Charleston, SC, for Defendants.

ORDER & OPINION

Joseph Dawson, III, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court with the Report and Recommendation ("Report and Recommendation" or "Report") of United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West made in accordance with § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) of the District of South Carolina.1 Kristen Decina ("Decina" or "Plaintiff") brought this case alleging a 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim against officer Amos Berry ("Berry") for False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution and other State law claims against Horry County Police Department ("HCPD") (Berry and HCPD collectively "Defendants") after she was arrested for domestic violence charges on January 22, 2018. (DE 57, pp. 1-3.) Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment contending inter alia that Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails because Plaintiff's arrest was made pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant supported by probable cause. (DE 57, p. 4.) Moreover, Defendants further contend that Berry is entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff's alleged constitutional violation claims. (DE 57, p. 4.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation and grants the DefendantsMotion for Summary judgment.2

BACKGROUND

A full recitation of Plaintiff's allegations is set forth in the Report, which the Court adopts. However, given the objections raised by Plaintiff and for the sake of brevity, the following summary of facts is sufficient for the matters addressed herein.

In the early morning hours of January 6, 2018, a physical domestic dispute occurred when Brandon Atkinson ("Atkinson") came to Decina's home despite her warning him that he was not welcome. (DE 57, p. 2.) As a result, Decina sustained damage to inter alia her front door, vehicle, and person. (DE 57, p. 2. DE 42, p. 1.) Decina called Horry County 911 around 1:46 a.m. and then twice more later in the morning. (DE 57, p. 2.) As a result, Berry was dispatched to her home around 9:00 a.m. that day, met with Decina and observed her injuries and damage, and then met with Atkinson. (DE 57, p. 2.) Atkinson admitted to causing damage to Decina's property, and to grabbing Decina to calm her down. (DE 42, p. 5.) However, Atkinson also reported that Decina bit him on the chest while he was grabbing her. (DE 42, p. 7.) Additionally, Berry testified Atkinson stated that "[Decina] threw a knife" and that there "was a weapon [sic] involved." (DE 57, p. 7. DE 42, p. 7.) Based on his investigation, Berry pursued an arrest warrant for both Decina and Atkinson.3 Thereafter, Berry emailed his case reports, the two warrant request forms, and photographs of Decina and Atkinson's injuries to Horry County Magistrate's Office on January 6, 2018, because he would not be on duty the following day. (DE 57, p. 7.)

As a result, Officer Deneane Pennington ("Pennington" or "Officer Pennington") appeared and presented the two warrants to the Horry County Magistrate Judge ("County Magistrate"). (DE 57, p. 8.) Pennington also testified that she handed Berry's investigative reports to the County Magistrate. Though Officer Pennington could not positively state that the County Magistrate read the reports, she testified that she presented the reports to him prior to the execution. The County Magistrate signed the warrant on January 22, 2018, and Decina was arrested for Second Degree Domestic Violence. However, she was later released on a $5,000.00 bond and her charges were eventually dismissed during her preliminary hearing because the State took no position on the matter. (DE 42, p. 10. DE 57, p. 13.)

Plaintiff contends that she was falsely arrested because inter alia there was no probable cause to support the arrest warrant and the County Magistrate erroneously relied on unsworn information in the investigatory report to establish probable cause. (DE 57, p. 4.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Berry is not entitled to qualified immunity because he deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a material misrepresentations or omissions in his warrant application. The Report recommends granting DefendantsMotion for Summary Judgment because Berry had probable cause to arrest her and he is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation and grants DefendantsMotion for Summary Judgment.

DISCUSSION

1234 Although Plaintiff has filed an objection to the Report (DE 59), to be actionable, objections to the Report and Recommendation must be specific. Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the district judge. See United States v. Schronce , 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984). "The Supreme Court has expressly upheld the validity of such a waiver rule, explaining that ‘the filing of objections to a magistrate's report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues -- factual and legal -- that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute. " Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 416 F.3d 310, 315 (2005) (citing Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (emphasis added)). "A general objection to the entirety of the magistrate judge's report is tantamount to a failure to object." Tyler v. Wates , 84 F. App'x 289, 290 (4th Cir. 2003). "Likewise, a mere restatement of the arguments raised in the summary judgment filings does not constitute an "objection" for the purposes of district court review." Nichols v. Colvin , 100 F. Supp. 3d 487 (E.D. Va. 2015). In the absence of specific objections to the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, this court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis , 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).

Plaintiff makes the following "objections" to the Report, which the Court will discuss seriatim. First, Plaintiff contends that the Report improperly resolved three disputed issues of fact in favor of Berry rather than Decina, and the Report failed to address that Berry was disciplined for unlawfully arresting Decina. Accordingly, Plaintiff identifies three statements in the Report that are conclusions by the Magistrate regarding whether Berry omitted key facts from his warrant affidavit that would have negated probable cause and whether Barry's conduct entitled him to qualified immunity.4 Although the record reveals that Plaintiff does not contest that the alleged omitted facts were in fact present in Berry's investigatory report and that the report was sent to the County Magistrate's office along with the warrant form, Plaintiff argues that the Report assumes that the County Magistrate read the information before executing the arrest warrant.5 Moreover, Plaintiff concedes this objection was already raised in his opposition to DefendantsMotion for Summary Judgment and ultimately rejected by the Report. See DE 59 p. 2 ("For each of these factual conclusions contained within the Report and Recommendation the Plaintiff has provided direct or circumstantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude otherwise." (emphasis added)). "Restatements of the arguments raised in the summary judgment filings does not constitute an "objection" for the purposes of district court review." Nichols v. Colvin , 100 F. Supp. 3d 487 (E.D. Va. 2015). Since Plaintiff has offered nothing new on this issue, the Court overrules this objection because it is non-specific.

5 As to Plaintiff's claim that the Report fails to address that Berry was actually disciplined for making an unlawful arrest of the Plaintiff, this objection is equally non-specific because it is not a factual issue at the heart of the dispute between the parties. Plaintiff filed her lawsuit alleging inter alia false arrest which was predicated on an arrest warrant issued by a County Magistrate not a warrantless arrest by Berry. "The magistrate should determine probable cause based on all of the information available to the magistrate at the time the warrant was issued." State v. Dupree , 354 S.C. 676, 684, 583 S.E.2d 437, 441 (App. 2003). "An arrest warrant is invalid only if the officer preparing the affidavit included a false statement with reckless disregard for its truth and, after that statement is redacted, ‘the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause.’ " Cahaly v. Larosa , 796 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2015) ; citing, Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). Accordingly, disciplinary actions by HCPD against Berry, if any, are immaterial to Decina's false arrest claim because her false arrest claim is predicated on the information available to the County Magistrate when the warrant was issued not whether, in hindsight, Berry misapplied State law or if Decina was guilty of criminal domestic violence. See Cahaly , 796 F.3d at 408 ; citing , Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536-37, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014) ("Even if that determination was wrong as a matter of law, officers may have probable cause to arrest based on "reasonable mistakes of law.").6 Thus, as Plaintiff has not forecasted any material facts in dispute, the Court is unmoved by Plaintiff's objection.

6 Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Report's finding that Berry is entitled to...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT