Decker v. Kanous' Estate
| Decision Date | 21 December 1901 |
| Citation | 129 Mich. 146,88 N.W. 398 |
| Parties | DECKER v. KANOUS' ESTATE. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Genesee county; Charles H. Wisner, Judge.
Proceeding to settle the estate of Olive Kanous, deceased. From a decision in the probate court allowing the claim of Caroline Smith (now Caroline Decker) against the estate, Jonathan Kanous, the administrator, appealed to the circuit court where claimant again recovered judgment, and the administrator brings error. Reversed.
Brown & Farley, for appellant.
R. C Johnson and George R. Gold, for appellee.
The claimant, on appeal from an allowance by the probate court recovered a judgment against the estate of $416 for services rendered in the care of the deceased in her lifetime. The claimant is the daughter of the deceased, and the evidence shows that she and her mother had lived together for many years in the homestead, that some time before the decease of Olive Kanous, she gave the the claimant a life lease of the 15 acres of ground upon which the house stood, and that some 5 years before her decease a guardian was appointed over the estate of Olive Kanous. The family relations continued the same. There is no evidence of any express contract on the part of the deceased to pay of the care and services claimed to have been rendered. On the contrary, it is undisputed that claimant has stated that there was no such express contract and much of the undisputed testimony goes further, and tends to show that there never way any understanding that claimant should be paid for her services. But, in our view, the strength of the appellant's case rests in the fact that there is no sufficient testimony to show that the minds of the parties ever met upon any contract, express or implied. There is testimony from a number of witnesses to the effect that Olive Kanous stated during her last sickness, and after a large portion of these services had been rendered, that Caroline should have her pay for staying with her. There was testimony tending to show that the purpose of giving this life lease was to compensate Caroline for her services, and that the deceased stated that she had supposed that the life lease was a warranty deed, giving to Caroline the right to dispose of the property. But a careful examination of the record indicates that all that was said by deceased was entirely consistent with the idea that the compensation was to be a compensation for kindness shown by Caroline in remaining at home, and such a substantial bounty as a parent is at times moved to confer upon one of the children to the exclusion of the others. There is nothing in the record which shows that Caroline at any time expected that she was to be compensated for her services at the time the services were performed. It is true, one witness undertakes to say that Caroline was in the room at one time when deceased stated that Caroline was very good to her and took good care of her, and that she ought to have her pay, and that there was enough to pay her, and that she should have her pay. But the cross-examination of this witness demonstrates that she did not understand at the time that Caroline heard the conversation, and the record is barren of any testimony that she did. There is nothing, therefore, to show that...
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