Deckard Realty & Development v. Lykins

• Decision Date: 15 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 53A01-9707-CV-227,53A01-9707-CV-227
• Citation: 688 N.E.2d 1319
• Parties: DECKARD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Chad LYKINS, Tony Erzen, Josh Long & Marc McDonald, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1319

688 N.E.2d 1319

DECKARD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Chad LYKINS, Tony Erzen, Josh Long & Marc McDonald,

Appellees-Defendants.

No. 53A01-9707-CV-227.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 15, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 11, 1998.

Herbert L. Kilmer, Bloomington, for Appellant-Plaintiff.

John M. Irvine, Student Legal Services, Bloomington, for Appellees-Defendants.

OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

Appellant-plaintiff Deckard Realty & Development (Deckard) appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees-defendants Chad Lykins, Tony Erzen, Josh Long and Marc McDonald (tenants). Specifically, Deckard argues that the trial court improperly determined that Deckard's knowledge of the address of one of the tenants, which was written down by Deckard's employee four months before the commencement of the lease, was sufficient notice of the tenants' forwarding addresses under Indiana's Security Deposits Statute. ¹

FACTS ²

On April 3, 1995, the tenants, who were students at Indiana University, submitted an application to rent a house from Deckard. At that time, the lease agent for Deckard wrote down the address of one of the tenants, Tony Erzen, and placed it in the rental file. The next day, the tenants entered into an agreement with Deckard to lease the house from August 2, 1995, to July 31, 1996. The lease was secured by an $850 deposit. On August 1, 1995, the tenants took possession of the house.

During an inspection of the premises on June 11, 1996, Deckard discovered that marijuana was being grown throughout the house. After contacting the Bloomington Police Department, Deckard left the tenants a note, informing them to vacate the premises immediately. The tenants moved out of the house on June 13, 1996.

Approximately three months later, on September 6, 1996, Deckard filed a complaint against the tenants in small claims court, requesting $2,582.26 for damages, clean-up, court costs and unpaid rent. Deckard then successfully served each of the tenants with its complaint at Erzen's address. Thereafter, the tenants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Deckard was precluded from collecting damages and was required to return their security deposit because it did not deliver a written notice of the itemized damages to be deducted from their security deposit within forty-five days of the termination of the lease, as required by Indiana's Security Deposit Statute. In response, Deckard argued that the tenants never provided written notice of their forwarding addresses. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the tenants' motion for summary judgment and ordered Deckard to return their $850 security deposit. Deckard now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The sole issue presented for our review is whether Deckard's knowledge of Erzen's address, which was written down by Deckard's employee four months before the commencement of the lease, was adequate notice of the tenants' forwarding addresses under Indiana's Security Deposit Statute. According to Deckard, this notice was insufficient because the tenants failed to provide the address in writing or for the purpose of mailing them a list of itemized damages and the remainder of their security deposit.

Initially, we note our standard of review. In reviewing the propriety of the grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Watters v. Dinn, 666 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Once the movant presents pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or affidavits showing that he is entitled to summary judgment, the non-movant must set forth specific facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We resolve any doubt as to any fact, or inference to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Id.

Pursuant to IND.CODE § 32-7-5-12, a landlord may retain a tenant's security deposit to pay for accrued rent, damages suffered by the landlord as a result of a tenant's noncompliance with the law or the rental agreement and unpaid utility or sewer fees which are chargeable to the tenant. In order to retain the deposit or make a claim for other damages, however, the landlord must provide the tenant with an itemized list of the damages claimed and the remainder, if any, of the security deposit within forty-five days of the termination of the rental agreement and delivery of possession. I.C. §§ 32-7-5-12(a)(3) and 14; Chasteen v. Smith, 625 N.E.2d 501, 502 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). Failure to provide such notice within forty-five days constitutes an agreement by the landlord that no damages are due. I.C. § 32-7-5-15. In such a situation, the landlord is prohibited from making a claim for any "other damages" and must return the entire security deposit to the tenant. Id.; Duchon v. Ross, 599 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ind.Ct.App.1992).

We recently examined the rationale behind this forty-five day notice requirement in Raider v. Pea, 613 N.E.2d 870 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). In Raider, we noted that the notice requirement, as a time limitation, protects tenants from unreasonable delays by their landlords in resolving claims against their security deposits. Id. at 872. Further,...